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ABSTRACT 
A search of literature shows that most writings on business alliances focus their attention 
on alliance inception and the resultant benefits from them, and largely ignore how 
cooperating relations between actors develop with the passage of time. 
In contrast, the main aim of the thesis is to examine the concept of phased development in 
alliances. Associated objectives are to establish if stages can be identified as alliances 
progress and whether it is possible to distinguish change points when the alliances advance 
from one phase to another and to determine characteristics at the time. 
Exploratory and inductive qualitative methods are utilised in this study and a conceptual 
framework constructed using a number of methodologies. In the first instance early 
conceptualisation is built upon a review of supply chain alliance literature and secondary 
data from one research site. 
Data gathering, observation and interviews continue in parallel with the introduction of a 
second field site. This presents the opportunity to apply an inductive approach and allows 
themes to emerge empirically from field research. Finally, secondary data from a third 
alliance helps to test and refine the previous findings. 
Case studies with the research sites from different industrial sectors provide the grounds to 
explore, describe and analyse the interactions and processes of three alliances. 
The main finding of this thesis is a framework for progressive relationship development in 
supply chain alliances which is presented in six notional stages, for convenience termed 
Prelude, Purpose, Process, Plateau, Progress and Parting. 
The thesis builds on and reinforces existing research to provide insights into evolutionary 
alliance development as well as contributing to practice, by equipping managers with a road 
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According to many academics, there seems to be a shift in supply chain relationships from 
adversarial to more cooperative associations (see for example Kanter 1994; Spekman et al 
1998; see also chapter 1.1.4, page4). Because of intense competition, companies are 
changing the focus of their attention from firm versus firm to supply chain versus supply 
chain (Christopher 1992). This is the background to companies' decisions to invest in 
cooperative exchange relations, through the medium of strategic alliances. 
For an organisation seeking to enter a new market and in response to competitive 
challenges, a strategic alliance is a mechanism for retaining flexibility that offers an 
alternative to mergers or acquisition. Such associations enable companies to extend 
knowledge boundaries in terms of pooled resources and skills (see also chapter 1.1.4). 
In the best circumstances, cooperative relationships allow access to a wide range of 
technologies, resources, expertise and knowledge. Closer, non-adversarial relations 
between customers and suppliers offer the possibility of gaining competitive advantage. 
Concord is based on the principle that both parties are likely to benefit more by working 
together, rather than alone. It is an all embracing philosophy that focuses on long-term 
objectives and growth, rather than gaining the lowest price through opportunistic 
behaviour. 
In an era where, in many instances, firms no longer compete individually and competition 
is between supply chains,, to acquire competitive edge it is essential to understand how 
technology, time and costs impact on products and services. This requires that customers 
and suppliers share accurate information to allow faster and more flexible responses to 
changing market requirements. Bettering the processes at the interface between 
organisations can improve efficiency, reduce time to market and lower costs. Adopting 
such cooperative strategies means that buyers and suppliers work towards a common goal 
based on the premise that each party can gain more by cooperating than by pursuing self- 
interest. 
i 
Although the notion of cooperation and its importance to competitiveness is generally 
appreciated, managers often have difficulty understanding the architecture of their supply 
chains. This, coupled with the challenge of modifying adversarial behaviour, creates 
stumbling blocks to successful alliances. 
Strategic alliances can be categorised by degrees of ownership. Full equity alliances 
involve mergers or acquisitions, whereas partial ownership alliances comprise joint 
ventures and non-equity alliances are cooperative agreements between trading partners. 
This study is concerned with the latter category, and the customer and supplier relations 
which are the primary focus of alliance improvement efforts (see chapter 1.1.2). 
Creating, developing and maintaining an alliance is a difficult task and there has been 
considerable rhetoric in literature regarding the benefits to customers and suppliers, of 
cooperative strategies. A great deal of academic research has been conducted into 
companies' motivation in forming alliances and the eventual outcomes of such coalitions. 
However, research has tended to ignore developmental aspects of the inter-organisational. 
exchange, preferring to emphasise the requirements necessary to begin an alliance and the 
conclusions at the end of it. 
This neglect means that the effects of joint learning and the complex dynamics between 
allies have been overlooked. Literature review has indicated, that although there have been 
a number of evolutionary process or lifecycle models describing alliance development, 
these are fragmented in terms of academic discipline. They are often only conceptual in 
nature, with each describing varying numbers of stages and different criteria within each 
such stage. 
In order to address this gap the aim of the thesis is to contribute to and build upon previous 
researck by considering further the notion of a phased development in business 
alliances. 
ii 
The reader is asked to forgive the use of interchangeable terms, for example, alliances and 
partnering, which mean the same thing; similarly in the case of collaboration and 
cooperation. Cooperative agreements between customers and suppliers are also given a 
variety of different names including, among others, collaboration, partnering, business 
alliances, networks, co-makership and preferred suppliers. Despite such terminological 
diversity, the over-riding principle is that teamwork and cooperation are only successful 
when all parties to the agreement are committed to common goals and provide mutual 
support. 
Methodology 
Three alliances in unrelated industrial sectors, namely Drinks and Packaging, 
Microelectronics and Oil and Gas supply services, were studied during the period from 
1991 to 2000. 
An inductive, interpretive methodology was considered the best technique to understand 
alliance development in the first place by obtaining knowledge from secondary data and 
observation and then by focusing on the personal experiences of managers directly involved 
in the process. 
Secondary data and literature were the main sources of material from which the early 
conceptual framework emerged. Themes elicited through interviews and observation 
contributed the re-definition of the framework. Secondary data, from a third research site 
was used to test and also further re-define the conceptual model. Case studies provided a 
detailed chronological description of how the three alliance developed. 
iii 
Thesis Contribution 
This thesis endeavours to enrich alliance theory by providing a deeper awareness of the 
alliance development process. The work also emphasises the role of teamwork in 
developing new capabilities and alliance management skills and presents evidence to show 
that innovation is the result of network links and learning. 
The study aims to contribute to managerial practice by demonstrating the significance of 
evolutionary development in alliances. It may therefore serve as an important contribution 
to research into change management by helping managers to navigate a route through the 
alliance maze. 
Appreciation of the evolutionary process has the potential to help alliance managers to 
intervene by showing interacting individuals how to recognise behavioural signals that 
presage a slow down. Timely intervention means that problems are addressed and resolved 
more easily; often with unexpectedly innovative outcomes. 
A further potential contribution of the work is the significance of alliance learning, so that 
managers may confidently use this new knowledge to build new alliances and achieve 
business objectives more quickly. 
This thesis also has the possibility to contribute to policy by demonstrating that, in order to 
improve the possibilities of alliance success, individuals must be supported and encouraged 
to learn new skills through education and continuous professional development. This is 
influenced by the extent to which the organisation sees the alliance as a significant strategic 
tool. 
iv 
Overview of Dissertation Structure 
CHAPTER AIM OF CHAPTER 
1. Development of Contemporary Strategic Alliances To outline and evaluate literature appertaining to 
strategic alliances 
2. Process Models of Inter-Organisational Exchange To evaluate a number of process models of inter- 
organisational exchange and orgai-iisational renewal 
To set out the main research objective 
3. Methodology To set out the philosophical context and 
methodological approach undertaken in this study 
4. Findings- Part I To explain the exploratory phase of this study by 
describing in detail the development of the early 
conceptual model 
To describe Killeen's alliance relationship with IDV 
5. Findings- Part 11 To address the emerging framework 
To describe the development of the Supply Chain 
Alliance 
6. Findings-Part III To describe the continued conceptual development 
To describe the Sun Birkbys alliance 
7. Discussion- Part I To review the case studies described in chapters four 
to six and discuss the main themes drawn from the 
findings chapters 
To address the research questions 
8. Discussion- Part 11 To continue the discussion by evaluating the findings 
relative to academic literature 
To present the final framework derived from this 
study 
9. Conclusions To discuss the factors identified in the study in 
relation to alliance evolution 
To review the research questions in the light of the 
foregoing discussion 
To present the theoretical and practical contribution 
Table 0.2: Overview of Dissertation Structure 
Chapter One: Literature Review 
The literature review is divided into five sections, linking supply chain literature and 
cooperative management practice with economic theories that support the alliance concept. 
The aim of Chapter One is to consider forms of inter-organisational cooperation and to 
describe the alliance concept and its philosophy. The literature review evaluates the 
importance of writings related to teamwork, learning, innovation, networks, and trust. 
Chapter Two: Process Models and Organisational Renewal 
This chapter elaborates on various process models, conceptual and empirical, summarises 
the models and explains how they differ. The discussion continues with the relevance of 
organisational renewal and dissolution in the alliance context. Finally the main research 
objective and research questions are set out. 
Chapter Three: Methodology 
This chapter provides background literature justifying the qualitative research strategy. It 
describes the research design and process, methods of data collection and analysis, as well 
as how the data has been interpreted and presented. Limitations of the methodological 
process are also outlined. 
Chapters Four To Six: Findings 
These chapters clarify how the conceptual framework was derived. Chapter four gives an 
account of the IDW Killeen alliance. Chapter five, describes the Shell, Seaforth and ARRC, 
Supply Chain Alliance. After each case study, the conceptual framework is reassessed in 
the light of the findings. Chapter six, relates the development of the Sun Microsystems and 
Birkby's alliance. Secondary field data provided the opportunity to test the framework. 
vi 
Chapter Seven: Discussion Part I 
This chapter reviews the case studies described in chapters four to six and specifically 
addresses the research questions. It discusses cases in relation to the conceptual framework 
and presents propositions drawn from the data. Reasons why the cases are similar and 
dissimilar, are considered and the transition between phases is described. Research 
questions are addressed in detail in this chapter. 
Chapter Eight: Discussion Part 11 
This chapter considers the evolutionary process of alliance development. It assesses 
whether the dominant characteristics in the conceptual framework agree with relevant 
literature. It establishes whether findings from the study have been corroborated by past 
research. It presents a framework of progressive relationship development in business 
alliances. 
Chapter Nine: Conclusions 
The aim of this chapter is to advance the general discussion concerning the evolutionary 
development of alliances. Answers to the research questions are reviewed and the realities 
of cooperation are summarised. The study's potential contribution to theory and practice 




1.0 DEVELOPMENT OF CONTEMPORARY STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to outline and evaluate literature appertaining to strategic 
alliances. 
The objective is to: - 
" consider forms of inter-organisational cooperation 
" describe the alliance concept and philosophy 
" describe the underlying motives for entering into strategic alliances 
consider theoretical perspectives 
evaluate the importance of inter-organisational teams to alliances 
reflect on learning, networks and trust literature in relation to strategic alliances 
1.1.2 DEFINMONS 
According to Whipple and Gentry (2000: 301), there is a marked shift from adversarial to 
more cooperative supply chain relationships. These relatively new forms of relationships 
have been referred to as partnerships (Johnston and Lawrence, 1988; Anderson and 
Narus, 1990), partnering (Macbeth and Ferguson 1994), networks (Miles and Snow, 
1986; Thorelli 1986), and strategic alliances (Heide and John, 1990; Day 1994). They are 
usually characterised by longer-term and closer working associations between suppliers 
and buyers (e. g. Heide and John 1990; Ellram. and Carr 1994). 
Strategic alliances are defined by Varadarajan and Cunningham (1995: 283) as 
"manifestations of inter-organisational cooperative strategies which entail the pooling 
of specific resources and skills by the cooperating organisations in order to achieve 
common goals, as well as objectives specific to the individual partners. " Similarly, 
Parkhe (1998: 3) describes strategic alliances as, "relatively enduring interfirm 
cooperative arrangements, involving flows and linkages that use resources and / or 
governance structuresftom autonomous organisations, for the joint accomplishment of 
corporate goals linked to the mission of each sponsoringfirm. " 
I 
Heide and Stump (1995) suggest that the basic assumption made by firms entering into a 
strategic alliance is that cultivating such relationships will enhance some aspect of 
performance (cited in Whipple and Gentry 2000: 301; see also Mohr and Spekman 1994; 
Ellram & Carr 1994). 1 
According to Contractor (1986: 78) business alliances are a form of vertical quasi- 
integration and occur when each partner contributes by adding value to one or more 
elements in the chain from raw materials procurement, production and finally distribution 
to the end consumer. Various degrees of interfirm cooperation he somewhere between 
the extremes of complete vertical integration, to circumstances in which production and 
distribution are owned by separate businesses contracting with one another. The optimal 
middle position for many companies is somewhere between full integration and a purely 
contractual relationship (ibid: 78). 
Strategic alliances are categorised by degrees of ownership. First, full equity alliances 
involve mergers or acquisitions; whereas partial ownership alliances include joint 
ventures and lastly, non-equity alliances are cooperative agreements between trading 
partners (Varadarajan and Cunningham 1995). At one extreme, a strategic alliance 
between two firms can encompass all of the functional areas, and at the other end of the 
spectrum, the association may be limited in scope to a single functional area or value 
activity (Varadarajan and Cunningham 1995). 
This is consistent with the emerging consensus that a number of inter-organisational 
cooperative arrangements fall into the domain of strategic alliances with varying degrees 
of flexibility (see for example Spekman et al 1998). According to Varadarajan and 
Cunningham (1995: 284), alliances not involving shared equity are less rigid and, when 
unstable market conditions prevail, are easier to revise, reorganise, or terminate than 
those that involve shared equity. 
Despite such diversity, the over-riding principle is that teamwork and collaboration is 
only successful when all parties are committed to common goals and support each other 
(for example see Best 1990: 125; see also Monczka and Trent 1993; Wageman 1997). 
2 
Such arrangements involve sharing risks and rewards (Ellram 1991), cooperation 
(Spekman 1988), preferred supplier status and flexible negotiations (Bailly and Farmer 
1988; Rainnie 1991), purposeful strategic relationships (Mohr and Spekman 1994), 
blurred boundaries (Kanter 1994), and new organisational paradigms (Macbeth and 
Ferguson 1994: 229). Other literature identifies commitment, coordination, 
interdependence and trust as qualities important to strategic alliances (see for example 
Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, Williamson, 1985, Sako 1992). 
1.1.3 DEVELOPMENT OF CONTEMPORARY BUSINESS ALLIANCES 
The fuel shortage during the oil crisis of 1973-74, which had a knock on effect on other 
raw materials, focused attention on the importance of purchasing. However, it was not 
until Porter (1980) identified the role of buyer and supplier as two of the "five forces", 
that the strategic importance of suppliers and buyers received due recognition in 
literature (Ellrarn and Carr 1994: 11). 
The 1980's saw the emergence of new attitudes regarding purchasing although real 
changes in business terms were limited. By the 1990's, the role of the buyer had gained 
acceptance as being significant to a firm's success (Ellram and Carr 1994: 11). 
The world-wide recession in the late 1980's and early 1990's, forced businesses to look 
at adding value and reducing costs generally. This resulted in large scale redundancy 
programmes euphen-dstically termed "down-sizing". The aim was to identify savings, 
through quality improvement initiatives and inventory reduction and managers were 
obliged to look at new ways of adding value (Ellram. and Carr 1994: 11). 
Evidence of the spread of close inter-organisational links between manufacturers and 
suppliers has been used as proof that difficult economic circumstances lead buyers and 
suppliers to re-examine business dealings with one another and shift from traditional 
adversarial relations to more cooperative ways of working (Womack 1990; Sako 1992; 
Lamming 1993: 185; Macbeth and Ferguson 1994: 7; Bresnen 1996; Whipple and Frankel 
2000). 
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1.1.4 ALLIANCE CONCEPT AND PHILOSOPHY 
Traditional forms of competitive tendering are characterised by 
" contracts awarded mainly on the basis of price 
" absence of strategic and operational linkage between buyer and supplier 
" win-lose transactions 
* mutual suspicion 
* opportunism 
(see for example, Imrie and Morris 1992; Macbeth 1994; Bresnen 1996) 
In contrast, a new philosophy of inter-organisational cooperation has emerged (Imrie and 
Morris, 1992), the philosophical underpinnings of which are based on the TQM work 
inspired by the example of Japanese economic planners in the late 1940's, tasked with 
reconstruction of Japan's shattered economy. W. Edwards Deming argued that firms 
should work more closely with fewer suppliers, thereby enabling clearer and less 
ambiguous communication. The principal benefit of good supplier relations, is the 
synergy resulting from organisations working together and resolving common problems, 
in order to achieve mutual goals (See for example, Deming 1986, Morgan and Hunt, 
1994; Wilson 1995). 
Continuous innovative effort, joint learning and developing customer and supplier core 
capabilities, could result in upgrading of product quality, development of new 
applications, and enhancement of the cooperating organisations' competitiveness in the 
market place (Dodgson 1991; Hamel 1991; Karnoe 1996; Madhock 1996). 
According to Mohr and Spekman (1994: 135), the motivation behind formation of 
strategic alliances is to gain competitive advantage. Varadarajan and Cunningham 
(1995: 284) argue that inter-organisational cooperation can be realistically viewed as 
strategic only if it enables the cooperating firms to achieve competitive advantage in the 
marketplace. Varadarajan and Cunningham (1995: 284) continue by stating that, although 
the term "strategic alliance" is used to describe close cooperation between customers 
and suppliers, such relations are operational more often than not and cannot, at this level, 
create sustainable competitive advantage (refer to chapter 9.3). 
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That is, the main purpose underlying cooperation between organisations may be either 
strategic, for example entry into a new market domain, or operational, involving 
streamlining operations or logistics processes (Sheth and Parvatiyar 1992). 
Ellram and Carr (1994) list the following significant advantages of alliances to 
customers: - 
" easier management of the supply base 
" reduced time searching for new suppliers by tender 
" increased supplier loyalty and reliability 
" increased attention to common problems 
" improved quality as a result of supplier knowledge and his involvement in design 
" reduced inventory through information sharing and joint forecasting 
" more stable supply prices due to long term partnering 
Cooperative practices have also been linked to strategic purchasing techniques such as 
Just in Time (JIT), Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), Internet Technology and Total 
Quality Management (TQM). These benefit the supplier in terms of improved scheduling 
and capacity planning and are based on the premise that long term orders mean lower 
prices for the buyer (Erridge 1993: 41, see also Angeles 2000; Tucker and Jones 2000). 
All these endeavours help to create the confidence essential for investment in plant, 
equipment, people and training (Cherrett 1994: 9; see also Boddy et al 1998). The logic 
of linking each step of the process, as materials and products move closer to the 
customer, is based upon the principles of optimisation (Christopher 1992: 187. See also 
Christopher 2000). The goal is to improve customer service whilst simultaneously 
minimising costs and freeing up assets in the logistics pipeline (Christopher 1992: 187). 
Shared design costs, on-time deliveries, and improved quality, together with faster 
product and service are as vital for the buyer as his security of supply (Christopher 
1992: 189). Similarly Monczka and Trent (1993) link business alliances with higher 
quality, improved delivery, lower costs and less duplication of effort (see also Hendrick 
and Ellram 1993; Kanter 1994). 
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Others (for example Mohr and Spekman 1994) point out that alliances enable firms to 
access new technologies and markets by providing a wider range of products and 
services. This creates economies of scale in terms of joint research and / or production, 
allowing access to knowledge beyond the firm's boundaries and the sharing of 
complementary skills (Varadarajan and Cunningham 1995; McFarlan and Nolan 1995). 
Related to this, is the desire of many firms to affiliate with a partner possessing 
sophisticated information capabilities (Whipple and Gentry 2000). 
On the most part, allies do not rely on legal contracts, but depend on trust that has been 
developed through working closely for a period of time (see for example Sako 1992). 
Both begin the relationship for maximum commercial advantage, based on the principle 
that teamwork is better than conflict (Cherrett 1994: 8). Although literature on the 
subject mostly emphasises dramatic aspects of buyer-supplier relations, in practice 
however, achievements in the early stages may be much more modest (ibid. 8). 
Traditionally, purchasing has been grounded on the importance of negotiating unit price. 
Now, other factors, often hidden, such as the cost of holding inventory or stock, lost 
production time, inadequate innovation and development, and administration and process 
costs, are identified as being much more important than price (e. g. Frazier et al, 1988; 
Monczka and Trent 1993; Chadwick and Ragagopal 1995). 
Assessing costs is only half the task, as benefits have to be quantified as well, which can 
be even more challenging and difficult (Cherrett 1994: 10). Total cost reduction, meeting 
profit targets and improving competitive position are somewhat easier to measure than 
"softer" values. For example the fostering of good relations and the success of the 
process itself, are intangible benefits that have considerable competitive potential 
(ibid: 10). To ensure that the benefits of the alliance are fully realised, dealing with 
suppliers must be monitored and all costs taken into account (Chadwick and Rajagopal 
1995: 98). 
The work of cross-functional teams is fundamental in all such strategic objectives (e. g. 
Cammish and Keough 1991; Cohen 1994; Wagernan 1997; Chen 1999). Forniing 
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business alliances with suppliers is not an end in itself but is rather a means of increasing 
competitiveness and enhancing quality. It is not a panacea for the fundamental problems 
of marketing and production and certainly not a soft option (Chadwick and Rajagopal 
1995; Thompson, Mitchell and Knox 1998). 
1.1.5 LOGISTICS AS A MECHANISM FOR CHANGE 
The concept of integrated logistical management, whereby the flow of information as 
well as materials between source and user are continuously coordinated and managed as 
a process, is now well understood (Christopher 1992: 187). The logic of linking each 
interfacing step and moving materials and products closer to the customer, is based upon 
principles of optimisation (ibid. 187). In other words, the goal is to simplify the supply 
chain, to improve customer service and total quality, whilst simultaneously minimising 
costs and freeing up assets in the logistics pipeline (ibid. 187). (see also Christopher and 
Towill 2000; Evans and Jukes 2000) 
The objective is to look for opportunities to simplify and combine these steps in the 
supply chain, by bringing together separate groups of people performing related tasks 
and by reducing paperwork (Christopher 1992: 193). 
For a business to compete and survive in the global market place, it has to be supply 
chain oriented (Christopher 1992: 197). For companies suffering from poor performance, 
this means nothing less than a move away from a functional towards a process 
orientation (ibid. 197). This involves restructuring the organisation so that cross- 
functional work flows create an information network (ibid. 197). Supplier integration 
must happen upstream as well as downstream, in the case of distributors and customers 
(ibid. 197). (see also Christopher and Towill 2000; Evans and Jukes 2000). 
The nature of logistics and supply chain management has dramatically changed as a result 
of new information technology systems. Information is now the catalyst forcing 
companies to revolutionise their dealings with customers and suppliers. It is no longer 
possible to conduct business in a vacuum, free from involvement with other 
organisations. Lack of planning discipline means that instructions to suppliers, revised at 
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short notice, will result in schedule instability as well as higher costs due to the change- 
overs, additional set-ups and shorter production runs (see for example Angeles 2000; 
Tucker and Jones 2000). 
An organisation is part of a wider supply chain and it cannot develop a strategy for 
competitive advantage by seeking to solely optimise its own internal efficiencies. Real 
competitive advantage is only achieved when the supply chain as a whole, is more 
efficient and effective than competing supply chains (Christopher 1992: 200). However, 
few recognise how extreme a paradigm shift is required to reap the benefits of waste 
reduction, improved performance, flexibility and innovation (Macbeth 1994: 215). 
1.1.6 JAPANESE INFLUENCES 
Dyer and Ouchi's (1993: 53) research into relations between suppliers and manufacturers 
in the automotive industries in the Unites States and Japan, concludes that the key 
characteristics of Japanese Supplier Partnering QSP) are as follows: - 
e Long-term relations and commitment, with frequent dialogue and planning, reduces 
transaction costs and eliminates inefficiency 
" Attention to cost and quality which reduces total cost in the value chain, not just unit 
costs. 
" Willingness to make significant joint investments in plant, equipment and superior 
personnel. 
" Improved performance benefits both parties equally as a result of regular sharing of 
valuable technical and cost information. 
" Building trust, by introducing practices such as stock owning, and staff exchange and 
by maintaining consistent goals. 
According to Dyer and Ouchi (1993) JSP's realise the following economic benefits: - 
Fewer direct suppliers; which in itself reduces costs of production and transactions. 
Site specific, physical and human capital investments creates commitment, by making 
the parties to the alliance interdependent. 
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Forces competition by building-in substantial incentives for suppliers to continue to 
innovate. 
Imai et al's (1985: 340) study of major Japanese companies, describes product 
development as "a dynamic and continuous adaptation to changes in the environment". 
It points to three features of product development, namely self-organising teams (i. e. 
autonomy given to groups to define their own activities), overlapping phases and finally 
commitment to continuous learning. Product development groups face challenges 
collectively rather than in the isolation of distinct specialist departments. Information is 
shared across functional boundaries, a common language. is developed and 
responsibilities are shared 
Imai et al (1985: 340) also identifies "an almost fanatical devotion to learning, both 
within the organisation and by members outside, but involved with the inter- 
organisational network". 
To enhance the capabilities of suppliers, parent companies established kyoryokukai or 
informal associations of cooperative part makers, constituted by informal understandings 
(Best 1990 155-156). Imai et al (1985) describes this process as "Sharing network 
norms". Formal and informal associations between parent and supplier firms become the 
means of transferring organisational innovation. For example, Just in Time, Zero Quality 
Defects, Single-Minute Change of Die Cutter, all required consultation and coordination 
across producing units. 
Best (1990: 166) described this new competition in Japan as being Schumpeterian 
because firms compete strategically by choosing the terrain of competition on the basis of 
price, product quality, technological process or product innovation. It is Penrosian, 
according to Best (1990: 166), in that the firm is a learning organisation, continuously 
creating new productive services by teamwork and experience. 
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1.1.7 FACTORS NECESSARY FOR SUCCESSFUL ALLIANCES 
Literature elaborates on the following important factors that contribute to the success of 
business alliances. 
Commitment. Commitment is considered a huge influence in stimulating innovation 
(see Ford and Rasson 1982; Ghemawatt 1991; Giancarlo 1999). Commitment is a 
measure of the importance of a relationship in terms of the inputs that each party is 
prepared to make to it. Or to put it another way, commitment is the degree of tolerance 
one party is prepared to offer the other when dealing with problems (Hardwick and Ford 
1986: 5; see also Morgan and Hunt 1994). 
Trust. Exploring the usefulness of trust, Driscoll (1978: 44-54) attributes participation in 
decision making, as an explanation for satisfaction at work. An outcome of his study is 
that trust predicts overall satisfaction with the organisation, more so than taking part in 
decision making. Regardless of an individual's degree of involvement, or the fit between 
desired outcomes and participation, people who haye greater trust in an organisation, 
seem to be more satisfied with their own role in it (see also Barney 1991; Barney and 
Hansen 1994; Bidault and Jarillo 1997; Giancarlo 1999; also chapter 1.5). 
Sako (1992: 37-39) identifies three types of trust. Contractual, competence and goodwill 
trust. 
o Contractual trust describes trading partners who adhere to a specific written 
agreement, uphold ethical standards, keep promises and protect commercial secrets. 
* Competence trust is the expectation that a trading partner will perform his role 
competently. 
* Goodwill trust refers to mutual expectation of commitment. The key to goodwill 
trust is that although trading partners may use their initiative, they will refrain from 
taking unfair advantage. Both goodwill trust and contractual trust imply the absence 
of opportunistic behaviour (ibid. 37-39). 
Other factors that build commitment and trust and contribute to successful alliances are, 
informal communication, measures to identify continuous improvement and well defined 
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structures that cross organisational boundaries and develop individual and organisational 
learning (Boddy et al 1998). Management commitment, clear objectives, mutual goals 
and availability of adequate resources to carry out the task, have also been cited as 
important (e. g. Ellram. and Edis 1996; Whipple and Frankel 2000). 
Choosing partners - appropriate supplier selection. The selection of an alliance 
partner, and whether he can be seen as a long-term collaborator, is perhaps the decision 
most critical to success (Dodgson 1991: 12). It takes a long time to develop a common 
language and procedures, bearing in mind that the business environment is ever changing. 
Because of this, the customer should be attracted to a particular supplier, not for what he 
can currently offer, but rather for his future development potential (ibid. 12 ; see also 
Ellram and Edis 1996; Hitt et at 2000). 
Tenbrunsel et al (1999) echo this by stressing the need to examine the process of partner 
selection and the influence that relationships may have on the partner selection. They, 
compared the matching process when relations could influence the partner selection 
decision, with a matching process when relationships could not influence this decision. 
Their findings showed that when relations were not allowed to influence the process, the 
resulting agreements were more economically optimal. The rational for this proposition 
was that, during the course of negotiations and interviews, potential partners implicitly, 
or explicitly, discussed commitment to each other and this might have been at the 
expense of the market and the association in the longer term. 
Lei and Slocum (1991) counter the above by suggesting that some of the most successful 
alliances are those that have an extended courtship period before the venture is created. 
Complementary skills. Hamilton's (1990) research in the US biotechnology industry 
found that both new and existing firms readily joined forces in search of complementary 
assets. However, although new firms possessed desirable technology and knowledge 
skills, they tended to lack the management and marketing expertise that firms of longer 
standing possessed (see also Ellram and Edis 1996; Miller and Shamsie 1996; Osborn 
and Hagedoorn 1997). 
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Bakker and Nichols (1994: 15) emphasised the complementary skill reasoning. Managers 
need to be aware of core competencies and capabilities available within the company and 
should anticipate the skills needed to succeed in the new business. Managers must judge 
the "critical mass" of competencies that is going to be necessary for joint development by 
both companies. 
Cooperative cultures. Culture is not a characteristic of individuals, but a collection of 
individuals who share common values and the extent to which these values are held can 
influence the implementation of a business alliance (see for example Fiol 1991; Hastings 
1993; Lowndes and Skelcher 1998). Slocum and Lei (1993: 295) state that the wide 
proliferation of alliances of varying degrees of sophistication, makes it necessary for 
senior management to understand the importance of organisational cultural factors. 
Alliances require partners to respond quickly to change whereas mechanistic, 
bureaucratic structures respond too slowly. Control through common values must 
therefore increase. 
Brouthers et al (1995: 20) suggest that the key to creating cooperative cultures is an 
understanding of the concept of symmetry, i. e. when collaborating firms are of an 
equivalent size, when they have comparable financial resources and have similar internal 
working environments (see also Brouthers and Brouthers; 2000). 
Compatible goals. Mismatch, in terms of strategic goals, is the most common cause of 
failed alliances. Clarity of focus is vital. Ambiguous, fuzzy direction, and uncoordinated 
activities are also reasons for the failure of cooperative ventures (see for example Lynch 
1991; Mahoney 1992; Yan and Zeng 1999). Khan (1996) suggests that partners can 
establish common goals through a process of inter-departmental integration. 
Commensurate risk is needed to glue the strategic alliance together (see for example Das 
and Bing-Sheng 1999). If nothing is at risk then there is little incentive to cooperate 
(Brouthers et al 1995: 22). 
Performance measurement. Organisations, used to traditional purchasing techniques, 
often find it difficult to accurately determine performance. They are accustomed to 
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recording savings achieved, versus price inflation and fail to map out their processes to 
make it possible to identify cost drivers. Although balance sheets may show an 
apparently satisfactory profit, waste that needs to be removed is not pin pointed. In fact, 
price inflation can only be kept under control through continuously challenging 
specifications, simplifying supplier logistics, and changing product design (Cammish and 
Keough 1991: 37, see also Ittner and Larcker 1996; Glaister and Buckley 1998). 
1.1.8 FACTORS IN UNSUCCESSFUL ALLL4, NCES 
According to Boddy et al (1998), alliancing requires a culture shift. It is not just a 
process but a behavioural change and must be evaluated by means of a formalised 
monitoring structure. If this does not happen, the initiative is likely to fail. Threats to 
stable alliances can come from two main directions, internal changes in one of the 
organisations, or a major change that shifts the focus of attention away from the alliance 
in general (see for example Murray and Mahon 1993). Other factors concerning alliance 
failure have been cited, such as differences in the goals of the parties, unequal benefits 
and costs, conflicts over decision-making, decline of resource contribution (see for 
example Dymsza (cited in Contractor and Lorange 1988: 403424). 
The following section reflects on theoretical perspectives for understanding strategic 
alliance formation. 
1.1.9 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 
A number of theoretical perspectives have been advanced to explain the motives 
underlying the entry of firms into strategic alliances, the conditions under which strategic 
alliances are likely to be formed and the types of strategic alliances (see for example 
Kogut 1988; Varadarajan and Cunningham 1995). 
One of the most difficult decisions that some managers have to make is whether to make 
or buy. The issue of what to make and what to buy is very much a strategic decision 
requiring full executive backing and clear communication. It should be taken from a 
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position of well-developed supplier relationships with clear awareness of cost and 
capability (Chadwick 1995: 89) 
Transaction Cost Economics is the most popular approach used in relation to this 
question and an important consideration is the level of transaction-specific investment 
(see for example Best 1990; Powell 1990). 
Transaction Cost logic suggests that the choice between market, hybrid or hierarchy, 
depends on the level of transaction specific investment required by the firm to gain the 
capabilities it desires to possess (Williamson 1993). If transaction specific investment is 
high, the firm should either, develop the necessary capabilities on its own if it can, or 
acquire another firm that already possesses such resources (Barney 1999). 
In Transaction Cost Economics, governance is the mechanism by which the firm 
manages the exchange. When firms embark on strategic alliances such associations 
replace arms-length market relations. Trust and self-enforcing agreements between the 
alliance partners is the governance employed to manage the exchange and reduce the 
threat of opportunism (see for example Barney and Hanson 1994. Refer also to chapter 
1.5, pages 4349). 
Firms' capabilities do not seem to play a significant role in Transaction Cost Economics 
and the Resource Based Perspective suggests that a firm is made UP of sticky and 
imperfectly inimitable resources and capabilities enabling it to successfully compete (see 
Wernerfelt 1984, Barney 1986). This means that a firm can achieve rents, not just 
because it has better resources, but because it makes better use of them (see for example 
Conner 199 1). The following sections 1.1.10 and 1.1.11 elaborate on the relevance of 
Transaction Cost Economics and the Resource Based Theory of the firm with respect to 
inter-organisational strategies. 
1.1.10 TRANSACTION COSTS AND ALLIANCES 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) has been held out as one of the most influential 
economic theories in strategy research (Coase 1937; Williamson 1979,1985,1999), and 
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Williamson (1985) suggests that a critical role of the firm is to economise on transaction 
costs. Transaction cost analysis has increasingly recognised the existence of forms of 
governance that correspond closely to alliance agreements (Teece 1984; Best 1990; 
Powell 1990; Williamson 1993). 
Once analysts sought to examine the choices amongst markets, hierarchies, and hybrid 
forms, such as joint ventures and franchising agreements (Osborn and Hagedoorn, 1997). 
Powell (1990), recognises three forms of organisation, namely market, hierarchy and 
network and suggests that 'firms are blurring their established boundaries and engage 
informs of collaboration that resemble neither markets, nor hierarchies, nor vertical 
integration" (1990: 297). This differentiation among administrative forms has been 
accompanied by a broader view of the alliance function. It is seen, not just as an 
instrument to reduce transaction costs, but also as a way of gaining technical, 
administrative and commercial benefits (Osborn and Hagedoorn, 1997). 
Transaction cost economics has had a profound effect on the analysis of interfirm 
cooperation (e. g. Williamson 1985,1991). The core argument of transaction costs is 
expressed as follows: The governance structures that we observe in our "institutions of 
capitalism" are devised to economise on bounded rationality and to simultaneously 
safeguard transactions against opportunism of adverse selection, moral hazard and hold- 
ups (Mahoney and Pandian 1992). Cost reducing governance structures emerge from 
institutional competition (Mahoney and Pandian 1992). 
Environmental conditions that make transaction cost analysis critical are asset specificity 
and uncertainty (Williamson 1979,1985,1999). The major dimensions of asset specificity 
are site, physical and human capital specificity. As site specificity increases, the buyer 
and seller become locked into a relationship, so as to economise on inventory and 
transportation costs. Physical asset specificity occurs when one or both parties to a 
transaction make investments in plant and equipment, that involve design characteristics 
specific to the transaction. Human capital specylicity involves learning by doing and 
team experience (Mahoney and Pandian 1992). 
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Ghoshal and Morans (1996: 13) critique of transaction cost theory argues that 
organisations are not mere substitutes for structuring efficient transactions, but that they 
posses unique advantages for governing certain kinds of economic activities and 
subscribe to a logic very different from transaction cost economics. They suggest that 
Williamson has ignored the potential power of organisations to influence both the 
direction of economic progress and the motivation of individuals to contribute and 
benefit from that progress (ibid. 40). Furthermore, the advantages of organisations over 
markets may lie in human ability to take the initiative and to cooperate. It may also rely 
on exploiting the organisation's internalised purpose and diversity, to enhance both 
learning and to create innovation and purposeful adaptation (ibid. 42). 
Powell (1990) proposes that inter-organisational alliances, based as much on cooperation 
and trust as upon formal contracts, is an alternative way to meet market demands and 
that alliances work just as well as hierarchical forms of governance. The focus of 
transaction costs is to explore the best responses in various environmental conditions, 
and not to proactively seek to change conditions through strategic initiatives 
(Varadarajan and Cunningham 1995: 287). Strategy is therefore a mechanism for 
change that reflects the power of idiosyncratic managerial intention and ability, as 
exemplified by the concept of the resource based approach (Varadarajan and 
Cunningham 1995: 287). 
1.1.11 THE RESOURCE BASED THEORY OF THE MIM 
The resource based iview of the firm has recently emerged as an alternative way of 
understanding industrial organisations and their competitive strategies (Das and Teng 
2000). The resource-based approach emphasises the firm, whereas industrial 
organisation theory concentrates on the industry and it is this that differentiates the two. 
Industry and the market are Siamese twins. As both production and market reaction are 
inextricably tied, the analysis of the firm and its industrial sector is important (Maijoor 
and van Witteloostuijn 1996). However, in contrast to transaction cost logic, which 
emphasises cost minimisation, the resource-based rationale emphasises value 
maximisation of the firm, by pooling and utilising valuable resources (Das and Teng 
2000). 
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Zajac and Olsen (1993) suggest that Transaction Cost Economics fail to explain inter- 
organisational strategies. In their view, the concept over-emphasised the extent that 
markets and hierarchies inhibit a behavioral approach. At the core of their analysis, is an 
exan-dnation of the influence of market structure upon industry, which concludes that it 
does not adequately take into account the internal organisation of the firm (see also Dyer 
and Singh 1998). The resource view holds that the type, magnitude and nature of a 
firm's internal resources and capabilities are important determinants of profitability (Das 
and Teng, 2000). 
The firm is considered to be both an administrative organisation and a pool of productive 
and interdependent resources (Penrose 1959: 3 1). Productive resources can take the 
form of human capital, physical capital and intangible capital (see for example Itami and 
Roehl 1987; Fajoum 1994; Dyer and Singh 1998). Different combinations of these 
attributes mean that all firms are unique or heterogeneous (Penrose 1959,1985) and, if 
used properly, resources can be a firm's particular source of competitive advantage 
(Grant 1991: 124). 
Rents derive from resources that are at the same time superior, imperfectly immitable and 
non-substitutable (Lipman and Rumelt 1982). These resources Will not be easily 
dissipated by competition, as they are unable to be traded perfectly (Amit and 
Schoemaker 1993, Barney 1986,1988,1991; Dierickx and Cool 1989; Peteraf 1993). A 
firm can achieve rents, not just because it has better resources, but because it makes 
better use of them (Penrose 1959: 54). 
The Resource Based theory of the firm identifies resources and capabilities, which are 
important determinants of sustainable competitive advantage. The way to understand the 
resource-based theory of strategy formulation is to appreciate the relationship between 
resources, capabilities and profitability and, in particular, the way that competitive 
advantage can be sustained over time. (Grant 1991: 124). The basic concept [strategy] is 
that a firm's competitive position is defined by a bundle of unique resources and 
relationships. Management's duty is to adjust and renew these as time, competition and 
change erode their value (Rumelt 1984 557-558). 
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The notion that firms are fundamentally heterogeneous, in terms of their resources and 
internal capabilities, has long been at the heart of the concept of strategic management 
(Peteraf 1993: 173). Heterogeneity implies that firms with lesser capabilities are still able 
to compete in the market place, or at least break even, although firms with superior 
resources will earn rents (ibid. 180). 
Heterogeneity in an industry may reflect the presence of limited superior productive 
influences. They may be fixed factors that cannot be expanded, but more often are 
quasi-fixed, in the sense that their supply cannot be increased rapidly. They are scarce 
and insufficient to satisfy demand and thus inferior resources have to be brought into 
production as well. The important point is that the supply of superior resources is 
exhaustible and efficient firms can only maintain competitive advantage if their resources 
are both able to be expanded, and at the same time, not easily imitated by others (Peteraf 
1993). 
Quasi-fixed resources, are much more important. These are resources which, while 
limited in the short run, may be renewed and expanded incrementally by the firm using 
them (Nelson and Winter 1982; Wernerfelt 1984; Peteraf 1993). For example, 
knowledge based capabilities are enhanced as they are utilised. These kinds of assets, 
provide the basis and direction for growth of the firm itself (Teece 1980; Teece et al 
1997; Argyres and Liebeskind 1999). Current capabilities may both impede and 
constrain further learning and investment, but overcoming this influence depends on an 
ambitious workforce (Itarni and Numagami 1992). Incremental growth and renewal of 
limited resources however, is consistent with the Ricardian view of rent and competitive 
advantage (Peteraf 1993: 182). - 
An emerging theoretical perspective is that the firm is a collection of tangible and 
intangible resources and capabilities required for product/market competition (see Miller 
and Shamsie 1996). The resource based view of the firm (see for example Coase 1937; 
Penrose 1959; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Teece 1981; Rumelt 1984; Wernerfelt, 1984; 
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Barney 1986,19911), highlights the heterogeneity of firms, their varying degrees of 
specialisation, and the limited transferability of corporate resources (Amit and 
Schoemaker 1993). In addition, the resource view holds that the type, magnitude and 
nature of a firm's resources and capabilities are important determinants of its profitability 
(see for example Barney 1999). 
1.1.12 COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 
For a limited period of time, competing in the right way and in the appropriate arena may 
result in a high level of profitability. However long-term profitability is unlikely unless 
this advantage is either not easily duplicated, nor countered (Aacker 1989,1993). 
Researchers attempting to understand the sources of competitive advantage (e. g. Rumelt, 
Schendel and Teece 1991), have looked at the differences between firms and how some 
are better able than others to conceive of, and implement, valuable strategies (Barney 
1991). These studies have concluded that the central issue in understanding success, 
rests on the underlying theory of the firm and the associated theory of strategy (Porter 
1991: 95). 
According to Barney (1986), companies may obtain above normal returns when they 
have superior information, when they are lucky, or both. Alchian (1950) and Rumelt 
(1984) also emphasise this point. The implication to be drawn is that, as well as analysing 
the competitive environment, managers should focus on their own company's skills and 
resources (Dierickx and Cool 1989: 1504). 
Williamson (1979) points out, that the idiosyncratic nature of unique assets precludes 
their tradability in the open market and, being non-tradable, the firm-specific content is 
accumulated internally. A business must be capable of continuous improvement in areas 
critical to its strategy, if any competitive advantage is to be sustained (Collis 1991: 66). 
' Other authors of work associated with research into the Resources Based Theory include: -Dierickx 
and Coot 1989; Teece, Pisano, and Sheun, 1997; Conner 1991; Ghemawat 1991; Peteraf 1993, Collis 
1991, Tallman 1991, Robins 1992, Schulze 1992 Peteraf 1993, Black and Boal 1994, Miller and 
Shamsie 1996; Maijoor and Witteloostuijn 1996. 
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A company is said to possess sustained competitive advantage when it pursues a value 
creating strategy, not simultaneously being implemented by current or potential 
competitors and when the latter are unable to duplicate benefits from that strategy 
(Bamey 1991: 102). 
This does not imply sustainability, or that the advantage lasts forever. Unanticipated 
economic changes in an industry may mean that what was, at one time, a steady source 
of competitive advantage, is no longer of value to the firm (Barney 1991: 103). - Such 
structural changes in an industry are often called "Schumpeterian shocke' (Schumpeter 
1934: 65-66; Bamey 1986; Rumelt 1987). 
The objective for managers is to build an organisation capable of continuous 
improvement, innovation, collective learning, and information transfer (Collis 1991: 66). 
Competitive strengths are developed by organisational learning, and acquisition of 
industry-specific capabilities for production, distribution, R&D, purchasing, and labour 
relations (Chandler 1992: 92). 
The key to sustainable rents is the existence of isolating mechanisms (Rumelt 1984; 
Rumelt 199 1). The notion of an isolating mechanism is analogous to an entry or mobility 
barrier (Caves and Porter 1977; Caves and Ghemawat 1992). 
1.1.13 ISOLATING MECHANISMS 
Rumelt (1984: 567) describes isolating mechanisms as " phenomena that limit the expost 
equilibrium of rents among individual firmel. That is, those "hidden! ' capabilities or 
assets, not directly associated with a product or service, that sustain advantage e. g. 
proprietary knowledge, or company reputation, or brand image, or specialised 
equipment. 
Dierickx and Cool (1989: 1507-9) go on to develop tWs concept by identifying 
mechanisms which render inputs costly to copy, such as team embodied knowledge that 
can be passed onto new generations of team members, without significant degradation. 
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Isolating mechanisms have been described as, but are not limited to, history and path 
dependence (Dierickx and Cool 1989), organisation routines (Nelson and Winter 
1982: 99), knowledge (Itami & Roehl 1987: 53; Badaracco 1991), bounded rationality 
(Simon 1962), causal ambiguity (Lipman and Rumelt 1982: 420), uncertain imitability 
(Lipman and Rumelt 1982: 419), culture (Fiol 1991: 194), first mover advantage 
(Liberman and Montgomery 1988: 47), social complexity (Fiol 1991: 191), managerial 
knowledge and skills (Prahalad & Bettis 1986: 491; Spender 1996), strategic groups 
(Cool and Schendel. 1988: 207), strategic alliances (Gomes-Casseres 1996: 84), and each 
will be described in turn. 
History and Path Dependence 
Resource-based theorists are not alone in recognising the importance of history as a 
determinant of a firm's performance and competitive advantage. Traditional strategy 
studies often cite historical circumstances as relevant precedents (Learned et al 1961; 
Ansoff 1979). 
Firms are idiosyncratic and, in the course of events, they accumulate and acquire assets 
as a result of tacit learning and dynamic routines (Teece, Pisano and Sheun 1997). 
Imitation of these assets is only possible by the same time consuming investment into 
learning that the firm itself made (Dierickx and Cool, 1989; Barney 1991). 
Assets are said to produce a "path dependence" which provides substance to the tenet 
that "history mattere'. A firm's history and strategy yield a special combination of 
resources and accumulated assets. Clearly, had the firm made different decisions in the 
past, it would itself be different today (Collis 1991: 5 1). 
Organisation Routines 
Routines and path dependence are used to explain the resource-based view and why 
imitation is often inhibited (Nelson and Winter 1982: 99; Teece, Pisano and Sheun 1997). 
According to Nelson and Winter (1982), routines are the most important means by which 
an organisation's operational knowledge is stored . Certain characteristics of routines 
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are so subtle that even persons carrying out the routines may not be consciously aware of 
them (Koch and McGrath 1996: 336) and this makes indtation by competitors difficult 
(Reed and Defillippi 1990). These routines stabilise knowledge and immobilise 
procedures so that routines "sticle' to the organisation where they were developed 
(Koch and McGrath 1996: 337). 
Knowledge 
Knowledge based resources are protected from imitation by barriers, which means they 
cannot be imitated by competitors, because they are refined and hard to understand. 
They involve elusive talents and their connection with results is difficult to pin point 
(Lipman and Rumelt 1982). Knowledge based resources often take the form of 
particular skills, e. g. technical, creative and collaborative (Itami and Roehl 1987; Hall 
1992,1993). 
Economic rents arise from such skills, mainly because rivals are ignorant of why a firm is 
successful. It is often hard to appreciate the basis for a rival's creativity or the teamwork 
that makes it effective. Complete protection by barriers is impossible, because 
competitors can acquire similar knowledge and talents. Normally this takes time, and by 
then a firm may have gone on to develop further skills and have learned to use them in a 
different way (Miller and Shamsie 1996: 522). 
Systematic knowledge based resources may depend on making use of integrating or 
coordinating aptitude in multidisciplinary teamwork (e. g. Fiol 1991; Monczka and Trent 
1993). Some firms invest in team-building and collaborative efforts to promote 
adaptation and flexibility. This is not just expertise in any field, but rather the way skills 
from several domains complement one another in a team,, to give competitive advantage 
(Itami and Roehl 1987: 12; Hall 1993; Teece, Pisano and Shuen 1997). 
Bounded Rationality 
In the past, economics largely ignored the processes that people use to reach decisions. 
It was deemed acceptable to explain strategic decisions flowing from static, relatively 
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simple problems, where it might be assumed that additional time, for deliberation or the 
exercise of power, was unlikely to change the outcome. Such explanations however, do 
not work when we are seeking to analyse a decision maker's behaviour in complex 
circumstances which involve much uncertainty and make severe demands upon his 
attention (Simon 1962: 14 ). 
Causal Ambiguity 
This term has come to mean the inability of economic agents to fully understand the 
causes of differences in efficiency which limit competition by entry or imitation (Rumelt 
1984: 567). Causal ambiguity is used in literature to describe circumstances where the 
link between resources controlled by a company and its sustainable competitive 
advantage, is not fillly understood (Alchian 1950: 219; Rumelt 1984; Barney 1991,1999). 
Whilst it is natural sometimes, to fail to understand why one company consistently 
outperforms others (Demsetz 1982), in the circumstances of causal ambiguity, imitators 
cannot identify the actions they should take in order to duplicate the strategies of firms 
achieving consistent competitive advantage (Barney 1991: 109). 
Uncertain Imitability 
Lipman and Rumelt (1982: 420) state that a common explanation for factor immobility is 
not ambiguity, but uniqueness. This means that concepts of uncertainty and uniqueness 
are deeply interdependent and, in the absence of uncertainty, creation of a unique 
resource could be attempted and, the uniqueness lost as a consequence. This strong 
connection between uniqueness and ambiguity is also emphasised by Williamson (1979) 
in relation to idiosyncratic knowledge. Frequent personal interaction between people 
and complex systems, gives rise to unique transaction - specific skills that are, in 
Polanyi's word, "unspeciflable7' (1958 : 53). 
Culture 
Culture consists of beliefs, knowledge, attitudes of mind and customs to which 
individuals in an organisation are exposed and, as a result of which they acquire values, 
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adopt terminology and habits of behaviour and thought. Thiý culture sets the 
organisation apart from others and binds its members together (Hall 1992: 139). 
According to Cartwright and Cooper (1996: 6) cultural differences and the concept of 
cultural distance can inhibit and obstruct cooperation and although by no means the only 
criterion, cultural compatibility will go a long way in aiding successful alliances. 
First Mover Advantage 
The first firm to implement a particular strategy in an industry can result in first mover 
advantage because of three reasons; technological leadership, pre-emption of assets and 
buyer switching costs (Lieberman and Montgomery 1988: 41, see also Lieberman and 
Montgomery 1998). 
Technological leadership derives from a learning or experience curve (Henderson and 
Green 1997), i. e. costs falling due to cumulative output, success in patents and R&D. 
Innovation need not be limited to physical hardware. Firms may also make managerial 
improvements by inventing better organisational systems (Lieberman and Montgomery 
1988: 44). Organisational innovation is often slow to diffuse, hence it will offer more 
durable first-mover advantage than product, or process innovation (Teece 1980). In 
describing managerial innovations in the late 19th century that enabled producers to 
exploit economies of scale, Chandler (1990) refers to companies such as American 
Tobacco, Campbell Soups, Quaker Oats, Procter and Gamble which, to this day, still 
retain dominant positions in industry. 
A business can acquire first mover opportunities through a combination of proficiency 
and luck (Lieberman and Montgomery 1988: 49). This can affect profits directly, as in a 
situation where a firm possesses the know-how to enable it to manufacture products at 
lower cost than its competitors (ibid. 50). 
Firms may win access to distribution channels, develop customer goodwill, or acquire a 
positive reputation, before their rivals (Barney 1991: 104). It follows therefore, that by 
implementing a strategy earlier than competing firms, a first mover must have insights 
into opportunities associated with implementation of a strategy, not shared by others in 
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the industry, or potential new entrants (Leiberman and Montgomery 1988: 44). This 
unique resource makes it possible for the better informed firm to implement its strategy 
to good effect (Bamey 1991: 104). 
Social Complexity 
Resources controlled by a business are frequently interdependent and subject to its asset 
specificity (Williamson 1975). Often, resources are implicit and taken for granted by 
managers, rather than being highlighted by explicit analysis (Polanyi 1967; Nelson and 
Winter 1982). 
A wide variety of resources can derive from social complexity (Dierickx and Cool 1989), 
culture (Fiol 1991: 94), a firm's reputation (Barney 1986), and relations between its 
customers and suppliers (Macbeth and Ferguson 1994). 
The resource-based view asserts that, not only are firms intrinsically historical and social 
entities, buf that their ability to acquire and exploit certain resources depends upon good 
luck and timing (see Barney 1991). When competitive advantage stems from complex 
social phenomena, the ability of competitors to imitate these resources is significantly 
constrained. Several firms may possess the same physical technology but, frequently, 
only one may possess the social relations or traditions to fully exploit this technology 
when implementing its strategy (Barney 1999: 107-110). 
Managerial Skills and Knowledge Based Resources 
Understanding the nature of superior management, involves examining skill differentials 
between the best and less able managers. All other things being equal, such as the level 
of experience, high quality managerial skills of any type are likely to result from superior 
innate abilities (endowments) and/or superior learning (Castianas and Helfat 1991: 160). 
However, management know-how is generally intangible and difficult to codify (e. g. 
Huber 1996). Learning by doing becomes important; Katz (1964) suggests that 
managerial skills are developed through the practise of relating one's own personal 
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experience and background. It is difficult for assets to accrue rents without continuous 
application of managerial skills (Castianas and Helfat 1991: 164). 
The systematic and coordinative nature of team skills makes them particularly firm- 
specific and therefore more valuable to an enterprise than to its competitors (Dierickx 
and Cool 1989: 1505). Team talents are difficult for rivals to steal as they are personal 
and they rely on the special infrastructure, history and the collective experience of people 
in a specific organisation (ibid. 1505). 
Cooperative skills especially, are not developed by programmed or routine activity but 
are nurtured during and as a result of, a history of challenging projects. Ambitious long- 
term projects force specialists from different parts of the business to work together 
intensively on complex problems. As such interaction broadens into effective tactics, it 
also promotes greater technical learning and social interaction in the team (Itami and 
Roehl 1987). 
Performance Difference among Strategic Group Members 
The term strategic group is used with reference to industrial competition and the variable 
success of strategic groups comes from the different asset accumulation of their members 
(Cool and Schendel 1988: 207). 
Coase (1937), Williamson (1975), Nelson and Winter (1982) point out that free markets 
tend to be imperfect and incomplete. Indeed, critical assets may be tied up and imitation 
consequently made difficult, if not impossible, because knowledge to reproduce the 
resources and skills are tacit and firm specific (Nelson and Winter 1982; Lippman. and 
Rumelt 1982). Substitutes may not be available without significant cost and may involve 
substantial uncertainty or long lead times. Wernerfelt (1984) calls this "resource position 
barriers", though group members pursuing the same strategy may not necessarily achieve 
similar performance (Cool and Schendel 1988: 210). 
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Strategic Alliances 
The very incentive to form an alliance revolves around the effort and investment required 
to tailor and combine the capabilities of the partners (Gomes-Casseres 1996: 84). 
Cooperative relations are encouraged by developing a strategic similarity or "dominant 
general management logic", which means the way managers conceptualise the business 
and make critical resource allocation decisions - be it in technology, product 
development, distribution, advertising, or in human resource management (Prahalad and 
Bettis 1986 : 460). 
Dominant logic is however, as much a cognitive concept, as it is a mind-set or a view of 
business in an industrial grouping. The implication of dominant logic for alliancing firms 
is that effective corporate management requires that business units share "strategic 
characteristics" compatible with the firm's dominant logic (Grant 1988: 640). 
Operationalising this mind set through shared activities, creates interdependence between 
these businesses (ibid. 641). 
Internal and inter-organisational teams are more likely to improve technological 
knowledge, skill, or routines that fit better with the firm's current activities by bringing 
new firm specific assets to its intellectual capital (Conner 1991). Know-how is unlikely 
to be transmittable in a lump, rather the alliance investment may generate gains when the 
possessor of the know-how is continuously and intimately engaged in applying it to new 
projects. It will also have a spill over effect on existing projects and Cohen and 
Levinthal (1990) call ihis feature "absorptive capacity". 
Barney (1986,1999) suggested that unique organisational skills and abilities, involving a 
combination of a firm's resources, may create advantage. Team specific assets, 
developed between customers and suppliers within a relationship specific (e. g. 
Alliancing) context may constitute such resources. 
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1.1.14 CRITICS OF BUSINESS ALLIANCES 
Critics of current research into cooperative inter-organisational strategies argue that 
studies to date have demonstrated a limited understanding of contemporary business 
relations. 
Writers such as Imrie and Morris (1992), Rainnie (1991), Turnbull (1991) suggest that 
strategic alliances are an exception, rather than a regular occurrence. Imrie and Morris 
(1992) find it difficult to conclude that coherent and consistent changes in buyer-supplier 
relations have occurred, or that any differences are the results of a broad philosophical 
shift. Despite evidence of change in buyer-supplier relations, many commentators still 
doubt its true extent and nature (see for example Ramsey 1996; Serapio and Cascio 
1996; Parkhe 1998; Yan and Zeng 1999). 
Alliances are becoming prevalent as companies' overall structure, and competitive 
advantage depends more'and more, not only on a business's internal capabilities, but also 
on the types of alliances and the scope of its relations with other firms (Parkhe 1998). 
Paradoxically, the rapid growth of alliances in recent years has been counterbalanced by 
high failure rates in the relationships (see Parkhe 1998; Koza and Lewin 1998). 
Customer and supplier alliances frequently are far from idyllic and advocates of 
cooperation often underestimate the negative aspects including, increased complexity, 
loss of autonomy and information asymmetry (Matthyssens and Van Den Bulte 
1994: 88). 
Earlier, Coleman (1988; cited in Tenbrunsel et A 2000) argued that reliance on alliance 
relations was a double-edged sword, beneficial for facilitating certain transactions but 
detrimental to others. For example, the relationship itself can become a dominant 
influence, de-emphasising the economic interests of the partners and limiting the amount 
of market information that participants seek to obtain. 
In the opinion of sceptics, ostensibly closer, more cooperative relations simply mask 
attempts to extend and exert greater managerial control over dependent supplier 
organisations (see for example Ramsey 1996). "Partnerships" between buyers and 
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suppliers are, in their view, forms of control and market power, underpinning the 
demand-supply exchange. 
Bresnen (1996) argues that over simplification of the dynamics of buyer-supplier 
relations tends to underplay the role of perception and choice on the part of the supplier 
organisation. The natural tension between competition and cooperation is underplayed or 
ignored in writings on buyer-supplier relations. 
1.1.2 SECTION ONE SUMMARY 
The foregoing literature has established that management of strategic alliances involves 
activities from procurement of materials to end-use and, at the risk of stating the 
obvious, that motivation for combining forces and forging cooperative agreements, is to 
benefit the partners (see section 1.1- 1.1.8). 
The review has touched on the necessity for companies in an alliance environment to 
develop and ultimately to operate more efficiently as a result of engaging in cross- 
functional, inter-organisational projects (see section 1.2, page 30). Skills acquired in this 
way, engender greater flexibility and increase knowledge of both the customer and 
supplier businesses. Such information channels help in communication of innovative ideas 
that are strategically significant (see section 1.3, page 36 and 1.4, page 39). 
The study of inter-organisational associations has been the subject of much research over 
the recent past (see section 1.1.3, page 3). The emphasis has been on how such 
relationships offer technical, commercial and corporate advantages over competitive 
tendering and arms-length market transactions (see section 1. *1.4, page 4ý Critical 
attributes of alliance success include, but are not limited to, commitment, sharing 
information and relation-specific skills (see section 1.1.7, page 10). 
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Scholars are questioning early theoretical assumptions concerning alliances and 
acknowledge the complexity of alliances and associated networks. To address this 
uncertainty the role of inter-organisational teams (see section 1.2), learning (see section 
1.3, page 36), innovation (see section 1.4) and trust (see section 1.5, page 43) will be 
considered in the remainder of this chapter. 
1.2 TEAM INTERACTION AND PERFORMANCE 
Section two provides a brief outline of team literature, as it relates to alliances. 
Taking strategic decisions is, by its very nature, complex and unpredictable and the team 
members' perceptions and interpretations of the market critically influence their choices 
(Dutton and Dunce 1987). Furthermore, decisions are influenced by strategies aimed at 
achieving high level objectives set by senior management (e. g. Tushman and Romanelli 
1985; Clark and Wheelwright 1992). Teamwork has to be seen as aligning individual 
motivation with organisational rationality (Mueller 1994). From a strategic perspective 
and with the aim of building competencies or capabilities, teamwork can be considered 
part of the corporate response to environmental challenges, (e. g. Monczka and Trent 
1993). 
Teamwork provides a structure that encourages employees to work in a mutually 
supportive way and it enables development of effective problem solving capabilities (see 
Hurst et al 1989). For a team to be successful in initiating strategic change, it must have 
certain essential qualities. These include receptivity to change, willingness to take risk, 
access to diverse information sources and perspectives, also creative and innovative 
decision making ability (see Cohen 1994). Mueller (1994) calls attention to quantifiable 
costs of teamwork such as training, reduced production due to split responsibility, as 
well as physical and spatial requirements. It goes without saying that when a new 
management technique is introduced, its benefits are stressed and potential costs or risks 
receive less attention. Concentration focuses on effective adoption and implementation 
(e. g. Polley and Dyne 1994; Wageman 1997). 
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Self-managing teams should be self regulating and responsible for a complete task 
(Cummings 1981; Cohen 1994). Teamwork encourages contributions based on different 
members' skills and abilities, exercises discretion over work methods and task schedules, 
disseminates feedback and determines rewards based on group performance, as opposed 
to individual effort (Polley and Dyne 1994; Tjosvold and Tjosvold 1994). According to 
McGrath (1984: 6) most definitions of teamwork stress the idea of interaction, 
interdependence, mutual awareness, a vision of the past and of an anticipated future. 
Teams are social systems and have pervasive, persistent and powerful effects on human 
behaviour (McGrath 1984: 6). Ideal team activity is encapsulated in the classic metaphor, 
as more than the sum of its parts (Polley and Dyne 1994: 26), where separate strengths 
are bound together into a single coordinated initiative. That is, the whole is greater than 
the sum of its parts (Dyer 1977: 4). 
Teamwork encourages organisational learning and adaptability, especially when teams 
have freedom to experiment and to develop unique strategies suited to the task in hand 
(e. g. McGrath 1984; Wageman 1997) 
As far back as 1951 (cited in Pearce and Ravlin 1987), researchers at the Tavistock 
Institute stated that groups should: 
" be responsible for an identifiable part of the business 
" foster cooperative work arrangements 
" learn all the jobs within their group 
" have the authority and material resources required to do the job 
receive performance feedback. 
1.2.1 CROSS FUNCTIONAL TEAMS 
The concept of cross-functional teams has a tremendous potential for a wide range of 
business applications (Clark and Wheelwright 1992). To be successful, the team requires 
strong and independent leadership, supported by members with a broad range of skills 
(Dimancescu 1992: 6). 
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Although ownership and commitment are the most striking features of cross-functional 
teams, each team has its own particular weaknesses. For example, given insufficient 
direction, or if the remit at the outset is vague, a team might go off at a tangent and lose 
its way (Clark and Wheelwright 1992). A balance has to be struck between the needs of 
the individual project and the corporate strategy. Cross-functional teams should 
complement the work of functional departments by integrating the processes across the 
organisation. In this way, teams should be able to see the larger picture and become 
more customer orientated (Harshman and Phillips 1994; Wageman 1997). 
Creating an effective team with good leadership, problem-solving skills and the ability to 
integrate across functions, means a basic change in the way people work together 
(Dimancescu. 1992: 8). It involves fundamentally transforming the behaviour of core staff, 
such as engineers, marketers, designers etc, not only in their day to day work, but also in 
their work ethics (Ketchum and Trist 1992: 10). Firms must be aware of the difficulties 
in realising the full potential of teamwork. Those prepared to rise to the challenge and 
make the profound changes needed will reap the rewards (Larson and Lafasto 1989). 
In some cases, gains from teamwork may include tacit knowledge that members are 
unable to explain to others (Nelson and Winter 1982; Nonaka et al 1996). Accordingly, 
members see their effort and ability as unique. Hedlund (1994) perceives the interplay 
between articulated and tacit knowledge at four different levels, namely, individual, team, 
company and inter-organisational. 
Teams learn from failure and have to be prepared to accept negative feedback in order to 
do better next time. Paradoxically, the team will learn, grow and become more 
successful as a result of circumstances of less than perfect performance (Spender 1996). 
Souder (1987, cited in Hedlund 1994: 81) in his literature on innovation readily 
acknowledges that functionally diverse groups find difficulty reaching agreement on 
integrated programmes of action. The key to competitive advantage is speedy 
exploitation of opportunities, which, in its turn, requires flexible co-ordination and 
synchronised execution. 
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A number of studies have looked at the subject of communication within and by groups 
(Tushman 1979; Allen 1984; Ebadi and Dilts 1986). These seem to give the impression 
that the frequency and patterns of communication, particularly of a technical nature 
within the team and also between the team and outside groups, is a useful pointer to its 
performance (Ancona and Caldwell 1992: 324). 
Creative decisions are activities that groups perform when faced with a problem 
requiring novel solutions, or resolution of an issue for which there is no "coffecf' 
formula (see for example Jackson 1992; Alper et al 1998). 
According to Bettenhausen and Murnighan (1985), conflict is counter-productive and 
detracts from a group's ability to negotiate roles, goals, and priorities. 
Teams must cooperate with other teams (e. g. Tjosvold and Tjosvold 1994: 141; 
Korshaard et al 1995). They should have similar goals (Polley and Dyne 1994: 27), 
although teams naturally strive to achieve in competition with other teams (Messick et al 
1997). Dichotomy between competition and coopqation is to be expected and ignoring 
tension will not make it go away, but can instead lead to frustration. Tjsovold and 
Tjsovold (1991: 141, also 1994) and Baron et al (1992) contrast this against the positive 
effect of acknowledging the existence of conflict and trying to manage it proactively. 
Review of research into the influence of group composition on the generation of creative 
ideas and consensus based decisions, appears to lead to the conclusion that 
heterogeneous groups are more likely to be creative and to reach better decisions than 
homogeneous groups (see Shaw 1981: 154; McGrath 1984: 15; Trent and Monczka 
1994). 
It follows that team creativity requires stimulation and the ideal condition is wh6re there 
is a pool of ideas to draw fiom. This lies at the heart of radical change (Feurer et al 
1996: 6). Creativity is also a function of problem recognition. During the initial problem 
awareness phase, team members collect information about the issues to be addressed and 
the business enviromnent (ibid: 6). 
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In order to develop creative solutions team members reflect on the points at issue as well 
as the general business environment. The problem identification and reflection phases 
are repeated continually in order to develop new breakthroughs and solutions (Hurst 
1995). Feurer, Chaharbaghi, and Wargin (1996: 6) propose that creative teams require an 
environment which is, to some extent, contradictory. 
In their study of this subject, Cohen (1994) and also Sims and Manz (1994) introduce the 
notion that team leadership is a paradox. How does one lead a group of employees who 
are supposed to lead themselves? The leader, in his diplomatic role, maintains positive 
relations with team members and others, within and outside the company (see for 
example Ancona and Caldwell 1992). Six leadership rules of group behaviour have been 
identified by Sims and Manz (1994: 187-221), as follows: - 
" the team monitors its own performance 
" the team set performance targets 
" the team is self-critical and discourages poor performance 
" the team encourages high ambitions 
" the team thinks through and practises before taking actions 
According to Monzcka and Trent (1993) team members are not always guaranteed to 
exert themselves to complete assignments. Certain factors discourage players from 
putting in maximum effort to complete a task. These can be as follows: - 
9 treating teamwork as add-on, or spare time, duties with minimal or no recognition of 
individual effort 
9 limited time set aside in the working day for teamwork 
Ancona and Caldwell (1992) state that a team's performance is linked to the degree of 
boundary spanning activity and the resources at its disposal. In the first place, teams 
need to be outgoing and to maintain good relationswith outsiders, because these are the 
people they depend on for information (Pfeffer 1984). Terms such as stars, gatekeepers, 
and liaisers describe the roles of individual. s who communicate across boundaries 
(Ancona and Caldwell 1988). 
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Teams have a significant measure of control over norms, the behaviour of their co- 
members, and consequently their overall effectiveness (Barney and Hansen 1994). 
Control is usually tacit and is not exercised by any authority outside the work group 
(Bettenhausen and Murningham 1985: Barney and Hansen 1994). 
Measured by the extent to which members desire to remain in the group, cohesion is 
important in establishing group identity and helping to smooth out internal friction 
(Cartwright 1968: 304-309). Cohesive groups are more efficient in performing tasks, 
especially when the group norms and tasks are designed to support productivity (Polley 
and Dyne 1994: 25). 
Eisenhardt (1989) and Deutsch (1957) see trust as a prerequisite to the establishment of 
stable relationships. If team members do not trust each other, the result is lack of co- 
operation regarding decisions, unwillingness to share information and even sabotage of 
future decisions (Barney and Hansen 1994). The challenge facing the team leadýr is to 
ensure members' commitment as regards decisions, their attachment to the team and 
trust in his judgment. 
Korsgaard et al (1995: 62) remind readers that the way decisions are arrived at affects the 
commitment and trust of individual team members and that people's cooperation is 
essential to implementing and adopting strategic decisions 
McGrath (1984: 95) understands norms to be expectations about actions that someone 
ought to perform in given conditions, with violations being condemned. Unless a team is 
clear as regards what is acceptable behaviour and what is not, it will not be able to 
regulate and direct its members. Although not the only requirement, having well 
understood norms is therefore an important necessity for effective teamwork. 
1.2.2 SECTION TWO- SUMMARY 
Section two indicated that to develop creative solutions, inter-organisational teams 
derive information from other organisations by drawing on knowledge and past 
experience. Appreciation of inter-organisational relations stimulates learning as issues 
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are better understood and objectives re-defined. Inter-organisational teams encourage 
regular communications, problem solving, boundary spanning and adapting to changing 
environments. The foregoing suggests that cooperation between trading partners should 
enable otherwise elusive specialist skills to be accessed, allowing complex tacit 
knowledge to be transferred and technologies shared. 
1.3 LEARNING IN ALLIANCES 
Section three goes on to expand the argument that interfirm cooperation and teamwork 
enhance organisational learning and skill development within the ally organisations. 
Management publications ascribe increasing importance to learning and this, as well as 
cooperation between firms and knowledge management, is seen as crucial in business. 
The importance of knowledge in business has been given enormous emphasis. So much 
so that it has even been suggested that a company's competitive advantage depends 
mainly on its knowledge-based, intangible assets (e. g. Nelson and Winter 1982; Harris 
1985; Itami and Roehl 1987; Tomer 1987; Spender, 1996). 
Mobility of knowledge is of fundamental importance to a firm because when people 
leave, the organisation's knowledge base diminishes. This al so happens if technologies 
are difficult to use or "inaccessible", or when organisational. routines are lost (Grant 
1995; Argote 1996; Spender 1996). 
Although people learn from experience, they tend to do so haphazardly (Huber 
1996: 827), rarely storing experiences in ways that make the lessons learnt, easily 
accessible by others (see also Dibello and Spender 1996; Lipshitz, Popper, and Oz 1996). 
Most organisations do not appreciate that everyday activities generate practical 
knowledge which, when recognised as valuable, should be stored for future reference by 
decision-makers (Nelson and Winter 1982; Karnoe 1996, Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995; 
Spender 1996; Weick 1996). Hastings (1993; 120), describes this as the "know-how 
iceberg". 
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Yves Doz (1988,1996) considers acquisition and development of unique non-tradable 
assets, i. e. knowledge, to be the key factor differentiating companies that adopt a 
successful strategy from those failing to grasp the same opportunity. 
This is echoed by Huber (1996: 827), who suggests that few businesses have 
systematically attempted to save corporate knowledge gained from experience which, if 
retrieved, could lead to considerable improvement in performance. Safeguarding 
knowledge, or intellectual property, in the form of patents and copyrights, is a forerunner 
of the developing field of intellectual capital management. 
Cooperation between companies is a potent alternative to internal knowledge generation 
(Richter and Vettel 1995) and managers strive to understand how firms learn from one 
another and the best ways to disseminate knowledge (Teece 1998). 
Itami and Roehl (1987) say that, in an age of rapidly proliferating knowledge, a pivotal 
requirement is the capacity to absorb, to create, to store, to buy or sell and to 
communicate. Acquisition of knowledge relies on social and economic networks that lie 
at the heart of the matter (see for example Dussauge, Garrette and Nfitchell 2000). 
Porter (1990: 151) writes that information and innovation spread rapidly as a result of 
customer and suppliers contacts and also as a reaction to competition. People and ideas 
combine in novel ways. Often unanticipated connections within trading clusters lead to 
new ways of competing and reveal unexpected opportunities. 
This is echoed by Badaracco (1991: xii) who observes that we are now in a world, not 
just of global markets and international firms, but in a complex web of business and 
social relationships. 
Business collaboration accelerates the exchange of knowledge and creates conduits for 
learning and generation of new knowledge. This is despite the fact that, on the most part, 
embedded knowledge moves slowly and unevenly. Analysis provides evidence 
confirming that "stickiness" in routines, individual skills and social arrangements means 
that the transfer of knowledge and capability is not easy to realise. According to 
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Szulanski (1996) cooperation between companies tends to reduce this stickiness (see 
also for example Nonacka and Takeuchi 1995; Lipshitz et al 1996). 
An organisation needs to form a close relationship with another company to absorb 
embedded knowledge from it. Knowledge cannot simply be expressed as a formula or a 
book to be bought (Badaracco 1991: xii). Companies wishing to create new capabilities 
and combine skills must provide the environment and conditions conducive for personnel 
to work together (see for example Hastings 1993; Chung, Singh and Lee 2000). 
Mody (1990) and Helfat (1997) suggest that collaborative learning is one way of dealing 
with uncertainly. Ciborra (1991) says much the same thing in proposing that alliances are 
the means by which organisational learning and innovation will be implemented. Many 
other authors such as Foray (1991) Griffin and Hauser (1996), Helfat (1997) and 
O'Neill, Pouder and Buchholtz (1998) appear to share the same point of view. Doz 
(1988) suggests that three essentials for good alliances are teaming about the following: - 
" the partner, appreciating all the time that the most important kind of knowledge is 
tacit knowledge 
I 
" the task, that is setting clear objectives expected of the alliance 
" the outcomes, over-expectation is anticipated because partners may overstate 
potential opportunities and understate weaknesses 
Strategic decisions not only depend on choices about resource allocation, but also about 
what a company learns, what core skills it builds, and the extent to which it will do so on 
its own, or as a result of cooperation. (e. g. Badar'acco 1991; Chung et al 2000). 
Knowledge links help a company to extend its expertise in wider directions. Links can 
contribute to transformation of a company's core capabilities and perhaps even change 
the competitive ranking in its own industry (e. g. Tomer 1987; Mody 1990; Badaracco 
1991; Peteraf 1993). Learning focuses on distinctive attributes that may be grounded in 
a firm's knowledge base, firm specific competencies and routines (Dodgson 1991: 24). 
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1.3.1 SECTION THREE- SUMMARY 
Section 1.3 described learning as contextually oriented and generated through a process 
of managed, joint social activity. The review elaborated on the significance of 
knowledge acquisition to alliances. In particular, the extent to which companies can 
learn from each other by pooling resources. Generation of knowledge is seen as a key 
element in enabling organisations to go through a process of sey'-renewal and 
expansion. In response to competition, companies are now linking in innovative ways 
and knowledge enhancement is a product of these new coalitions. 
Accordingly, literature argues that business collaboration accelerates the exchange of 
knowledge and creates conduits for learning. This knowledge transfer, increases 
understanding of joint processes, and open communication provides the background so 
that the inter-organisational teams can be the medium for innovation and creativity. 
Cross boundary communication derives information from other organisations by drawing 
on knowledge and past experience, to develoý unique competencies. New appreciation 
of cross-functional relations stimulates learning as issues are better understood and 
objectives clearly defined. 
Innovation and creativity are influenced by the impact of information networks. Their 
place in the dissemination of novel ideas is the subject of section four. 
1.4 ALLIANCES AS NETWORKS OF INNOVATORS. 
Sectionjour extends the review to include network literature to reinforce the themes in 
sections one to three. 
1.4.1 INNOVATION AND CREATIVITY 
When organisations innovate to re-create their enviromnent they not only process 
information, but are also inventive and acquire knowledge (see Griffin and Hausser 1996; 
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O'Neill et al 1998). We therefore need to have a theory of learning to adequately explain 
innovation (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). 
Similarly, Nelson and Winter's (1982) view of organisational capabilities and absorptive 
capacity is that it does not reside in one or more persons, but depends on a mosaic of 
linked capabilities. "Given today's complex technologies, almost invariably innovation 
needs a team or a network, since no individual has a monopoly of the skills and 
knowledge required"' (Fairtlough 1994: 95). Moreover, Nelson and Winter's analysis 
suggests that much of the detailed knowledge of organisational routines enabling a firm 
and its R&D department to function, is tacit. 
An important feature of business alliances is the evolution of shared communication via 
interpersonal and inter-organisational networks. The exchange of ideas between ally 
companies stimulates the search for, and analysis of, opportunities. Innovation is 
supported by encouraging networks to spread concepts relevant to the innovative 
process (ibid: 89-96). 
Inter-firm alliances provide a means of pooling resources by using complementary assets 
to create favourable conditions for innovation and exploration. Furthermore, the 
network philosophy offers an alternative to the individualism of Schumpeter's 
entrepreneur (Debresson and Ammesse 1991: 364). 
Powell (1998) contends that networks are a new way of fostering innovation beyond the 
scope of bilateral supplier-buyer links. Successful innovation in a new market often 
results from networks that generate collective knowledge in order to realise common 
standards (see also Saxenian 1991; Chung et at 2000). 
, 
Analysis is useful when complemented by other important aspects of innovative networks 
such as synergetic creation of knowledge, technological accumulation (Pavitt 1992) and 
social learning (Aoki 1988). According to Teece (1980) all technological transactions 
have a number of common characteristics including systems interdependence, 
indivisibility, asset specificity, tacit knowledge, market and technological uncertainties. 
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According to Saxenian (1991: 431), Silicon Valley in the United States of America is 
characterised by networks of interdependent, yet autonomous, producers who are 
organised to innovate reciprocally and to grow. These social networks promote new 
product development and encourage specialisation. They also provide firms with 
opportunities to spread the costs and risks associated with developing technologically 
intensive products. They allow diffusion of new technologies by facilitating exchange of 
information and joint problem solving between firms, and even between industries. 
Finally, networks foster use of new technologies because they provide conduits for new 
firm entry and product experimentation. 
According to Lundvall (1994) networks encourage businesses to learn, create scope for 
application and experimentation, reduce sunk investments and irreversible technical 
commitment. However, Teece (1980) says it is naive to think that all negative tendencies 
in human nature, such as for example opportunism, can be neutralised in networks; 
although he suggests that they are reduced. Literature on the subject appears to confirm 
that participation in an industrial network, not only reduces the cost of information 
acquisition, but also circumvents exclusion and entry barriers (Debresson and Amesse 
1991: 368). 
Sharing uncertainties, risks and costs, by themselves is insufficient to explain why 
networks are so beneficial, unless long-term results are compared with the immediate 
costs of cooperation (Debresson and Amesse 1991: 369). The motivation must be an 
expectation of exceptional and immediate joint returns on investment, resulting from 
significantly better lead times and improved time to market (Debresson and Amesse 
1991: 369). This aspect of joint rents has been given considerable attention to date (see 
for example Barney and Zajac 1994; Dyer 1996; O'Neill et al 1998). 
Quests for new ideas draw firms into networks where rational dimensions prevail over 
transaction costs (see Powell 1990; 1998). Close relations based on reciprocity, mutual 
goals and personal commitment, call for early involvement of suppliers in product design 
and development stages. As a consequence, by adhering to a "learning by cooperating" 
logic, firms profit from early sharing of crucial information that stimulates technical and 
managerial ideas (Griffin and Hausser 1996; Hunt - Campbell 2000). 
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Experience gained through networking provides information about alternatives. In a 
sense, the firms with high absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990) use internal 
and external networks to understand and learn from failures experienced by others in the 
network. It could be argued that effective organisational learning is an essential 
requirement for survival. Organisations that understand the dynamics of adopting and 
evaluating novel strategies should have an advantage in a highly competitive world 
(O"Neill et al 1998; Hunt-Campbell 2000). 
Research into networks has tended to ignore why some dissolve (Debresson and Amesse 
1991: 369), although it may safely be assumed that failure results from diverging 
strategies, incompatible assets, or persistent and unacceptably opportunistic behaviour. 
1.4.2 SECTION FOUR - SUMMARY 
Section four has described how inter-firm networks provide an environment that 
encourages formal and informal communication. In this way, diverse competencies are 
shared, promoting knowledge transfer and innovation among participating firms. 
Literature suggests that firms' survival depends on the ability to gain knowledge and to 
translate it into innovative strategies. This reinforces Cohen and Levinthal's (1990) 
concept of "absorptive capacity" and the alliance teams' skill to recognise the potential 
value of external information, to assimilate it and apply it to commercial ends. 
The review again emphasised that afirm's knowledge and capabilities are internal and 
embedded. However, close relations between customers and suppliers, can provide the 
opportunity for specialised attributes to take root and grow. Organisations cannot create 
knowledge without people's contribution and this takes place within an expanding 
community of interaction, crossing intra and inter-organisational levels and boundaries. 
Innovation is considered essential for organisations to maintain competitive edge and 
business alliances appear to provide the creative context that nurtures innovation. 
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The next section reviews the role of trust within alliances, describing how mutual trust 
and interdependence provide the foundation upon which cooperative business relations 
are based. 
1.5 TRUST IN ALLIANCES 
Section rive provides a brief review of the importance of trust in cooperative 
behaviour by firstly looking at the role of trust in market and social relations. The 
review then considers individuals' expectations and trust building in alliances. 
Economists, psychologists, sociologists and management theorists (Williamson 1975, 
Lewis & Weigert 1985; Grant 1991; Barney and Hansen 1994) are united in agreement 
as regards the importance of trust in the conduct of human affairs (Hosmer 1995). 
Saxenian (1991) proposes that trust is a crucial component of long-term business 
alliances. 
Barney and Hansen (1994: 176) describe trust, as mutual confidence that no one will 
exploit another's vulnerability (see also Sako 1992). Trust which partners bring to an 
exchange reflects values, principles and standards that are embedded in the firm's history, 
culture, or the personal beliefs of key individuals associated with it (Barney 1986; 
Dierickx and Cool, 1989). However, to be a source of competitive advantage, trust 
must be mutual to only the firms participating in the exchange relationship (Fiol, 1991; 
Peteraf, 1993). Building on Powell's (1990) work, Ring and Van de Ven (1992) suggest 
that a firm's reliance on markets, hierarchies or alliances for its governance structure 
depends on the level of trust by the collaborating parties. Hill (1990) describes his 
typology of trust as follows: - 
9 weak form, where there is no significant vulnerability 
e semi-strong form, when significant exchange vulnerabilities exist. Trust can still 
emerge if parties to an exchange are protected by governance penalties that impose 
various ds of sanctions on the party who behaves opportunistically and where it is 
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in the interests of all to behave in a trustworthy manner. This type of trust applies in 
most models of economic exchange. 
strong-form, which is not a product of the exchange structure, but is rather a 
reflection of the values, principles, and standards that the partners bring to the 
exchange. 
Trust plays an essential part in a variety of human activities including personal and social 
relationships and econornic exchanges (flosmer 1995). 
1.5.1 ECONOMIC EXCHANGE 
Lorenz (1988: 194) contends that, as a rule, economists attach little importance to social 
niceties such as trust and friendliness in market exchanges. He goes on to say that this is 
because the ideal market involves large numbers of anonymous buyers and sellers with 
perfect information. In such markets there is no room for bargaining or negotiation, and 
operators who contract together, need not have recurrent, or continual dealings. 
According to Lorenz (198 8: 194), trusting behavior involves activity that: - 
* increases one's vulnerability relative to another person, whose behaviour is outwith 
one's control 
takes place in a situation, if the trust was abused, that would lead one to regret the 
action 
Lorenz (1988: 195) adds that although trust aids decision-making in a risk situation, 
there is no best action in the absence of trust. There is a distinction between risk 
associated with the behaviour of others and that arising from economic uncertainty. 
Williamson (1993,1999) points out that in the absence of opportunistic behaviour, if 
parties came to a self-enforced agreement, there would be no need for costly controls 
and formal contracts. In such circumstances, the question of trust would not arise, as 
everyone's behaviour would be rational (see also Madhok 1996). 
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Trust is an essential ingredient in negotiation, because of human nature and the 
possibility of opportunistic behaviour (see for example Barber1983; Lorenz 1988; Creed 
and Miles1996; Bidault and Jarillo 1997). It is important as trust saves a lot of time and 
trouble by placing a reasonable degree of reliance on other people's word (see Arrow 
1974; Lewicki and Bunker 1996). 
Motivated by opportunism, suppliers' or buyers' ambition to maximise individual profit 
may lead to an impasse. This does not mean changing the terms of the original 
agreement but more usually involves either reneging on the contract, or using 
unanticipated circumstances to try to alter profits in one's favour (e. g. Lorenz, 1988; 
Doney and Cannon, 1997). 
Trust cannot be discounted entirely and in the face of economic uncertainty, trusting 
behaviour is viewed as rational (e. g. Heide and John; 1990; Goshal and Moran 1996). A 
priori, a common bond exists between the parties, or they would neither collaborate, nor 
be prepared to share sensitive cost and revenue information (see for example, Ford 1984; 
Gulati 1995). Trust is therefore essential for firms working cooperatively (e. g. Good 
1988; Kramer and Tyler 1996; Jones and George 1998). 
Lorenz (1988: 202) suggests that the implications of a lack of trust in an economic 
exchange may include :- 
* The right sort of investments may not be made. Actors, who do not trust each other, 
will not refrain from abusing their bargaining power, or failing to live up to contract 
conditions, or using changed circumstances to alter the division of profits in their 
favour. 
* Considerable cost may arise from safeguards to minimise the risk of opportunistic 
behaviour. Such expenses could be avoided if mutual trust was assured. 
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* More subtly, those in a bilateral agreement may hesitate to make legitimate claims, 
fearing such demands may cause suspicion that the proposed amendments are in fact 
illegitimate, and only raised to change the agreed costs. 
Time and experience are critical elements in deciding trust. Good (1988) talks of 
incremental trust, that is trust built up in successive stages through personal contact. 
This infers that building trust is not simply a question of registering satisfactory 
performance in successive contracts, but that it is based on the probability of 
trustworthiness (see Killing 1987; Lewicki and Bunker 1996; Lane and Bachmann 1998). 
Trust concerns cooperating firms being prepared to sacrifice short-term gains for the 
long-term benefit of mutual cooperation (e. g. Lundvall 1994). Although building trust is 
expensive, lack of trust is costlier still (e. g. Miles and Snow 1992; Lewicki and Bunker 
1996; Nfishra 1996). Tyler and Kramer (1996) argue that declining trust in the case of 
long-term exchange relations increases transaction costs, because people make provision 
for opportunistic behaviour, just in case it happens. 
1.5.2 SOCIAL RELATIONSHIEPS 
Tyler and Kramer (1996) suggest that literature, dealing with social dilemmas, provides 
evidence that trust plays an important role in cooperative behaviour. Evidence of the 
nature of people's behaviour in social dilemmas, is provided by. the role of group 
identification in facilitating cooperation (Brewer and Kramer 1986). This is 
corroborated by Dawes and Thaler (1988: 195) in their review of cooperation, in so much 
that "group identity appears to be a crucialfactor in lessening competition. " 
Although one aspect is that group identity increases expectations that others will 
reciprocate, expectations of reciprocity do not fully account for this effect (Brewer 
198 1). Those who trust continue to cooperate, irrespective of the behaviour of others in 
the group (Brann and Foddy 1988) and trusting behaviour reflects a "moral duty or 
commitment" (Kramer and Goldman 1993). Similarly, cooperators do not leave groups 
46 
when it is in their interests to do so, which suggests that group identification reinforces 
cooperation (Orbell, van de Kragt, and Dawes 1988). 
Creed and Miles (1996) show how organisational norms and management philosophies 
shape issues of trust in organisations. Zucker, Darby, Brewer and Peng (1993) attest to 
similar findings in their study of the biotechnology businesses, which suggests that when 
intellectual capital is widely valued, people are likely to have a larger number of 
collaborators. Because of the proprietary nature of the business environment, 
collaborators within the same company were more likely to be imbued by a mindset that 
generated confidence. 
Powell's (1996: 51) study on trust in interpersonal networks in a large high-technology 
firm, found that although trust and distrust had opposite effects, their influence was not 
symmetrical. Instead, while trust was built incrementally, distrust had a more dramatic 
"catastrophic7' effect. 
1.5.3 INDIVIDUAL EXPECTATIONS AND INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS 
Lewicki and Bunker (1996) point to the centrality of trust in emerging organisational 
forms and seek to understand how trust can be developed. They propose a three-stage 
model to illustrate the circumstances underlying the development of trust. 
Stage one, deterrence-based trust is based on the threat of punishment for failure to 
cooperate. This type of trust assumes that two parties entering into a new business 
relationship, have no history, no previous "reputatiore' to overcome and are therefore, 
quite naturally, uncertain about each other. 
Stage two, knowledge-based trust is where people's disposition is sufficiently well 
known and their behaviour can be predicted. Knowledge-based trust relies on 
information, rather than deterrence, and it grows over time as the parties interact and 
develop an expectancy of each other's behaviour. Information contributes to 
predictability which, in turn, enhances trust. Regular communication is essential for 
knowledge-based trust in human relations, and parties acquire knowledge about one 
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another by gathering data, observing each other in different contexts and noting reactions 
in various situations. 
Finally, identification-based trust occurs when people adopt, as personal goals, the 
needs and desires of others and act in ways that result in mutual gain. Identification- 
based trust occurs in situations of common understanding and is evident in collective 
identity, co-location, joint products and commitment to shared values. 
Sheppard and Tuchinsky (1996), explore the implication of the movement away from 
market or hierarchy, to more collaborative forms of organisation. They suggest that 
organisational behaviour often depends on managerial control over subordinates, 
whereas collaborating organisations emphasise interaction between people. 
In similar vein, Meyeson, Weick and Kramer (1996) suggest that businesses are moving 
towards more flexible temporary groupings, based around specific projects. This 
stimulates "swift trust". whereby people behave in an apparently trusting manner, but 
hedge their bets to reduce risks of betrayal. This demands a high level of competence and 
realistic appreciation of their own roles and responsibilities. 
Trust entails the assumption of risks and a degree of trust is inherent in all relationships 
(see Deutsch 1957; Saxenian 1995). However, time, proximity, shared strategic design, 
shared identity, common incentives, and negotiation of mutual ethos, all can lead to the 
eventual evolution of highly similar internalised views, beliefs and values (Sheppard and 
Sherman 1998). 
1.5.4 TRUST BUILDING IN ALLIANCES 
In networks, economic transactions occur neither through discrete exchanges (markets) 
nor by administrative flat (hierarchies). Rather, network forms of exchange entail 
indefinite, sequential transactions within the context of a general pattern of reciprocity 
(Grabher 1994). Heide and Nlinor (1992) argue that cooperation is sustained by a shadow 
of the future and trust is seen as a response to expected future behaviour. An ongoing 
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relationship is expected to sustain belief in the integrity of others because it pays the 
participants to cooperate. 
The ethical foundations of exchange contracts include qualities such as equity, 
responsibility, commitment and trust. In many cases no agreements are written, and 
instead firms cooperate under conditions of mutual understanding and trust (Blomqvist 
1997). In general, non-legal sanctions such as ridicule or ostracism, can be important 
substitutes to contractual control (see for example, Luthmann 1979). 
It has been widely acknowledged by scholars that trust can lead to cooperative behaviour 
in companies (see for example, Axelrod 1984, Sako 1992; Lewicki and Bunker 1996). 
Although the presence of conditional trust, i. e. based on knowledge or positive 
expectation, allows a group to work towards a common goal, it is the existence of 
unconditional trust, i. e. founded on shared values, that can fundamentally change the 
exchange relationship (Jones and George, 1998). 
According to Jones and George (1998), unconditional trust promotes help seeking 
behaviour, free exchange of knowledge and infonnation, subjugation of personal needs 
and egotism and leads to greater involvement. 
Other researchers claim that one of the main sources of competitive advantage is the 
capability to produce tacit knowledge (see Badaracco 1991; Amit and Schoemaker 1993; 
Huber 1996). What that does for a company is to add unique advantages not able to be 
imitated or copied (see Penrose 1959, Wernerfelt 1984, Conner 1991). Rumelt (1984) 
terms these "isolating mechanismsý' and Barney and Hansen (1994) go as far to suggest 
that trust is an isolating mechanism (refer to section 1.1.13). 
1.5.5 SECTION FIVE - SUMMARY 
The foregoing described how inclinations to trust are embedded in management 
philosophies and organisational forms, with attitudes and behaviour of managers 
determining the level of trust expected. Such values and norms are incorporated into the 
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governance structures of firms and emphasise the importance of social relations in all 
market transactions. 
As. a common norm, trust grows as individuals, teams and organisations interact, share 
information and generate new strategically valuable knowledge and skills. Trust is seen 
as a mechanism of control among cooperating firms and a willingness to share 
information reduces uncertainty, minimises bounded rationality and constrains 
opportunistic behaviour. Firms produce competitive advantage through isolating 
mechanisms and some scholars consider trust to be a differentiating factor, even 
suggesting that trust has a measurable economic value. 
Trust is a dominant form of governance providing the incentive to build a strategy. Trust 
is stimulated and reinforced through the work of inter-organisational teams. The social 
dimensions of their transactions are essential in explaining the background to the alliance 
control and coordination, as teams begin to form networks, develop social capital and 
relationship specific skills. 
1.6 SYNTHESIS OF LITERATURE REYIEW- Research Gap 
Zajac and Olsen (1993) expand Williamson's (1975,1979,1993,1999) Transaction Cost 
Economics theory by suggesting that inter-organisational exchange relations need to be 
looked at as a developmental process, rather than making a "before and after" 
comparison. In their opinion, alliances should be regarded as an intertwining of 
structure, content and process to deal with issues in a dynamic environment. Viewing 
inter-organisational exchange relations in this way, promotes more flexible strategic 
decisions and allows reaction and adaptation to change. 
In particular, research not only tends to ignore the dynamics that characterise inter- 
organisational dealings, but also looks at the latter with too narrow an empirical focus 
(Doz 1996). Such a perspective downplays the dynamics of business alliances. Studies 
have tended to ignore the developmental, evolutionary aspect of inter-organisational 
relations, preferring to emphasise the requirements necessary to begin an alliance and the 
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outcomes of it. This oversight precludes the effects, and degree, of joint learning 
between the partners. 
To address this gap, researchers relatively recently have begun to consider the impact of 
broader social relations rather than maintaining a static, deterministic interpretation of 
the nature of transactions (e. g. Ford 1980; Ring and Van de Ven 1994; Doz 1996; 
Spekman et al 1998). 
Recent studies of inter-organisational relations have emphasised the need for research to 
more fully explain the dynamics of inter-organisational cooperation and the 
performance implications of strategic alliance development see for example Spekman et 
al 1998). This has been acknowledged by scholars (e. g. Ford 1980; Dwyer et al, 1987; 
Anderson and Narus, 1990; Wilson 1995) and Ring and Van de Ven (1994) who state 
that a concern for process adds a temporal dimension, affecting how managers negotiate, 
execute and modify alliances over time. 
While the importance of evolutionary processes is well recognised in many fields of 
management (e. g. Nelson and Winter 1982;. Baum and Singh 1994; Teece Pisano and 
Shuen 1997), there is growing recognition that alliances and networks are also an 
evolutionary, multifaceted means of cooperation (Osborn and Hagedoorn 1997). 
From this review it is deduced that writings on the topic of alliancing have focused 
mainly on how to form alliances and the resultant benefits from them. Central to this 
issue, and largely ignored, is understanding how alliance relationships develop with 
the passage of time This demands that greater attention is directed to evolution of the 
alliance and the social context within which dyads or networks are embedded. 
Accordingly chapter two considers this literatureý 
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Chapter Two 
Process models of inter-organisational exchange 
2.0 PROCESS MODELS OF INTER-ORGANISATIONAL EXCHANGE 
The aim of this chapter is to extend the literature review to evaluate a number ofprocess 
models of inter-organisational exchange and organisational renewal, 
To achieve this, the objectives are to-. - 
" elaborate on the various process models both conceptual and empirical 
" summarise the models and explain where they differ. 
" discuss organisational renewal and dissolution in alliances 
" describe the relevance of organisational renewal in the alliance context 
" set out the main research objective 
2.1 PROCESS MODELS REVIEWED 
A number of inter-organisation life cycle process models have been proposed, each 
emphasising different factors to explain the changing characteristics of an alliance 
exchange relationship over a period of time. See table 2.1 for a chronological review of 
life cycle development. 
Wilson. 1978 Legitimisation 
Information exchange 
Attribute delineation 
Attribute value negotiation 
Relationship maintenance 
Hakansson and I Environment 
Wootz 1979 Atmosphere 
Interaction process 
Ford. 1980 Pre-relationship 
Early stage 
Development stage 
The long-term stage 
The final stage 
Conceptual Decision Process Model of I 
Organisational Buying 
Empirical I UvIP Interaction Model 
Conceptual The development of Buyer-Seller I 
relationships in industrial markets 
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... ... .. 
coliceptUM .......... . 
.... ........... .... ........ ...... Or ........... .......... ....... ... .............. ...... ............ ......... Empirical ......... D'Aunno & Emergence ('011ceptlIA A life cycle model of 
Zuckerman Transition organisational federation 
1987 Maturity 
Crossroads 
Dwyer, Schurr Awareness Conceptual Relationship Development Process 




Frazier, Interest stage Conceptual Just -in-Time Exchange 
Spekman & Initiation-rejection stage Relationships in Industrial 
O'Neal, 1988 Implementation stage Markets 
Review stage 
Gray 1989 Getting started Empirical. Collaboration model 
The negotiation stage Case study 
Implementation 
Revision 
Ellram 1991 Introduction Empirical Life-cycle patterns in Buyer-seller 
Growth Case study partnerships 
Maturity 
Decline 
Larson 1992 Pre-conditions for exchange Empirical. A process model for the formation 
Conditions to build Case study of entrepreneurial dyads 
Integration and control 
Murray and Courtship Conceptual Strategic alliance life-cycle 




Zajac and Initialising stage Conceptual Transactional value model 
Olsen. 1993 Processing stage 
Reconfiguration stage 
Ring & Van de Negotiation Conceptual Developmental processes of 
Ven. 1994 Commitment cooperative inter-organisational 
Execution relationships 
Dissolution 
Doz. 1996 Learning cycles. Empirical. The evolution of cooperation in 
Cognitive and behavioural Case study strategic alliances: Initial 
interaction between initial conditions or learning processes'? 
conditions, learning processes, 
re-evaluation and adjustment 
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...... .... ... ... 
Schmitz, Conceptualisation E1111)11 Ical F. CR alliances: best practice model 
Frankel & Pursuance Case study 
Fraver 1995 Confirmation 
Implementation and continuity 
Spekman, Anticipation Empirical. A life cycle approach to strategic 
Forbeshm, Engagement Case study alliances 
Isabella & Valuation 




Table 2.1: Chronology of Lifecycle Model Development 
The following summarises the characteristics of each model as specified by the authors. 
2.1.1 Wilson: Decision Process Model of Organisational Buying (1978: 31-43). (See 
also Wilson and Murnmalaeni 1986; Wilson 1995) 
Wilson's (1978) early model is based on works by several authors who have explored 
organisational buying behaviour including O'Shaughnessy, Olshavsky and Sheth, Homan 
(cited in Wilson 1978: 41-42). Wilson suggests that selling is not simply an exchange of a 
product for money, but an exchange of attributes having both physical and psychological 
values. 
Wilson's dyadic process model was concerned with the development of long-term relations 
rather than one-off selling situations. It begins with an initial meeting between buyer and 
seller and moves through a number of stages that take place over a period of time. The 
stages involved are source legitimisation, information exchange, attribute delineation, 
attribute value negotiation and relationship maintenance. 
The basic objective of the source legitimisation stage is to establish the salesman as a 
legitimate and credible partner in the dyadic interaction process. This process may 
continue through the early interactions of the dyad. Information exchange involves 
bounding the problem to be solved so as to assign a package that will result in a sale. 
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Attribute delineation involves the development of a bundle of attributes, both explicit and 
intangible. The influence of the salesman who offers guidance and support is considerable 
at this stage. Attribute value negotiation involves bargaining and determines the attribute 
set, for example, price, product quality, delivery etc. Finally relationship maintenance 
involves developing and building on the relations. The maintenance of an ongoing account 
is much easier to manage and less costly than finding new accounts. 
2.1.2 International Marketing and Purchasing (IMP) Group. Interaction Model. 
Hakansson and Wootz 1979 
An emergent interactive model contains four groups of variables (Campbell 1985: 59) 
" The interactive process itself 
" The environment within which the action takes place 
" The parties involved, the organisations as well as individuals 
" The atmosphere affected by interaction. 
Relations between a buyer and seller are frequently long term, close and involve complex 
patterns of action. This ground breaking research, places considerable emphasis on the 
impact of broader social relations rather than a more static, deterministic interpretation of 
the nature of transactions (Grabher 1994). 
Industrial marketing and purchasing can be described as the management of buyer-seller 
relations (Ford 1980: 349). Rather than play the market, companies develop close links with 
other businesses and benefit by cost reduction and increased revenue. These advantages are 
achieved by efficient use of resources and by making durable "transaction specific" 
investments to deal with specific buyer and supplier requirements (Williamson 1975, 
1979). 
Implications of these relationships (Ford 1980: 349) may be seen as: - 
9 increased experience for two companies in alliance 
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" reduced risk and uncertainty 
" growth of commitment; actual and perceived 
" increased communication through formal and informal channels 
" investment and cost benefits 
ENVIRONMENT 
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Figure 2.1: Industrial Marketing and Purchasing Model: Source Ford 1990: 20 
2.1.3 Ford: The Development of Buyer-Seller Relations in Industrial Markets 
(1980: 339-351) 
This model is theoretically based on an interaction approach developed by the International 
Marketing and Purchasing (HAP) group (Hakansson and Wootz 1979) see figure 2.1, 
which, like Wilson (1978), sees buyer-seller relations taking place between two active 
parties. 
The interaction approach considers that either the buyer or seller may take the initiative in 
seeking a partner. Both are likely to be involved in adapting their process or product 
technologies to accommodate the other. Neither party, however, unilaterally changes its 
activities without consulting the partner. 
According to Ford (1980: 340), the complexity of alliances and the importance of mutual 
adaptation mean that the analysis of relationships must be separated between the overall 
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relationship itself and the individual episodes that comprise it. It is important to analyse 
individual episodes and the overall relationship, as well as to understand the interaction 
between the two. Thus, each delivery of product, price negotiation or social meeting takes 
place within the context of the overall relationship. Norms and procedures, that may have 
been established, as well as the atmosphere of cooperation, or conflict, affect each episode. 
Development within the two companies involves mutually shared experiences, reduces 
uncertainty, promotes growth of both actual and perceived commitment to one another 
through formal and informal adaptations and encourages investment. The process evolves 
in five evolutionary stages as follows: - 
Stage 1. Pre-relationship stage. Evaluation of the supply base and potential new suppliers 
Stage Z Early stage. Potential suppliers are in contact with the buyer to negotiate or 
develop specifications 
Stage 3. Development stage. Features continual purchase of products and deliveries. 
Stage 4. Long-term stage. Is characterised by recognition of the companies' mutual 
importance to each other 
Stage S. Final stage. Marked less by commercial considerations and more by the way the 
parties conduct their business. 
2.1.4 D'Aunno and Zuckerman: A Life Cycle Model Of Organisational Federation 
(1987,534: 544) 
This conceptual model is based on the authors' involvement in hospital federations. 
Federations in this case are three or more organisations that pool resources to achieve 
planned objectives. They are not permanent arrangements and their life can span from 
several months to years, depending on the objectives. Federation members relinquish some 
control over their activities to a management group or organisation (Provan 1983). 
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The model is based on life cycle models of individual firms (Quinn & Cameron 1983). The 
underlying assumption is that federations pass through predictable stages and that the 
passage from one stage to the other is influenced by one or more key factors. 
The model proposes that the strategies, structures and activities of a federation correspond 
to four stages in the life cycle. Stage 1, emergence suggests that organisations engage in 
collaborative coalescent activities, prior to forming a federation. Collaboration is an attempt 
to reduce the effects of one organisation's dependence for scarce resources on at least one 
actor. During this stage, organisations define the purpose of the coalition and develop 
criteria for membership. Stage two involves the transition to a federation and recognition 
of increased dependence on the coalition for valued resources. It involves creating a 
management group that encourages centralised decision making and trust building. Shared 
values and expectations are reinforced and risks reduced, by investing initially in 
programmes that are relatively safe, and with potential savings substantial enough to 
encourage further commitment. 
The maturity stage, is characterised by increased resource investment, although only if the 
federation is seen to achieve objectives that benefit its members in the relatively short term. 
it also depends on individual members' willingness to put the interests of the federation 
ahead of their own concerns. The final stage, critical crossroads, views escalating member 
commitment as creating instability within the federation thereby leaving two options; to 
either withdraw because of the reduced autonomy and increased dependence, or to move 
towards merger and common ownership. The latter involves a transition to more formal 
hierarchical arrangements or alternatively dissolution of the federation. Table 2.2 
summarises the features of this life cycle model 
Define purpose Increasing dependency Increased investment in Instability 
Develop membership Steering group formed resources Withdraw 
criteria Trust building Increased commitment Merger 
Table 2.2: Summary of Main Features in D'Aunno and Zuckerman Model 
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2.1.5 Dwyer, Schurr and Oh. Relationship Development Process (1987-15-24) 
The authors describe a framework for developing buyer-seller relationships through five 
phases. These are identified as (1) awareness, (2) exploration, (3) expansion, 
commitment, and (5) dissolution. 
Awareness is recognition that a particular party is a feasible exchange partner, although 
interaction between the two has not yet happened. Exploration is characterised by sub- 
processes, namely attraction, communication and bargaining, exercise of power, norm and 
expectation development. These sub-processes enable each party to test the goal 
compatibility, integrity and performance of the other. Expansion refers to a continued 
increase in benefits obtained from the exchange and recognition by the partners of their 
increasing dependence. The rudiments of trust and joint satisfaction, established earlier, 
lead to increased risk taking within the dyad and consequently, the range and depth of 
dependence increases. This greater cooperation leads to interaction beyond that intended, or 
required at the outset. Commitment refers to an implicit or explicit pledge of continuity 
between the partners and is measured using three criteria, firstly, inputs in terms of the 
levels of communication and resources, secondly, durability or expectation of continued 
association and thirdly, consistency of performance. The final stage, dissolution is implicit 
throughout the model. Table 2.3, summarises the main features of this model 











Table 2.3: Summary of Dwyer et al's Relationship Development Model 
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2.1.6 Frazier, Spekman and O'Neal: Just-in-Time Exchange Relationships in 
Industrial Markets (1988: 54-61) 
Elements instrumental in the development of this framework are political economics (see 
Stem and Reve 1980), resource dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), transaction cost 
analysis (Williamson 1975,1985), inter-organisational exchange (Frazier 1983), and 
relational exchange (Dwyer, Schurr, and Oh 1987). 
The framework provides useful insights into how and why JIT exchanges begin, evolve, 
grow and fail. It consists of four stages, interest, initiation-rejection, implementation and 
finally review. 
Interest in JIT exchanges is related to the level of importance of the materials/products and 
the need to improve price and quality levels, joint design efforts, technology transfer and 
waste reduction. Once a moderately high level of interest has been created, the initiation -ý 
rejection stage is triggered. This stage is characterised by the translation of interest into a 
desire to initiate a JIT exchange for the material parts. Search and evaluation processes 
assess, in greater depth, the costs and benefits of an exchange relationship. Greater 
uncertainty often contributes to a desire to establish JIT exchange by offering higher levels 
of interfirm coordination and increased stability. The exchange agreement, partner 
expectations and the internal socio-political structure of the partner organisations represent 
the implementation stage. Once the agreement is formalised, partners have a better idea of 
their roles and obligations, although unrealistic expectations may hamper the success of JIT 
exchanges. The review stage involves comparisons of past and present, after which each 
firm is in a better position to judge the equity of the JIT exchange. Equity is judged by 
each firm comparing rewards or outputs against its investment and costs. Table 2.4, on the 
next page, describes Frazier et al's process model. 
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Need to improve price 
and quality 
Generate interest 
Search and evaluation 
Cost/ benefit analvsis 
Formalise agreement, 
roles and obligations 
Compare past and 
present rewards with 
investment of project 
Table 2.4: Summary of Frazier et al's Process Model. 
2.1.7 Gray: Collaboration Model (1989) 
This model has been based on case study observation and comprises three stages, (1) 
getting started, (2) negotiation and (3) implementation / revision. Getting started is 
influenced by previous experience of collaborative relationships. During this stage a 
background analysis evaluates current environmental conditions faced by the firms, 
possible collaborators are assessed and a selection is made. The next stage, negotiation, is 
often difficult for collaborators as they have little past experience on which to base 
decisions. During this time, estimates are made of anticipated resources as well as 
mechanisms to protect and transfer Intellectual Property, Roles and responsibilities are 
assigned. During the implementation / revision stage it is clear that the original plan 
requires substantial revision and adaptation. These revised projects frequently differ 
greatly from the original intention, partly because it takes some time for the companies to 
establish effective operational mechanisms. Favourable or unfavourable contingencies 
may occur, such as new market opportunities or technological and competitive problems. 
Often, there is a lapse of time between start-up and negotiation which may adversely affect 
the motivation to collaborate. 
However, adjustment and revision during collaboration are common features. Re- 
adjustment is due to internal learning that stimulates fine-tuning of structures and 
processes. For example, modifications might be made in the human resource profile, 
reassignment of roles and composition of the management team. The implementation stage 
is critical, as firms usually underestimate obstacles at this time. Continual negotiation to 
resolve impasses, suggests that a priori compatibility between partners is insufficient for 
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successful alliances. Making them work, requires mutual adaptation, fine-tuning and 
openness to learn from partners previous mistakes. Table 2.5 summarises Gray's model. 
Partner selection 
Resource consideration 
Assesses current envirorunental 
conditions 
Resource considerations Adaptation 
Mechanisms to protect EPR 
Assign roles and responsibilities 
Table 2.5: Summary of Gray's Collaboration Model 
2.1.8 Ellram: Life-Cycle Patterns In Industrial Buyer-Seller Partnerships. (1991: 12- 
21) 
According to Ellram, the life-cycle concept is useful to understand the growth and 
development of business alliances. The study was based on in-depth observation of eight 
manufacturing firms involved with one or more purchasing partners. Ellram's findings 
suggest four stages which she has termed development, commitment, integration and 
dissolution. 
The development stage, is when the partners become familiar with each other and establish 
the basis and ground rules for the future. This stage is characteristically exploratory and 
tentative in nature, and an unsatisfactory development stage may indeed delay or even stop 
the alliance's development. Development is critical, as it establishes norms and promotes a 
growth of confidence between the parties. 
Based on a successful development stage, the partners will move into the commitment 
stage. The aim of this stage, is to improve the relationship and build strength and 
dependency. Ellram suggests that top management support at this point is essential to 
determine strategic direction. This is in contrast to the need for top management visibility 
in stage one, which was symbolic and important to show support for the relationship. The 
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third stage, integration, is when confidence is at a high level and the goal is to maintain and 
stabilise the relationship. 
The fourth and final stage, is dissolution. Dissolution, where one partner dissolves the 
relationship, may be due to unsatisfactory performance, or where the alliance never got 






Maintain Declining product 
Stabilise Unsatisfactory performance 
Partner Incompatibility 
One partner decides to withdraw 
Table 2.6: Summary of Ellram's Lifecycle Framework 
2.1.9 Larson: A Process Model for the Formation of Entrepreneurial Dyads (1992: 82- 
97) 
This empirically researched model of seven dyads comprised three phases. Pre-conditions 
for exchange, conditions to build and integration and control. 
Phase 1, Pre-conditions for exchange, consists of historical experience of prior personal 
relations and firms' reputation. Prior personal relationships and known reputation reduced 
uncertainty and established expectations that enhanced early cooperation between the 
partners. 
Phase 11, Conditions to build, is considered a trial period designed to establish the 
necessary conditions to build the relationships, for example mutual economic advantage. 
Rules, procedures and clear expectations also help to build trust and reciprocity. 
Phase 111, Integration and control, means the organisations become operationally and 
strategically more tightly integrated. Effective control and coordination is achieved and 
opportunism avoided, through the regulatory presence of moral obligations, trust and 
concern for preserving reputations. Table 2.7 summarises Larson's process model. 
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Conditions to Build 
Prior experience of partner Trial period 
Rules 
Clear expectations 
Trust and reciprocity 
Operationally and strategically 
integrated 
Control and Coordination 
Moral obligations 
Trust 
Table 2.7: Summary of Larson's Process Model 
2.1.10 Murray and Mahon: Strategic Alliance Lifecycle(1993: 109-110) 
According to Murray and Mahon, alliances go through five stages, namely (1) courtship, 
(2) negotiation (3) startup, (4) maintenance, and (5) endings. All alliances being with the 
ritual courtship stage, where partners investigate each other, assess strengths and 
weaknesses, develop initial contacts and negotiating positions and critically evaluate the 
costs and benefits of the alliance. Negotiation, involves creating the contract agreement 
and, if all goes well, is followed by joint activity in the start-up stage. Organisations then 
progress to the maintenance phase, characterised by routine operations and reporting. 
Murray and Mahon then consider the importance to the organisations of endings and future 
alliance activity. They suggest three possible endings. Firstly, the end of the specific 
relationship with an extension into another area. Secondly an amicable separation and 
winding-up of the alliance with no further immediate relations by the partners and thirdly, a 
hostile divorce. Table 2.8 summarises this framework. 
Partner selection Contract agreement Joint activity Routine operations 







Table 2.8: Summary of Murray and Mahon's Strategic Alliance Lifecycle 
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2.1.11 Zajac & Olsen: Transactional Value Model (1993: 133: 143) 
Zajac and Oslen's value framework addresses joint value maximisation and the process by 
which the exchange partners create and claim value. The authors contend that expected 
joint gains often outweigh transaction cost considerations although the existence of inter- 
organisational strategies may appear irrational from a transaction cost and efficiency 
perspective. I 
Examination of inter-organisational strategies from a transactional value, rather than a 
transaction cost point of view, -suggests two major limitations vis-a-vis the transaction cost 
perspective. Firstly, the emphasis on single party cost minimisation neglects the 
interdependence between the exchange partners and their pursuit for joint value. Secondly, 
an over emphasis on structural features neglects process issues. 
Zajac and Olsen's inter-organisational exchange processes can be described in three distinct 
and logical stages. The initialising stage, theprocessing stage and the reconfiguring stage. 
The initialising stage is when each firm formulates its own strategic plan, evaluates 
exchange alternatives and begins involvement in the inter-organisational exchange. 
Perceptions of value emerge at this stage and firms identify with complementarities that can 
form the basis for mutually beneficial exchanges. Firms' behaviour at this stage can set a 
precedent and pattern for future exchanges (Fiol and Lyles 1985). 
The second processing stage, encompasses the forecast period over which value-creating 
e xchanges are expected to occur. A parallel process of informal inter-organisational 
communication occurs between individuals at many different levels in the organisations 
and between functions. 
'Recognition that learning is important to such exchange relations, is explicit in this model. 
Learning continues and actual value becomes increasingly clearer with the passage of time 
and over a range of inter-organisational exchanges. New interdependent activities by the 
65 
two parties give rise to associations, cognitive systems and memories, which then become a 
repository of organisational learning (Fiol and Lyles 1985). 
Inter-organisational conflict is an obstacle to value maximisation and explicit and implicit 
norms for managing conflict will be created. Expectations, arising from past actions, 
emphasise the importance of joint value maximisation and lead to searches for jointly 
satisfactory outcomes to conflicting situations. 
Development of trust is critical. The norms developing and evolving in this processing 
stage, set the tone for execution of future contracts. 
The third reconfiguring stage is characterised by redefinition of the strategy. Reaching the 
end of the planned duration of the relationship, or catalysed by changes in the partners, the 
value of the business relationship is assessed and compared relative to absence of the 
association. 
Changes emerge from a fluid environment and, as a result, value created has to be 
measured against actual gains. While the performance gap (Shortell and Zajac 1988) can 
lead to a re-evaluation of the relationship itself, it may simply lead to a reassessment of the 
developmental processes. In other words, the reconfiguring stage may not involve 
modification of the inter-organisational strategy per se, but only changed interaction within 
the existing strategy. Therefore, the reconfiguring stage can be said to loop back to, either 
the initialising, or processing stage. Table 2.9 summarises Zajac and Olsen's transaction 
value model. 
Each firm fonnulates strategic 
plan 
Evaluate altematives 
Formal and informal 
communication. 
Learning 
Norms for managing conflict 
Redefining strategy 
Value of relationship assessed 
Table 2.9: Summary of Zajac and Olsen's Transaction Value Model. 
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2.1.12 Ring & Van de Ven: Developmental Processes of Cooperative Inter- 
Organisational Relationships (1994: 94-112) 
Ring and Van de Ven consider how inter-organisational relationships emerge, grow and 
dissolve over time. They base the framework on the following key concepts, or assumed 
starting conditions, that remain fluid throughout the duration of the exchange. (a) 
uncertainties inherent in the cooperative relations, (b) efficiency and equity criteria for 
assessing the cooperative relations, (c) the need for resolution of disputes, and (d) the 
importance of role relationships. 
This framework is consistent with Common's (1950) original formulation of transactions, 
although Ring and Van de Ven see the evolution of a cooperative relationship as consisting 
of a repetitive sequence of negotiation, commitment, and execution, each of which is 
assessed in terms of efficiency and equity. 
In the negotiation stage, the focus is on formal bargaining. The parties develop joint 
expectations about their motivations, possible investments and perceived uncertainties. The 
underlying socio-psychological processes should offer evidence why the parties should 
enter into negotiations with one another. 
The commitment stage is when agreement is reached concerning the obligations and rules 
for future action. The terms and governance structure of the relationship are established 
and either made explicit in a formal relational contract or in a looser understanding. These 
agreements will depend on the amount of risk and the parties' willingness to rely on trust. 
In the execution stage, after a series of interactions, the players become more familiar with 
one another, and increasingly rely on inter-personal, as opposed to inter-role, relations. 
With the passage of time, misunderstandings, conflicts, and changed expectations are 
inevitable, and these factors can provide causes for rethinking the terms of the relationship. 
In these renegotiations, new supplementary agreements are established to resolve contested 
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issues. All other terms and understandings contained in the relational contract are expected 
to remain the same. 
in the final cycle of the process, the parties may decide to terminate the relationship, 
usually when they have achieved their commitments and the business is complete. Of 
course, dissolution will also be inevitable, as a consequence of failure. Table 2.10, Ring and 









Table 2.10: Summary of Ring and Van de Ven's Process Model. 
2.1.13 Doz: The Evolution Of Cooperation In Strategic Alliances: Initial Conditions 
Or Learning Processes? (1996,59: 81) 
In a longitudinal case study of two projects in one alliance, that extended to another four 
projects in two alliances, Doz has developed a framework to analyse the evolution of 
cooperation in strategic business alliances. He suggests that successful alliances are highly 
evolutionary and go through a sequence of interactive cycles of learning, re-evaluation and 
re-adjustment. Conversely, failing projects manifested inertia and resulted in either little, 
or divergent learning. 
A set of initial alliance conditions determined whether an exchange of knowledge between 
the partners would take place. These conditions were understood as a definition of the task 
to be performed, a set of action routines borrowed from the context of each partner, a 
design interface between the partners and a series of expectations about the results of the 
alliance. Doz observed that these initial conditions could either facilitate, or hamper, the 
partner's knowledge about their alliance's environment. 
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As the partners engage in the exchange, their learning leads to periodic evaluations of the 
alliance, which, in turn, causes the partners to make adjustments to the relationship. 
Successful alliances were seen to evolve through a sequence of learning, adjustment and re- 
adjustment cycles, in which the intentions behind the initial conditions changed or 
improved. Throughout the cycles, partners' expectations about alliance efficiency, equity 
between partners and their adaptability was positively re-evaluated by increasingly 
irreversible commitment to the alliance, thereby justifying further efforts to make the 
relationship successful. These learning cycles nourish the growth of cooperation between 
the partners. Table 2.11, below summarises Doz's Process Model. 
Initial alliance conditions 
Define tasks 
Expectations 
Assessment Intention behind initial conditions 
are changed 
Table 2.11: Summary of Doz's Evolution Learning Process Model. 
2.1.14 Schmitz, Frankel and Frayer: Efficient Consumer Response (ECR) Alliances: 
Best Practice Model (cited in Handifield and Nichols 1999). 
This framework is based on case studies involving several manufacturer-supplier and 
manufacturer-distributor alliances and the model has a number of vertical and horizontal 
components. The vertical components are, process, strategic and operational. Process 
outlines the stages of alliance development that show the required steps for formation, 
implementation and maintenance. The strategic element examines how strategic 
expectations and evaluations of the alliance evolve as it passes through development stages. 
The operational element outlines the development of search and selection criteria and 
operating standards for managing alliances. 
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The strategic and operational phases of alliance development must coincide with each of 
the following process stages namely conceptualisation, pursuance, confirmation and 
implementatioml continuity. 
Level one, alliance conceptualisation begins when the firm, driven by expectations of 
improved performance, decides to collaborate. Moreover, the creation of an alliance 
requires a new mindset towards other supply chain members. 
Level two, alliance pursuance The decision to form an alliance is taken and strategies are 
clarified and defined. Initial goals, established earlier, are reviewed and secondary goals 
derived by refining the primary goals. 
Level three, alliance confirmation, by formal or verbal agreement, focuses on partner 
selection. All partners determine the criteria for managing the relationship process. These 
will include the expected duration of the alliance and mechanisms to manage conflict and 
imbalances when partners fail to provide equal support. In addition to agreements on 
strategic effectiveness, the parties also develop mutual agreement regarding a number of 
operating standards. These are the mechanisms by which the parties intend their day-to-day 
business to operate together. They also include roles and responsibilities, measures of 
operational performance, type of information to be shared and frequency of information 
transfer. 
Level four, alliance implementation / continuity creates feedback mechanisms to 
administer and assess performance to determine whether the alliance will be sustained, 
modified or terminated. Table 2.12 summaries the model. 
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Conceptualisation Pursuance Confirmation Implementation 
/Cont 
Expectations of Define strategy Alliance agreement Feedback mechanisms 
improved performance Establish goals Duration Assess performance 






Type of information to 
be exchanged 
Table 2.12: Summary of Schmitz et al's, Alliance Best Practice Model 
2.1.15 Spekman, Forbeshm, Isabella and MacAvon: A Life Cycle Approach to 
Strategic Alliances (1998: 747-769) 
This is a seven stage model based on extensive case study research. The stages are 
anticipating, engaging, valuing, coordinating, investing, stabilising and decision. 
Spekman et al also examine the requirement that managers, involved in alliances, should 
have an "alliance mindset" and their research concludes that those whose perspectives 
accentuate learning and creativity, make the strongest alliance managers, 
The role of project, or team leader calls for new skills and a commitment to learning, to 
seek challenges and to honestly review successes as well as failures. The successful 
alliance manager is the symbol of the learning organisation. 
Anticipating is the preliminary stage, in which an organisation envisions the possibility of 
an alliance. Managers begin to articulate the strategic intent of the alliance and to consider 
potential alliance partners. 
Engaging follows and is characterised by partners shaping mutual expectations of the 
alliance. A steering committee enables key managers to take ownership of the alliance. 
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Valuing is the period when the terms and conditions of the business exchange are 
negotiated and finalised. A business case is completed and anticipated benefits determined. 
Coordinating is when joint work begins and more permanent governance structures are 
bedded in. The focus is on the integration of complementary business activities. 
Investing involves commitment of key resources and assets. The full costs associated with 
the alliance should be known and apparent at this time. 
Stabilising defines the stage when the alliance is on-going and viable. This stage reflects 
the alliance as it matures and realises its potential. 
Decision considers where the alliance and partners are going next. 
According to Spekman et al and the previous mentioned scholars, simply enumerating and 
defining the stages fails to impart the full impact of the on-going dynamic nature of these 
models. In particular, the continuous and often conflicting interplay between people, 
activities and processes has to be emphasised. Spekman et al, begin to address this when 
they consider the necessary attributes and skills that alliance managers require. For 
example, they discuss "alliance mindsets" that involve management perspectives to 
promote learning and creativity. Table 2.13, summarises Spekman et al's lifecycle model. 
Table 2.13: Summary of Spekman et al's lifecycle Model. 
72 
2.1.16 SUMMARY 
There is a strong link to theoretical roots in the foregoing synthesis of life cycle models. 
Marketing literature tends to focus on processes prior to formation of alliances, such as 
negotiation and positioning (e. g. Heide & John 1990, Wilson 1995) as well as factors that 
help to make alliances successful such as trust, commitment, interdependence and 
communication (e. g. Spekman et al 1998). 
Management and strategy literature examines the strategic intent behind alliances and the 
steps required for partner selection, determination of an alliance structure and its 
implementation. (see for example Hamel 1991; Larson 1992). Economic literature 
investigates inter-organisational strategies from a transaction cost point of view. This 
limitation of focus on costs of one party neglects the interdependence between the 
exchange partners (Zajac and Olsen, 1993). 
Although the models give a macro view of the whole lifecycle, they fail to illustrate the 
actual activities of life cycle evolution or the changes that take place when moving from 
one phase to another. Zajac and Olsen, Gray, Doz and Spekman et al. come closer to 
explaining this with the introduction of the general notion of learning. With regard to 
affiance dissolution, although implicit in many of the models, the concept is based mainly 
on opinion and is an area requiring further and empirical investigation. 
Ring and Van de Ven state that a concern for process adds a transient dimension that affects 
how managers negotiate, execute and modify alliances over time (1994: 113). According to 
Spekman et al (1998-247-248), a focus on process begins to address research gaps by 
considering the following types of questions. How do alliances evolve over time? What 
managerial skills and experience are required for managing alliances? What kinds of 
problems would alliance managers have to address over the life of an alliance? 
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2.2 ORGANISATION EVOLUTION AND BUSINESS SURVIVAL IN A 
CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 
The summary of the lifecycle models in the previous section alludes to dissolution as part 
of the evolutionary process, therefore section Z2 provides a brief review of organisational 
evolution and renewal. 
The historical process by which the past is encapsulated in the present is mimicked in 
modern theories of evolution, learning, and culture and natural selection. Past experiences 
are the product of a combination of experimentation and exploitation, turning to advantage 
the knowledge gained from experience. Evolution includes mechanisms for interpreting, 
retaining, transmitting and retrieving lessons from the past ýBaum and Singh 1994, refer 
also 1.3 and 1.4). 
According to Baum and Singh (1994: 45), the natural development of organisations can be 
affected by relatively small interventions, which have a significant and permanent effect. 
March (1991) agrees adding that evolutionary changes are unpredictable. The outcomes of 
an environment depend not only on its particularity, but also the ways in which previous 
environments have developed. Mis-directed strategies can make some outcomes 
unrealisable and history, is perversely unpredictable. 
Company culture often depends on ways in which information and experiences are spread. 
March, (1991) emphasises that historical processes rely on branching out, as well as on 
local feedback. Furthermore, evolutionary theories define opportunities for changing the 
course of history, sometimes by relatively modest interventions if these occur in the right 
places at decisive moments (see Nelson and Winter 1982). 
According to Nfiner and Anderson (1999), in order to achieve business prosperity, 
managers have two main roles. Firstly, to steer the company towards a higher level of 
evolutionary processes, often by direct intervention and secondly, to influence the 
organisation in its variation- selection and retention cycles. Variations occur in routines, or 
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stable bundles of activities, either intentionally or unintentionally, and some of these 
changes are selected and built into practice. 
Considering organisational evolution and business survival, Levinthal (1991) says it is 
essential to understand the distinction between learning and adaptation. On the one hand 
learning involves a cumulative development of skills and capabilities whereas adaptation 
refers to a response to feedback about environmental changes. 
Miner and Anderson (1999) put forward a number of reasons why some managerial action 
can lead to failure. For example, managers may fall into a competency trap. This is the 
result of lack of foresight and arises from a failure to recognise better practice, because the 
search does not extend beyond current routines. Even though management is aware of 
alternatives, these are not followed up because of switching costs and may ultimately lead 
to stagnation (Levitt and March 1988; Starbuck 1996). 
Quinn (1980) stresses that "logical incrementalism " is the means by which firms can 
capitalise on current competencies, make incremental adaptations and explore alternative 
pathways. Increasingly, research points to the combination of existing routines as an 
important source of innovation (Abernathy and Clark 1985). 
Serendipity also plays a considerable role in major organisational change (see for example 
March and Olsen 1975; Quinn 1980; Van de Ven, Angle and Pool 1989), when unexpected 
outcomes are the product of interacting routines. 
Social interaction plays a central role in the transfer of new technologies and involves a 
more complicated process than the simple transfer of information (Granovetter 1985; 
Leonard-Barton 1991). 
Cohen and Levinthal (1990) suggest that a firm's "absorptive capacity", that is its capacity 
to evaluate and utilise outside knowledge, is a function of the ability and level of learning 
of the workforce. An R&D department that recognises the value of new information can 
75 
assimilate and apply knowledge to enhance this learning capability, as well as directing it to 
commercial ends. This implies that development of capabilities and innovative performance 
is path dependent (Levinthal 1991). Conversely, if a firm is not involved in active market 
research, the net result may be lost opportunities and reduced absorptive capacity. 
Miles and Snow (1994) maintain that existing managerial philosophies are the most 
difficult barriers for firms to overcome in their search for new strategies and structures. 
Furthermore, success results from achieving a 'fit" between the internal and external 
environments and writers conceptualise this as a journey, during which strategies are 
modified, rather than a destination. 
2.2.1 ORGANISATIONAL RENEWAL 
Tangible assets alone do not usually provide a sustainable competitive advantage (Miles 
and Snow 1994). The principal vehicle for renewal is an organisation's dynamic capability 
(Teece et al 1997) and its source of distinctive competence (Wernerfelt 1984). Such know- 
how is not just in the minds of its members, but also resides in organisational. processes and 
characteristics (Dodgson 1991; Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995; Nonaka et al 1996). Firms 
with the capability to continually redesign strategies are termed learning organisations 
(Senge 1990; Huber 1991,1996; Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). 
In order to renew themselves quicker, increasing numbers of businesses are moving toward 
organisational forms of networks that demand new types of managerial skills (Miles and 
Snow 1994; Spekman et al 1998). Cooperation between firms is therefore growing in 
strategic importance (Mudambi and Helper 1998). Supply chain alliances are recognised as 
important to competitive advantage by transferring and combining technologies, skills and 
capabilities (e. g. Das and Teng 2000). In so doing, they develop isolating mechanisms 
(Rumelt 1984) such as the ability to create more value than their competitors, by sharing 
tacit and explicit know-how (Reed and de Fillipi 1990; Ghemawat 1991). 
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These alliances are built upon long-term informal agreements between partners and are 
governed by trust, commitment and reputation (Casson 1991; 1997; Mudambi and Helper 
1998; Das. and Bing-Shen Teng 1998). The'development of such institutions takes time to 
grow and as Ring and Van de Ven (1994: 113) point out: - 
"As uncertainty, complexity and duration of economic transactions within and between 
firms increase, it becomes increasingly importantfor scholars and managers to understand 
developmental processes and how equity, trust, conflict resolution procedures and internal 
governance structures emerge, evolve and dissolve over time. " 
2.2.2 DISSOLUTION IN PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS: ARE THERE 
SIMIULARITIES IN ALLIANCE WITHDRAWAL? 
A useful framework to analyse the dissolution of business alliances is the exit-voice 
dichotomy, originally proposed by Hirschman (1970). Hirschman describes two 
characteristic ways of reacting to deterioration in economic / political domains: 
(1) exit, ending or threatening to end the relationship; 
(2) voice, actively and constructively expressing one's dissatisfaction, with the intention of 
improving conditions. 
Hirschman's model encapsulates a range of reactions to relations in an economic or 
political environment. However, he is not pessimistic and does not assume that all alliances 
culminate in exit, although business relations have their periodic ups and downs. "Voice" 
refers to active and constructive reactions, in terms of actual vocalisation and modification 
of behaviour. "Exit" refers to destructive behaviour, including not only termination of 
relations but, more importantly, other behaviour intended to harm the relationship 
(Hirschman 1970). 
A number of models account for the process by which participants disengage from and 
dissolve in personal relationships (Baxter 1983; Duck 1982; Miller and Parks 1982). 
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Rusbult's (1983) investment model is an attempt to describe reactions to potentially 
reparable lapses in the quality of relations. Rather that assuming that the relationship is on 
the road to dissolution, his exit-voice-loyalty-neglect study deals with reactions to problems 
as they emerge. 
Rusbult"s (1980,1983) investment model of commitment in close partnerships uses 
measures of satisfaction, investment size, and alternative quality to predict the level of 
commitment. This model proposes that the level of satisfaction, prior to relationship 
decline, tends to determine whether persons react to problems in a constructive or 
destructive manner. Greater satisfaction should induce voice while discouraging exit (see 
also Wilson 1978; 1995). Satisfaction is positively associated with voice-like behaviour, 
such as superior communication. 
Rusbult (1983) found that increases in investment size usually promoted constructive 
behaviour while inhibiting a destructive response. Resources, such as time that individuals 
direct to a relationship and activities which are intrinsic to the involvement, are considered 
to be investments. Other studies, in the domain of interpersonal relations, have concluded 
that greater investments in relationships lead to higher levels of voice and loyalty and lower 
levels of exit (e. g. Staw 1976). 
Relating these findings to business alliances where investment is often high, there is much 
more to lose in financial terms if the alliance suffers or ends. Accordingly constructive 
responses, intended to maintain or revive the alliance, are to be expected (Wilson 
1978; 1995). Similarly, if investment is low, there is little to lose from an exit. 
Rusbult's third variable, Le. alternative quality, determined whether an individual's 
response to dissatisfaction was active or passive. Such a threat to a business alliance can 
serve as a source of power that, in the absence of a suitable alternative, assists improvement 
of the relationship. Thus factors associated with alternative quality may promote exit or 
voice. 
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Helper and Levine (1992) argue that an exit relationship is characterised by low 
commitment and infrequent information exchange, making it easy for suppliers to perceive 
high probability of change in allegiance. By contrast, in a voice relationship both 
commitment and information exchanges are high, causing suppliers to perceive low 
probability of switching to a rival. Inter-organisational life cycle literature considers 
relationship dissolution to be of sufficient merit to be a concept for study (e. g. Ring and 
Van de Ven 1994). 
Informal commitment requires active effort by participants to develop social networks 
(Casson 1997). Given that alliances depend on such networks, it might be usefill to look for 
information in literature about organisational renewal and dissolution pertaining to personal 
relationships (e. g. Duck 1982). 
In exchange theory terms, each relationship has its own rewards and cost dynamics. 
Evidence appears to suggests that a ceiling exists on the number of alliance relations at any 
one time. Accretion of additional associations is usually offset by disengaging from 
existing ties (Baxter 1979), similarly organisations can grow out of existing alliances as 
motivation changes with the passage of time (see for example Spekman et al 1998). 
2.2.3 SUNBIARY 
A number of process models are reviewed in Chapter two, setting out phases and different 
characteristics within each phase. 
The importance of evolutionary processes has been recognised in many fields of 
management (see for example Nelson and Winter 1982; Baum and Singh 1994; Teece, 
Pisano and Shuen 1997). However, on the most part, research has ignored questions of 
process with regard to inter-organisational business alliances. In essence, understanding 
the historical and contemporary evolution or lifecycles in alliances could provide a useful 
tool for interpreting lessons from the past and learning future alliance strategies. In today's 
market environment, organisations must grasp every opportunity to maintain and improve 
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competitive positioning. This implies that business strategy must be flexible and people 
adaptable and alert to changes. 
In this sense, business alliances could be used as strategic instruments with which 
companies transfer and combine technologies, skills and capabilities. This ability of allies 
to align strategies in response to market turbulence is described by Teece et al (1997) as a 
dynamic capability. 
2.3 RESEARCH AIM and QUESTIONS 
Discussions concerning inter-organisational exchange relationships can be found in 
literature, on such diverse subjects as marketing ( for example Ford 1980), management 
(Ellram 1991), strategy (Doz 1996) and economics (Zajac and Olsen 1993). It is perhaps 
this kind of fragmentation which has contributed to the relative anonymity of process 
frameworks in academic publications. 
There is a strong link to theoretical roots in the synthesis of life cycle models. Marketing 
literature tends to focus on processes prior to formation of alliances, such as negotiation 
and positioning (e. g. Heide & John 1990; Wilson 1995) as well as factors that help to make 
alliances successful such as trust, commitment, interdependence and communication (e. g. 
Spekman et al 1998). 
Management and strategy literature examines the strategic intent behind alliances and the 
steps required for partner selection, determination of an alliance structure and its 
implementation (see for example Hamel 1991; Larson 1992). Economic literature 
investigates inter-organisational strategies from a transaction cost point of view. This 
limitation of focus on costs of one party neglects the interdependence between the 
exchange partners (Zajac and Olsen, 1993). 
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There is a dearth of research on the evolution of strategic alliances in contrast to abundant 
research on the conditions that lead to their creation (Doz 1996). When alliance 
management is discussed, the relevance of such systems seems to have been missed in 
terms of both theoretical development and practitioner value (Zajac and Olsen 1993; Ring 
and Van de Ven 1994; Spekman et al 1998). Recent studies of inter-organisational relations 
have emphasised the need for research to more fully explain the dynamics of inter- 
organisational cooperation and the performance implications of strategic alliance 
development ( see for example Spekman et al 1998). 
This has been acknowledged by scholars (e. g. Ford 1980; Dwyer et A 1987; Anderson and 
Narus, 1990; Wilson 1995) and Ring and Van de Ven (1994) who state that a concern for 
process adds a temporal dimension, affecting how managers negotiate, execute and modify 
alliances over time. There appears to have been an overemphasis on the structural content 
of alliance building and a dearth of empirical studies of its development (Doz 1996). 
From this review it is deduced that writings on the topic of alliancing have focused mainly 
on how to form alliances and the resultant benefits from them. Central to this issue, and 
largely ignored, is understanding how alliance relationships develop with the passage of 
time. This demands that greater attention is directed to evolution of the alliance and the 
social context within which dyads or networks are embedded. 
In the light of the foregoing and in order to contribute to, and build upon, previous research 
the overall aim of this thesis is to consider further this notion of phased development in 
business alliances. The research question which supports this aim is :- 
How do alliances evolve over time? 
This review outlines a number of process models each with different numbers of stages and 
characteristics within each stage ( for example Wilson 1978; Ford 1980; Dwyer et al 1987; 
Gray 1989; Larson 1992). Nevertheless, although empirical evidence is inconsistent with 
regards to alliance stages and characteristics, there is growing recognition that alliance 
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development remains an under researched area of understanding (see for example Ring and 
Van de Ven 1994; Doz 1996). A central issue of this thesis is to explore the alliance 
development path and capture the dynamics of cooperation , summarised in the 
following 
research question: - 
Z Are progressive stages evident as the alliance matures and in what way does one 
stage differentiate itsetffrom another? 
While the importance of evolutionary processes is well recognised in many fields of 
management (e. g. Nelson and Winter 1982; Baum and Singh 1994; Teece Pisano and 
Shuen 1997), there is growing recognition that alliances and networks are also an 
evolutionary, multifaceted means of cooperation (Osborn and Hagedoorn 1997). To 
address this, researchers relatively recently have begun to consider the impact of broader 
social relations rather than maintaining a static, deterministic interpretation of the nature of 
transactions (e. g. Ford 1980; Ring and Van de Ven 1994; Wilson 1995; Doz 1996; 
Spekman et al 1998). 
Appreciation of inter-organisational relations stimulates learning as issues are better 
understood and objectives re-defined. Inter-organisational teams encourage regular 
communications, problem solving, boundary spanning and adapting to changing 
environments (Ancona and Caldwell 1992; Monczka and Trent 1993: Spender 1996). The 
foregoing suggests that cooperation between trading partners should enable otherwise 
elusive specialist skills to be accessed, allowing complex tacit knowledge to be transferred 
and technologies shared (Nelson and Winter 1982; Nonaka et al 1996). 
Accordingly, literature argues that business collaboration accelerates the exchange of 
knowledge and creates conduits for learning (Hall 1993; Teece et al 1997ý This knowledge 
transfer, increases understanding of joint processes, and open communication provides the 
background so that the inter-organisational teams can be the medium for innovation and 
creativity (Best 1990; Dodgson 199 1; Varadarajan and Cunningham 1995). 
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Cross boundary communication derives information from other organisations by drawing 
on knowledge and past experience, to develop unique competencies (Ancona and Caldwell 
1992). New appreciation of cross-functional relations stimulates learning as issues are 
better understood and objectives clearly defined (Clark and Wheelwright 1992; Harshman 
and Phillips 1994; Hedlund 1994). 
Although scholars acknowledge the important economic role that alliances play in the 
competitiveness of the firms, in terms of generating new capabilities through learning and 
innovation (see for example Itami and Roehl 1987; Miller and Shamsie 1996), they are 
questioning early theoretical assumptions concerning alliances and acknowledge the 
complexity of alliances and associated networks ( Debresson and Amesse 1991; Powell 
1998; Lundvall 1994; Griffin and Hausser 1996; Hunt- Campbell 2000). 
Critics of current research into cooperative inter-organisational strategies argue that studies 
to date have demonstrated a limited understanding of contemporary business relations 
(Imrie and Morris 1992; Serapio and Cascio; Parkhe 1998; Yan and Zeng 1999). In 
particular, the field has suffered from a lack of reseaich into individual and managerial 
behaviour or organisational processes (Doz 1996). 
From a strategic perspective and with the aim of building competencies or capabilities, 
teamwork can be considered part of the corporate response to environmental challenges, 
(e. g. Monczka and Trent 1993). Teamwork provides a structure that encourages employees 
to work in a mutually supportive way and it enables development of effective problem 
solving capabilities (see Hurst et al 1989). 
The review again emphasised that a firm's knowledge and capabilities are internal and 
embedded. However, close relations between customers and suppliers, can provide the 
opportunity for specialised attributes to take root and grow (see for example Penrose 1959; 
Wernerfelt 1984; Barney 1991; Dyer and Singh 1998). Organisations cannot create 
knowledge without people's contribution and this takes place within an expanding 
community of interaction, crossing intra and inter-organisational levels and boundaries 
83 
(Powell 1989; Saxenian 1991; Chung et al 2000). Innovation is considered essential for 
organisations to maintain competitive edge and business alliances appear to provide the 
creative context that nurtures innovation ( see Debresson and Arnmesse; Pavitt 1992). 
The objective for managers is to build an organisation capable of continuous improvement, 
innovation, collective learning, and information transfer (Collis 1991: 66). Competitive 
strengths are developed by organisational learning, and acquisition of industry-specific 
capabilities for production, distribution, R&D, purchasing, and labour relations (Chandler 
1992: 92). 
However, all of the above takes time to accumulate as well as being influenced by external 
and internal conditions affecting the alliance and. the continuous and conflicting interplay 
between people, structures and processes. Furthermore, because alliances evolve over time, 
internal and external conditions, alliance objectives and expectations change and are likely 
to differ from the original concept. 
Although studies identify stages in alliance evolution (see for example Ellram 1991; 
Muffay and Mahon 1993; Ring and Van de Ven 1994), few of the studies cited in this 
review consider how an alliance advances from one phase to another (see Ellram 1991). 
Although the models give a macro view of the whole lifecycle, they fail to illustrate the 
actual activities of life cycle evolution or the changes that take place when moving from 
one phase to another. Zajac and Olsen (1993), Gray (1989), Doz (1996) and Spekman et al 
(1998) come closer to explaining this with the introduction of the general notion of 
learning. 
This knowledge is critical to both academic and practitioner understanding in order to 
identify where in the cycle the alliance might currently be and the factors that influence 
management and growth at that point in time. Without an understanding of movement 
between stages, the concept of alliances developing in stages becomes almost meaningless. 
Research questions number three to five summarise the above: - 
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3 Given that the degree of interaction, learning and innovation may alter as the 
alliance relationship develops, what characteristics are evident within each of 
the stages? 
Are certain characteristic more important in one phase of the evolution than in 
another? 
Whatfactors identify the transition from one stage to another? 
One of the striking facts about the increase in alliance formation is the large number which 
have failed to succeed (see for example Parkhe 1998; Speckman et al 1998). Despite this, 
explanations of dissolution or withdrawal have received little empirical attention, with 
notable exceptions including Weitzel and Jonsson (1998), Seabright, et al (1992), 
Truskowski and Thorne-Thomsen (1994), Serapio and Cascio (1996); Glaister and Buckley 
(1999). 
Quinn and Cameron (1983) refer to an organisational life cycle with stages similar to those 
of the product life cycle and cite decline as the latter stage. In this regard, a number of inter- 
organisational process models have also emphasised different factors and stages to explain 
the changing characteristics of exchange relationships over a period of time (see for 
example D'Aunno and Zuckerman 1987; Gray 1989; Larson 1993; Murray and Mahon 
1993, Wilson 1978,1995; Speckman et at 1998). Implied in these discussions is the notion 
that dissolution only occurs after organisations have passed through other stages in the life 
cycle. 
According to Dwyer et al (1987) the possibility of withdrawal, or disengagement, has to be 
implicit throughout the whole relationship, although actual dissolution is often left 
unexplained. They suggest that there are probably many dissolution trajectories and that it 
is overly simplistic to regard termination as being consolidated within a single phase. 
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Research to date suggests that suspension of cooperation between organisations might be 
due to one, or a combination of the following reasons: - lack of clear purpose and 
management commitment; incompatibility between objectives and reward; lack of clear 
monitoring of changing internal and external conditions; personnel turnover; lack of 
investment or commitment to a long-term future; other factors beyond the companies' 
control; static focus on the final outcome rather that viewing the process as being 
evolutionary (see for example Greenhalgh 1983; Cameron, Whetton and Kin 1987; Weitzel 
and Jonsson 1989; Yan 1998; Yan and Zeng 1999). 
This latter factor is crucial since it indexes contemporary concerns in the alliance literature 
that researchers should focus more on the process of alliance development (Ring and Van 
de Ven 1994; Doz 1996) and in particular, the way in which stability and instability of that 
process comes about and is managed ( Yan and Zeng 1999). 
The main argument from the literature is that research recognises that alliances are 
inherently unstable, but most fail to explain why many can survive and succeed over time 
(Yan 1998). Dissolution is usually considered as a sign of failure, yet it may actually 
represent an accomplishment of the partner's initial intention, and would thus signify 
success (Gomes-Casseres 1986). 
The summary of process models in chapter two alludes to dissolution as part of the 
evolutionary process. Although implicit in many of the models, the concept is based 
mainly on opinion and is an area requiring further and empirical investigation. Given this 
lack of empirical exploration and conceptual depth, this thesis sets out to contribute to the 
debate by considering the nature of alliance dissolution with a view to understanding better 
its conditions and consequences. This is encapsulated in research question number six: - 
6 R%atfactors tfigger stability and instability in alliances and what happens when 
the alliance ends? 





The aim of the chapter is to set out the philosophical context and methodological 
approach undertaken in this study. 
Accordingly, its objectives are: - 
* to provide background literature justifying the qualitative research strategy 
* to describe the research design and process, methods of data collection and analysis and 
how the data was subsequently interpreted and presented 
9 to articulate the limitations to the methodology 
3.1 QUALITATIVE RESEARCH AND ITS TRADITION 
Qualitative research is a form of social inquiry that focuses on the way people interpret and 
make sense of their experiences and the world in which they live (Holloway 1997: 1). 
Researchers, studying an actual setting try to make sense of phenomena by inductive and 
interpretative methods (Flick 1998: 24). A number of different procedures within the wider 
framework cut across disciplines and subject matter and utilise interconnected terms, 
concepts and assumptions (see for example Denzin and Lincoln 1998; Holloway 1997; 
Patton 1990). The aim however, remains the same; that is to understand the social reality 
of those individuals, groups or cultures under examination (Holloway 1997: 1). The focus 
on which attention is concentrated is how participants' interpret their experience and 
construct reality (Berger and Inkmann 1967, cited in Burgess 1985: 3). 
3.2 HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
Denzin and Lincoln (1998: 13-22) refer to historical development of qualitative research as 
taking place in five moments, or phases, which are described as follows: - 
1. The traditional period which had its roots in anthropology and sociology and spanned 
over the period from the early twentieth century up to World War H. In terms of 
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sociology, the work of the "Chicago Schoor' in the 1920's and 30's established the 
importance of qualitative research in the study of human group behaviour (Denzin and 
Lincoln 1998: 1). Prior to that time qualitative research had been journalistic in style and 
relatively unsystematic (Holloway 1979: 3). In anthropology, during the same period, 
studies by Boas, Mead, Benedict, Bateson, and Malinowski charted new fieldwork 
methods for observing and analysing the customs and habits of other societies and 
cultures (Denzin and Lincoln 1998: 1). 
2. Since then qualitative research experienced steady advancement, and the Modernist 
Phase from the 1940's onwards was marked by attempts to formalise qualitative 
research. This lasted until the emergence of the symbolic interactionist perspectives by 
Becker et al, in 1961 and was followed by the development of grounded theory by 
Glaser and Strauss (1967) (see also Holloway 1979: 4, also Miles and Huberman 1994). 
3. Blurred genres is the term describing the subsequent development of qualitative 
research until the mid 1980's and features in the various theoretical models which 
researchers could choose to use, either ' separately or in combination. 
Ethonomethodology and phenomenology are two of these paradigms (Flick 1998: 9). 
4. A profound split occurred in the mid 1980s when some researchers challenged 
previous models and called into question issues of validity, reliability, and objectivity, 
of work carried out in earlier phases. This was termed the crisis of representation by 
Denzin and Lincoln (1998: 19). Interpretive theories were common, and writers 
continued to question older models of truth and meaning (Rosaldo 1989, cited in 
Denzin and Lincoln 1998: 19). 
5. In the Fifth Moment, or what appears to be the latest and current phase, the emphasis 
has shifted towards interpretation of theories and narratives that fit specific, delimited, 
local, historical situations and problems (see also Flick 1998: 10). 
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3.3 QUALITATIVE VS. QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH: CONFLICTING OR 
COMPLEMENTARY PERSPECTIVES 
There appear to be two main interpretive research paradigms: - 
9 positivist and post positivist and 
0 constructivist-interpretative 
The term positivist applies to the dominant philosophical ideas of the physical and social 
sciences over the last four centuries (Denzin and Lincoln 1998: 116). A positivist 
approach takes the view that the world is relatively unproblematic and the main issue is 
how to measure research findings adequately (Sapsford and Jupp 1996: 1). Positivism 
emphasises the neutrality and separateness of the researcher from the subject under 
investigation and is typically quantitative in nature in that it results from measurement and 
analysis of relationships between numerical quantities (ibid. 1). 
One of the main traits of this type of research is the question of objectivity and distance 
between researcher and his subject (Holloway 1997: 12). However, the danger of this 
approach is that researchers treat perceptions of the social world as objective and absolute, 
and neglect everyday subjective interpretations in the context of the research (ibid. 12). 
Other paradigms take a more interactionist approach, looking at the meanings of people's 
situations and actions as dynamic and negotiated moment by moment. Studies based on 
this perspective, are more likely to be qualitative (see for example Strauss and Corbin 
1996). The word qualitative implies an emphasis on process and meanings that are not 
rigorously measured in terms of quality, amount, intensity or frequency (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 1998: 8). Qualitative researchers stress the socially constructed nature of reality, 
the intimate relationship between researcher, the study subject, and the situational 
constraints that shape the inquiry (ibid. 8). 
Embodied in this is the constructivist point of view that considers the context as a product 
of history and social structure (Sapsford and Jupp 1996: 2). The constructivist / 
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interpretive paradigm is a wide ranging framework with fine distinctions and detailed 
subdivisions, including phenomenology, ethnomethodology and related theoretical 
traditions associated with interpretive'methods (Lincoln and Guba 1985: 14-15). According 
to Denzin and Lincoln (1998: 218), paradigm development within qualitative research is at 
a formative stage, with no consistency of agreement among proponents about definitions, 
meanings or implications. 
Both quantitative and qualitative research have had a long and distinguished history in 
studies of social science (Denzin and Lincoln 1998: 1). The discussion therefore, is not 
about the merits or demerits of quantitative or qualitative methodology, as both have their 
own strengths and weaknesses. It is the problem itself and the subsequent questions to be 
answered, that guide the researcher as to the most appropriate method for a particular study 
(Patton 1990: 13). 
3.4 INTERPRETIVE PROCEDURES 
Interpretive procedures owe their theoretical tradition to the notion of "interactionism" 
which is to be found in the work of Blumer (1996) and Hughus (1971) (cited in Burgess 
1984: 3) and has roots in the human sciences, particularly history and anthropology 
(Holloway 1979: 1). 
Researchers focus on the way in which different people experience, define and structure 
their lives (Burgess 1983: 3). Interpretists claim that people's experiences are essentially 
context bound, that is, they cannot be free of time, location or the mind of the human actor 
(Holloway 1997: 2). To make the best use of such a theoretical perspective it is therefore 
essential to gather statements from participants with a view of examining various 
dimensions of the situations that they construct and, in so doing, to focus on ongoing 
patterns of interaction (Burgess 1983: 4). 
In describing fully situations in the life of individuals or groups under scrutiny, empirical 
data is collected from a variety of sources, including case study, histories, personal 
experiences, life stories, introspection, interviews, observations, interaction and any 
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material that gives meaning to the routine and problematic moments in individuals' lives 
(Denzin and Lincoln 1998: 3). Accordingly, qualitative researchers deploy a wide range of 
practices, hoping always to get a deeper understanding of the subject matter in hand 
(ibid. 3). 
The multiplicity of related methods and meanings make it difficult for researchers to agree 
on a definition of qualitative research, for it is never just one thing. However, Nelson et 
al"s (1992) definition which is quoted as follows, provides a good starting point (cited in 
Denzin and Lincoln 1998: 6). 
"Qualitative research is an inter-disciplinary, trans-disciplinary, and sometimes counter- 
disciplinary field It cuts across the humanities and the social and physical sciences. 
Qualitative research is many things at one and the same time. Its practitioners are 
sensitive to the value of a multi-method approach. Yhey are committed to a naturalistic 
perspective; and to an interpretive understanding of human experience. At the same time, 
the field is inherently political and is shaped by multiple ethical and political positions 
(Nelson et al 1992). 
Qualitative research places the investigator in a historical and contemporary context that 
guides and constrains work in his specific study (see for example Miles and Huberman 
1994, Flick 1998). In this sense qualitative methodology is imprecise because human 
beings do not behave logically or predictably (Holloway 1997: 3). Investigators in 
qualitative inquiry turn to actors for guidance, control and direction throughout the research 
(ibid. 3). 
As a consequence, during the course of the research the researcher must not only confront 
the ethics and politics but also consider the effects of his, or her, own actions (Lincoln and 
Guba 1998: 23). According to Punch (1994, cited in Punch 1998: 140) politics suffuse all 
social science research. In this respect, a central feature of qualitative work involves 
monitoring the process and the research design, for the latter must be continually modified 
and developed by the researcher throughout the process (Burgess 1984: 5). 
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This sentiment is echoed by Holloway (1997: 3), while stating the apparently obvious, that 
rigour and order are important for scientific research given that the social world is neither 
orderly nor systematic, says that it is all the more important that the researcher proceeds in 
a well structured and systematic way. 
Alongside observational work, formal and informal interviews should be conducted and 
records made. Techniques should be developed for gathering, storing and retrieving data 
for analysis as well as checking the reliability and validity of that information (Burgess 
1984: 5). Basic to the good conduct of field research is the development of open relations 
between the researcher and the researched (ibid. 5) 
According to Miles and Huberman (1994: 5) qualitative research has the following recurring 
features: - 
" it is conducted in the course of intense and prolonged contact in field situations 
" it offers a "holistic" overview of the context 
" the researcher gains perceptions from a new standpoint 
" themes are reviewed and discussed with contributors of information 
" the researcher is the main medium for measurement 
" analysis is described in a way that permits researchers to draw comparisons 
Patton (1990: 40) illustrates how the variety of strategies for qualitative inquiry are built 
upon several interconnected themes that are summarised in table 3: 1 below. 
92 
Naturalistic inquiry Studying real-world situations that unfold naturally and unobtmsivcly; free of 
prcdeterniined constraints on outcomes. 
Inductive analysis Immersion in detail and specifics of data to discover important categories and 
inter-relationships. Use of open questions, rather than testing theoretically 
derived hypotheses. 
Holistic perspective Ue phenomenon is understood to focus on complex interdependencies as 
opposed to discrete variables. 
Qualitative data Detailed, in depth, inquiry using direct quotations that capture people's 
personal experiences. 
Personal contact and People's perspectives and insights are critical to a better understanding. 
insight 
Dynamic systems Attention to process, assumes that change is constant and ongoing. 
Unique case Assumes each case is special and unique. Cross case analysis follows 
orientation individual case studies. 
Context sensitivity - Places findings in a social, historical and temporal context. 
Empathic neutrality Complete objectivity is impossible and the researcher's goal is to understand 
the world in all its complexity, while taking a neutral non-judgmental stance. 
Design flexibility Open to adaptive inquiry as understanding deepens and /or situations change. 
Avoids getting locked into designs that eliminate responsiveness and therefore 
allow pursuit of new possibilities. I 
Table 3.1: Variety in Qualitative Inquiry: Theoretical Traditions (Patton 1990: 40) 
3.5 STARTING RESEARCH AND GAINING ACCESS 
Number of research sites 
According to Eisenhardt (1989: 532) there is no ideal number of cases. Nevertheless it is 
often difficult to generate theory with fewer than four cases and if there are more than ten 
cases it becomes too complicated. However, in Dyer and Wilkins's (1991: 614) response to 
Eisenhardt, the former argue that "such a view is clearly at odds with what social scientists 
would consider to be classical case studies in the field "' For example, some of the more 
important studies that have advanced the knowledge of organisations and social systems 
include authors listed in the following table: - 
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Table 3.2: Theory Generation Using Two or Fewer Case Studies. Source Dyer and Wilkins 1991 
According to Dyer and Wilkins (1991-615) the main aim is to describe the social scene, the 
context in which the events occur and to reveal, what Light (1979) refers to as, the deep 
structure of social behaviour (see also Dyer and Wilkins 1991-615). 
Glaser and Strauss (1967: 61) suggest that it is impossible to define at the outset exactly 
how many groups will be sampled during the entire study and that the criterion for judging 
when to stop sampling, is "theoretical saturation. " This means that when no more data is 
found, the researcher develops new categories or additional properties and begins to see 
similar instances repeated. 
It is usual for research reports to indicate that the literature review constitutes the "real" 
start of research. It is the reading done by the researcher, it is argued, that helps to generate 
the research problem (Burgess 1984: 32). However, background reading is not all that may 
be used and the foregoing account overlooks the researcher's personal experience. That is, 
the researcher can make links between familiarity with the social setting and the literature 
within the field of study (Burgess: 1984-34). 
Gaining access is a precondition for conduct of the research. This usually involves 
negotiating entry into a group, institution, community or social setting (Sapsford and Jupp 
1996: 64). 
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3.6 DATA COLLECTION 
Observation 
Observation is one of the principal strategies in data collection. The typology developed by 
Gold (1958) distinguishes four types of participant roles (cited in Flick 1998: 137-138): 
* The complete participant. The researcher is part of the setting and takes an active 
insider's role. 
* The parficipant-as-observer. The researcher has negotiated access to the setting and is 
an observer of the whole work group under study. 
* Yhe observer-as-participant. The researcher is only marginally involved in the 
situation. 
7he complete observer. The researcher does not take part in the setting and adopts a 
"fly 
-on 
the wall" approach. 
Researchers, as observers, look at places and people in their natural settings and qualitative 
researchers generally rely on participant observation (observer-as-participant) (Holloway 
1997: 109). In the majority of cases data is collected regarding incidents that give meaning 
to the behaviour or culture of a particular group, institution or community (see for example 
Sissons 198 1). Participant observation does not just mean observing the situation, but also 
involves listening to the people under scrutiny (Holloway 1997: 109). The aim is to produce 
detailed, qualitative descriptions of human behaviour in natural situations and in a cultural 
context. Spradley (1980: 34) distinguishes three phases of participant observation (cited in 
Flick 1998: 142): 
1. Descriptive observation serves to provide the researcher with an orientation as regards 
the field under study. It helps to add non-specific background information, which is 
helpful to appreciation of the complexity of issue while at the same time serving to 
develop new research questions and different lines of vision; 
95 
Focused observation, whereby the perspective increasingly narrows onto processes and 
problems which are essential to the research question, 
3. Selective observation, occurs towards the end of the data collection and is concerned 
with finding further evidence for the types of practices and processes found in the 
second step. 
Data collected in this manner is combined with information from conversations and 
interviews. Where appropriate, documentary sources are recorded using fieldnotes, ideally 
to produce an in-depth and rounded picture of the group that reflects the complexity of its 
social world (Sapsford and Jupp 1996: 61-63). It is not unusual for the focus of the research 
to change quickly during the course of data collection as particular issues are revealed as 
important (ibid. 61). As with any research method, participant observation has its 
advantages and limitations, and these are summarised in table 3.3 below (Sapsford and 
Jupp 1996); 
............ ....... t 
........... ... ........... ....... 
.... 
. ........... ... ............... 
" Dates are documented as events occur 0 The environment may be inaccessible and 
" Observation provides information on the observation impossible 
context and behaviour of those not directly 0 People may consciously or unconsciously 
involved change the way they behave and render 
" Information gathered at interviews can be observation inaccurate 
checked against observational notes 0 It is time consuming and costly 
Greater in-depth knowledge of a culture or 0 Observations are filtered through the 
subculture is generated interpretive lens of the observer 
Immersion in the setting is the first step in 
observation. Researchers may avoid 
disturbances and potential bias as a result of 
only occasional visits 
Observation is less disruptive than 
interviews. 
Table J. J: Advantages and Disadvantages of Participant Observation. Source: Sapsford and Jupp 
1996: 56-65 
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In summary, some of the problems are that participant observation can involve questions of 
validity and reliability, observer and setting bias, and the absence of checking by a third 
party (Burgess 1984: 45). 
Interviews and interviewing 
Basic interviewing skills include gaining access, presentation by the researcher, building 
trust and establishing rapport. Kvale (1996: 133) uses as a metaphor, a journey with the 
interviewer exploring unknown landscapes, where he enters into conversations with people 
he meets. During these meanderings, he learns about the world of the natives and listens to 
their stories. The journey not only leads to his acquiring new knowledge, but the traveller's 
outlook changes as well. 
Interviews, conducted for the purpose of qualitative research, are intended to help 
understand the world from the respondent's point of view and to reveal its meaning from 
his experience. While the interview may appear to be a straightforward conversation it 
should involve skills for listening as well as questioning. This is not a neutral tool and it 
varies according to the personal characteristics of the interviewer. Asking questions is one 
thing, and actually getting answers is often more difficult than it would seem (see for 
example Burgess 1984; Flick 1998). 
The spoken word always contains a degree of ambiguity no matter how carefully the 
questions are worded and answers reported. Nevertheless, interviewing is one of the most 
effective ways of understanding human beings. The most common type of interview is a 
face to face verbal exchange between two people, however, interviews may also involve 
groups (see for example Kvale 1996; Punch 1998; Sapsford and Jupp 1998). 
There is no single interview style for every occasion. While it is important to understand 
the mechanics of good interviewing an understanding of the context of the respondent's 
world is equally important. Finally, the importance of using multiple data gathering 
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methods has to be mentioned (Patton 1990). Also use of structured or semi-structured 
questions. See following table 3.4. 
istics 0 pre-established with limited response 
little room for variation of response 
" responses recorded according to a 
predetermined coding scheme 
" interviewer controls pace, using 
questionnaire like a script 
" little flexibility in the sequence or manner 
in which questions are asked 
" neutral role of interviewer 
Purpose to provide an ideal interview and I 
minimise errors 
Source of errors I* respondent's behaviour 
Problems 0 elicits rational responses only 
9 inadequately assesses the emotional 
dimension 
" interview guide provides a basic 
framework for interviewer 
" questions and answers encourage 
interview-respondent interaction 
" enables interviewer to probe 
" new questions emerge as study progresses 
enables understanding of people's often 
complex behaviour 
personal judgment influences analysis 
"going native" 
respondent may go off on a tangent 
analysis can be complicated 
Table 3.4: Difference Between Structured and Semi-Structured Interviews. Source: Flick 1998: 76 
3.7 ANALYTICAL TECHNIQUES 
The Interplay between Deduction and Induction 
Deduction means that the researcher moves from the general to the specific, that is they 
start with a general theory from which a conclusion is deduced (Holloway 197: 46). 
Researchers search for empirical evidence to test a hypothesis by collecting data from 
observation and subsequent analysis (ibid. 46). 
Conversely, inductive reasoning, involves going from the specific to the general, by starting 
with the observation or study of a number of individual cases or incidents and establishing 
generalities that link them to each other (Holloway 1997: 91). Researchers should collect 
data, without making prior assumptions, analyse the data and generate theories (ibid. 91). 
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According to Strauss and Corbin (1998: 136), interpretation is a form of deduction based on 
the researchers reading of the data, along with assumptions about the nature of life, relevant 
literature and discussions with colleagues and research participants. 
With regards to the inductive approach, grounded theory has as its explicit purpose, the 
generation of theory from data (Punch 1998: 166). Textbooks discuss the distinction 
between theory generation and theory verification (Strauss and Corbin 1998: 12). 
Traditionally quantitative research, has followed the theory verification model where the 
hypothesis is central to the research and since the hypothesis was deduced from other more 
general theory, the point of the research was to test the theory (Punch 1998: 166). 
In the grounded approach which aims to generate theory, no specific theory is initially 
proposed and no hypotheses are formulated for testing ahead of the research (Punch 
1998: 166). One starts with an open mind, aiming to end up with a theory (ibid. 166). 
According to Lincoln and Guba (1985: 332), generative inquiry attempts to discover 
constructs which may lead to propositions, and uses the data itself as a point of departure. 
The authors go on to suggest that generative inquiry is most often served by inductive 
analysis and verification inquiry by deductive analysis. Although they do observe that 
there are exceptions, when generative inquiry is nevertheless informed by some a priori 
theory (Lincoln and Guba 1985: 33). 
The main challenge is how to ensure accurate data input and how to test theory rigorously. 
Data analysis in qualitative research begins with data collection and involves breaking 
down the information in search of categories, which are then reassembled to form themes 
(Holloway 1997: 43). According to Glaser and Strauss (1967: 228) records rely on an 
orderly system of information gathering and analysis. Glaser and Strauss (1967: 228) 
suggest that the following inter-related activities allow a theoretical qualitative study to 
expand into particular areas of behaviour: 
" explanation to provide a perspective of behaviour 
" theoretical prediction 
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e practical applications 
The method of constant comparison provides an excellent fit with continuous and 
simultaneous data collection and processing (Lincoln and Guba 1985: 335). 
Comparative analysis means the researcher is able to systematically check data obtained in 
the course of a study. It may be viewed as an ever changing process with theoretical 
implications that fit into and are easily understood in the study context (see for example 
Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss and Corbin 1998). This kind of analysis, which sets out 
to record the chronological flow of events, may also lead to unexpected findings that help 
the researcher go beyond the initial concept giving rise to a new framework of ideas (Miles 
and Huberman 1994: 337). Generating theory from data means that propositions and 
concepts are regularly worked out in a formalised way in relation to data collated 
(ibid. 337). 
According to Strauss and Corbin (1990: 13) the constant comparative method of analysis is 
designed to: - 
" build rather than test theory 
" base research on "good" science 
" help the analyst to disregard biases and unwarranted assumptions 
" provide the grounding for a tightly woven theory that approximates reality. 
Inductive analysis relies on comparing incidents or cases and on establishing similarities 
and differences, in order to define categories and concepts (Punch 1998: 200). Lincoln and 
Guba (1985: 334) describe this as a process of abstraction whereby units of analysis are 
derived from a "stream of behaviour". Researchers attempt to make sense of the data by 
conceptual ordering, which refers to the organisation of data into discrete categories 
according to their properties and dimensions and then using description to elucidate those 
categories (Strauss and Corbin 1990: 19). Categories derived by the constant comparative 
method, advocated by Glaser and Strauss (1967) and Miles and Huberman (1994: 12) 
illustrate the concurrent activities ongoing throughout the analysis as; data collection, data 
reduction, data display and drawing and verifying conclusions. The constant comparative 
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method provides an excellent fit with the earlier account of continuous and simultaneous 
data collection and processing (Lincoln and Guba 1985: 335) 
The point to make is that grounded theory is not a theory at all. It is a method, an approach, 
a research strategy to generate propositions developed inductively from data (Punch 
1998: 163). "As a research strategy, grounded theory is specific and different. -and is 
probably the most widely employed interpretive strategy in the social sciences today" 
(Denzin and Lincoln 1994: 204). This approach, developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967) 
offers a method for the study of complex social behaviour. "Grounded" means that the 
theory will be generated on the basis of data and "theory" means the objective of collecting 
and analysing data is to generate theory (Punch 1998: 163). 
Constructing theories involves a number of definite stages in data analysis (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967: 105). These are: - 
" comparing data applicable to each conceptual category 
" integrating the categories and their properties 
" delimiting the emergent theory 
" writing up the theory 
This procedure has many advantages. It is coordinated, systematic and flexible in contrast 
to the ad hoc and uncoordinated approach which sometimes characterises qualitative 
research (Punch 1998: 162). Following the stages listed above means that the study is 
substantive and the analysis formalised (Glaser and Strauss, 1967: 105). However, this is 
not a clinical process as Patton (1990: 434) states "qualitative evaluation inquiry draws on 
both critical and creative thinking - both the science and the art of analysis" This is 
especially important in an area of new research and where a grounded concept for 
describing and explaining what goes on, is lacking (Punch 1998: 163). 
In summary, the comparative method's requirement to constantly intermesh data collection 
and analysis, has a direct bearing on how the research is conducted. The analysis is not 
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scattered, data is systematically ordered and, by inductive effort, a substantive theory is 
developed which is grounded in specific data. 
3.8 INTERPRETATION AND PRESENTATION 
Case study 
Rather than a method, case studies can be considered a strategy for organising social data 
while at the same time preserving wholeness and unity (Punch 1998: 153). As with all 
inquiries, a case study has its limitations. According to Hamel et al (1991: 39), case study 
has proven to be in complete harmony with the three activities that characterise all 
qualitative methods: namely describing, understanding and explaining. 
3.9 VALIUDITY - ESTABLISHING TRUSTWORTHINESS 
Validity is the scientific concept of the notion of truth (Holloway 1997: 159). The basic 
issue in relation to trustworthiness is the ability of the researcher to persuade his or her 
audience that the findings of the investigation are worth paying attention to (Lincoln and 
Guba 1985: 290). The criteria that have evolved in response to this are termed internal and 
external validity (Punch 1998: 30) 
Intemal validity is concerned with the research design and whether it is a true reflection of 
reality, studied and described through detailed descriptions of the decision trail and in field 
notes (Holloway 1997: 159). 
Extemal validity relates to the generality of the research and how far the study's findings 
can be transferred to other settings (Punch 1998: 30). However, Lincoln and Guba 
(1985: 294) consider that external validity in qualitative research needs to be assessed 
differently from quantitative research and should include the notion of trustworthiness. The 
elements of trustworthiness may be credibility, transferability, dependability and 
confirmability. Each of these qualities will be dealt with in turn. 
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Credibility corresponds to internal validity in quantitative research and exists when the 
participants in a study acknowledge the findings in their own social context. That is to say, 
the researcher's findings are compatible with the perceptions of the people under study 
(Holloway 1997: 160). Techniques to make it more likely that credible findings and 
interpretations will be produced are triangulation; which is the use of different methods, or 
possibly different researchers, as well as evidence from different data sources (Holloway 
1997: 160). Denzin (1978, cited in Flick 1998: 229) identified four basic types of 
triangulation: - 
Data Study of material from different information sources 
Investigator Participation by several different researchers 
Theory Use of multiple perspectives to interpret a single set of data 
Methodological Use of several methods to interpret a single problem 
The logic of triangulation is based on the premise that "no single plan ever adequately 
solves the problem of rival causalfactors ... multiple methods of observations must 
be 
employed because each reveals different aspects of empirical reality. Ais is termed 
triangulation and I now offer as a final methodological rule the principle that multiple 
methods should be used in every investigation " (Denzin 1978: 28) 
The concept of triangulation by different methods can imply either different data collection 
modes, for example, interview, questionnaire, observation, or testing (Lincoln and Guba 
1985: 306) as well as verifying findings through feedback from participants and peer 
debriefing (Lincoln and Guba 1985: 3 10). 
Transferability is the alternative term for external validity and generality. It means that 
findings in one context may be transferred to similar situations or other participants 
(Holloway 1997: 161). However, Lincoln and Guba (1985: 316) suggest that the 
establishment of external validity by qualitative research is very different from quantitative 
inquiry. These authors go on to explain that although the quantitative researcher may 
expect to make relatively precise statements about external validity, the qualitative 
researcher cannot specify the external validity of an inquiry (ibid. 316). The researcher can 
provide only the thick description so that they describe accurately and in detail the data in 
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their contexts providing a clear picture of what goes on and inviting readers to reach 
conclusions about whether transfer can be contemplated as a possibility (ibid. 316). 
Dependability means that the study is consistent and reliable and can be demonstrated 
through an audit trail where the researcher provides details of the research path (Holloway 
1997: 161). 
Finally, confirmability means that the findings are the result of research and not a biased 
conclusion and subject to researcher assumptions (ibid. 161). The major technique for 
establishing confirmability is an audit. Even although qualitative researchers realise the 
futility of attempting to achieve complete objectivity, they must nevertheless be reflexive 
and show that the data can be traced back to its origin (ibid. 161). 
Strauss and Corbin (1998: 267) do not propose that theory, developed from the study of a 
small area of investigation or from a specific population, has the relevance of a wider, more 
general theory. The real merit of a substantive theory lies in its ability to speak specifically 
for the population from which it was derived and to apply back to it (ibid. 267). With 
regard to qualitative inquiries, validity hinges, to a large extent, on the skill, competence 
and rigour of those carrying out the fieldwork. 
"Yhe inquirer is himself the instrument. Changes resulting ftom fatigue, shifts in 
knowledge, as well as variations resulting ftom differences in training, skill and 
experience, may easily occur. 77iis loss in rigor is more than offset by the 
flexibility, 
insight, and the ability to build tacit knowledge peculiar to the human instrument" 
(Guba 
and Lincoln 1981: 113). 
The major concern is to provide credible conclusions from the research (Sapsford and 
Jupp, 
1996: 1). For judging its applicability to the focus of a study well constructed grounded 
theory should meet the following four central criteria, fit, understanding, usability and 
generality (Glaser and Strauss 1967: 233). 
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The first requisite, fit, is that the theory be closely related to the day-to-day realities and 
clearly applicable to dealing with the subject under investigation (Glaser and Strauss 
1967: 238). Understanding the theory is important to people involved and is critical to its 
use. It should sharpen their sensitivity to problems they face and should provide an image 
of how they can potentially make matters better (ibid. 238). Usability, enables the person 
who applies the theory to understand and analyse on-going realities as the structure and 
daily situations change with the passage of time (ibid. 238). Generality, makes the theory 
flexible enough to understand a wide variety of changing situations within the substantive 
area (ibid. 238). 
In summary, John Dewey suggests that people in situations for which grounded theory has 
been generated, can apply it in the natural course of daily events (cited in Glaser and 
Strauss 1967: 249) 
Lincoln and Guba (1985: 289) state that "the inquirer soon becomes accustomed to hearing 
charges that naturalistic studies are undisciplined; that he or she is guilty of "slOPPY " 
research, engages in "merely subjective " observations, responds indiscriminately to the 
"loudest bangs or brightest lights. Rigour, 'it is asserted, is not the hallmark of 
naturalism. " However, it must be recognised that there are flaws in every research method. 
Grounded theory is no exception. If data is not gathered and analysed in a systematic and 
rigorous manner, the results are bound to be biased and will not withstand criticism. 
3.10 INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH DESIGN 
Given that relatively few empirical studies have investigated the process of alliance 
development, an exploratory mode was chosen for this study (refer to chapter 3.1, pages 
87-90) 
An inductive, interpretive methodology was considered the best technique to understand 
alliance development (refer to chapter 3.4, page 90); firstly by obtaining knowledge from 
observation and then by focusing on the personal experiences of managers directly involved 
in the process. Information was gained from in-depth-interviews with the most 
knowledgeable participants in the alliances as well as insight gained from the literature and 
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other sources (refer to chapter 3.6, pages 95-98). Propositions were derived from data, 
rather than from a priori assumptions, other research, or existing theoretical frameworks 
(refer to chapter 3.7, pages 98-102). The remainder of this chapter describes this in more 
detail. 
3.11 RESEARCH DESIGN 
Getting started 
The aim is to describe the purposeful route of this study from start to finish. Table 3.5 
below summarises the interpretive framework of the research. 
................... . ............ ......... .......... - .... ..... .. ...... .................. ........ ............. ......... .............. .... ........ ....... ....... ................. ........ ....... ... ......... . 
Framework 
What is the nature of the knowledge? 
" Naturalistic 
" Local and Specific 





How has the knowledge been accumulated? 0 Observation 
0 Participation 
0 Interviews 
0 Historical data 
How is the theory developed? 0 Inductive and 
0 Deductive 
Table 3.5: Interpretative Framework. Source Author 
3.12 RESEARCH CONTEXT 
Work for this dissertation began in August 1996 during involvement in an EPSRC project, 
Grant Number GRK 21252, titled "Implementing Partnering in the Supply Chain". The 
duration of the project was three years from 1994 to1997. The project had been running for 
about fifteen months prior to the author joining. 
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3.13 HOW THE RESEARCH PROBLEM WAS EDENTIFIED 
In the first instance, literature review and the study of a new alliance in Ireland between 
International Distillers and Vinters (IDV) and Killeen Corrugated identified the importance 
of inter-organisational teams when adopting partnering. Starting with a basic assumption 
that these teams were a key element in business alliances, the initial research objective was 
to try and understand how team dynamics and the organisational context affected project 
outcomes in cooperative alliances. 
Following on from this, an early review was compiled from alliance literature. It was from 
these literary sources as well as, in the first place, practical involvement in one alliance that 
it became apparent that they are complex, often neither properly managed nor supported 
and costly and time consuming. 
More significantly, there was an abundance of literature regarding partner selection and 
reasons why firms embark on an alliance route as well as accounts of expected benefits and 
outcomes. That is, the "before and aftee, of the alliance was explained but what seemed to 
be missing was the actual process by which the alliance developed and performed over a 
period of time. 
Growing familiarity with the research environment, conversations with participants as well 
as consideration of documents complied during the earlier fifteen months highlighted 
changes in behaviour and pace of the alliance under investigation. 
According to Dussauge et al (2000) alliances by their very nature change substantially, as 
the partners learn more about each other and as technical and market environments, within 
which the alliance operates, change over time. 
Such developmental changes were apparent during the author's involvement with IDV and 
Killeen and, in addition, this alliance seemed to indicate a progressive pattern as it matured. 
In the light of the latter, while still emphasising the significance of teamwork, the research 
107 
focus shifted away from team efficiency to stress the relationship process and alliance 
development. Thus the research problem was established through interaction and links 
between literature, consideration of the actual research setting and reflections on 
participants' views of the alliance. 
Research Objective and Associated Research Questions 
In the light of the foregoing, the research objective was to examine further the notion of 
phased evolutionary development in alliances and, in so doing, to contribute to a growing 
understanding of the alliance development process. Questions to be investigated in this 
study included the following: - 
1. How do alliances evolve over time? 
2. Are progressive stages evident as the alliance matures and in what way does one stage 
differentiate itself from another? - 
3. Given that the degree of interaction, learning and innovation may alter as the alliance 
relationship develops what characteristics are evident within each of the stages ? 
4. Are certain characteristic more important in one phase of the evolution than in another 
S. What factors identify the transition from one stage to another? 
6. What factors trigger stability and instability in alliances and what happens when the 
alliance ends? 
3.14 ENTERING THE FIELD 
Negotiating access 
Access to field sites began when cross-functional teams were still being considered in the 
main topic of study. Even although the overall research objective changed, the basis for 
selecting the organisations remained valid, namely that they should be involved in customer 
supplier alliancing. Criteria for selecting target organisations were that they should-. - 
" have inter-organisational project teams tasked with driving the change process 
" utilise teams related to the company's logistics function 
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Selection was justified because literature identified inter-organisational / cross-functional 
teams as essential to the alliance process and logistics as a fanctional area where customers 
and suppliers could work effectively together to remove costs and improved processes, 
essential to supply chain efficiency (refer to chapter 1.1.5, page 7 and also chapter 1.2, page 
30). 
A letter of introduction to business organisations and a follow up telephone call initiated the 
first contact. Twenty one positive responses were received to sixty-eight letters of inquiry 
and this number was further reduced following telephone conversations with the 
companies. Although in many instances an initial interest was expressed, other 
organisational changes were taking place and in these cases the timing was deemed 
inappropriate. 
Gaining access is central in the research process (refer to chapter 3.5, page 93, #4). If an 
inappropriate site is selected then that will influence the reliability and validity of the data 
the researcher subsequently gathers. With this important aspect in mind, a number of 
businesses were visited to assess if the research matched with the company's activity. 
These are surnmarised in table 3.6, along with the reasons for rejecting the site. 









Electronics Company director 
Purchasing manager 
Finance and sales manager 
Clothing Company director I 
Purchasing director 
Not ready for alliance relationship. 
New purchasing director was trying to 
change the mindset in the department from 
transactional purchasing to cooperative 
relations with suppliers. 
Lots of internal project teams, but little 
involvement with suppliers. 
Internal project teams, lots of communication 









Drinks I Company director I Contact was leaving the company. 
Electronics Company director Internal project teams but no specific close Iý 
alliance relationships. 
Clothing Company director Organisational change, it was not a good II 
time. 
Construction I MD I Unable to convince board members 
MOD Director All the management team were fired and the II 
company was under threat of closure. 
Engineering MD World-wide organisational change about to I 
begin. 
KI Drinks I Company director I Organisational change, not a good time. 
Table 3: 6: Companies Visited During Site Selection Process 
Conversations revolved around customer / supplier relations within each organisation, how 
these were managed and the importance of customer / supplier relations and alliancing. All 
discussions were taped, transcribed and analysed by the author in accordance with the 
constant comparative methods recommended by Glaser and Strauss (1967) and Strauss and 
Corbin (1990,1996). 
Following from these negotiations, two further companies and associated suppliers were 
selected as possible research sites, namely 113M in Greenock and LJDV in Edinburgh. A 
number of presentations were made to IBM managers as well as interviews with its supply 
chain personnel in order to negotiate entry. This raised the issue of the significance of 
gatekeepers in the site selection process and although initial contacts expressed positive 
interest in the research, indecision and procrastination by the company eventually led to a 
realisation that the "moment" was lost. 
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With regards to UDV, a conversation with the European Supply Chain Manager indicated a 
personal interest in the proposed research and with his assistance, a meeting was arranged 
with another member of his team. Regrettably, this opportunity also evaporated when the 
project he had in mind was transferred to a division in England. 
Due to this failure to gain access to any of the foregoing organisations it was necessary to 
re-evaluate the situation and consider alternative ways to achieve the aim. While still 
searching and considering appropriate research sites, the author attended a presentation in 
Glasgow on strategic alliance implementation with the idea that this might lead to other 
research site possibilities. Two logistics managers from Shell Expro UK Limited, Aberdeen 
were present at this meeting 
Shell Expro had been considering an alliance and this was to prove a most fortuitous 
meeting. After a short presentation to the alliance team, Shell Expro and two contract 
organisations permitted the author complete freedom of access to personnel within the three 
organisations associated with the alliance. 
During the "Implementing Partnering" project a second supply chain had been studied and 
there was a great deal of available data, field notes and case studies from this source. As 
access to a third "live" alliance appeared unlikely; contact with companies who participated 
in the first project was re-established. This was to be the third site with analysis based 
primarily on secondary, historical data. In summary the three alliances studied covered a 
time period ftom 1991 to 2000, see table 3.7 below (see also chapter 3.5, pages 93-94). 
UDV, Operations& 
Killeen Corrugated 
I Sun Microelectronics& 
2 Birkby's Plastics 
Dublin Drinks 1994 to 2000 ý 
Packaging 





Shell Expro, Supply Aberdeen Oil and Gas related 1996 to 2000 
3 Logistics Logistics contractor 
Seaforth Maritime Limited Haulage contractor 
ARR-Craib 
Table 3.7: Research Sites 
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Sites one and two were customers and product suppliers, cooperating in the manufacturing 
and electronics sectors respectively. Site three was similar, although this time it was a three 
party arrangement between two service providers and a customer in the oil and gas 
extraction industry. 
The purpose and motivation behind all three alliances was to reduce costs and jointly create 
innovative solutions to supply related problems. Savings from cost reduction were to be 
shared annually on an agreed financial gainshare basis. All alliances were based on 
cooperative agreements between the trading partners. Although in different industrial 
sectors, i. e. drinks and packaging, electronics and oil and gas, cooperation between the 
partners in each alliance was based on the commitment of resources and joint activity to 
remove costs and improve the logistics process between the organisations. That is, 
although clearly unique each alliance was based on similar concepts. 
3.15 RESEARCH METHODS APPLIED 
Observation 
Observation stages evolved as the study progressed. The initial observation involved 
getting to know the background and the people participating in the alliance. Field notes 
were mostly descriptive. In terms of Gold's (1958) typology, the observer-as-parficipant 
(refer to chapter 3.6, page 95). There then followed a shift to a more focused kind of 
observation, once familiarity with the setting and key social groups had been established, 
that is parficipant-m-observer (refer chapter 3.6, page 95). 
The principal objective was to assess what was happening among the groups involved and 
to describe their behaviour in the context of the alliance. In the first alliance,, both 
companies were located in Ireland and it was only possible for the author to be there once 
or twice a month. The aim was to observe the alliance teams in operation as frequently as 
possible and visits usually coincided with either a project or Steering Committee meeting. 
Additional visits were arranged for the purpose of interviewing. 
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As a participant-as-observer, it was possible to learn and to understand what was 
happening during each encounter and move to a more insider role, the complete participant 
(refer to chapter 3.6, page 95). As well as observation at meetings, seventeen one to one, 
semi-structured interviews, each lasting sixty to ninety minutes, (to elicit the insider's point 
of view), were completed. These were supplemented from other sources, namely 
contractual documentation, workshop reports, diaries, in fact anything that could be useful 
to the study. This information was made freely available and access was never restricted at 
any time. 
Different levels of observation enabled the researcher to become acquainted with the 
research environment and gradually establish closer relations with the participants. In this 
way trust was built between the researcher and participants which resulted in openness and 
access to sensitive information. 
Initial data collection in Ireland was analysed in a variety of ways throughout the duration 
of the study. Interviews were reviewed using the constant comparative method, (using the 
look alikelfeel criteria described in chapter 3.17, pages 117-119), in this way it was possible 
to capture new and emerging themes and to cluster similar themes and indicators together. 
Also, interrogating the data in this fashion ensured that all material was considered and 
placed in appropriate categories. Field notes were written after each visit and a research 
diary was kept up to date and analysed in a same manner as the interviews. This in turn 
influenced subsequent data collection, as themes emerged and some characteristics became 
more important than others. 
As the data from the first alliance accumulated, the research was developing in Aberdeen. 
Close involvement with the ally firms since the beginning of this second alliance led to a 
long term and intimate understanding of the challenges facing the participants. Visits and 
contacts by telephone and e-mail were frequent. At no time was entry denied and indeed, 
interaction with the participants was such that problems were shared as soon as they 
occurred. 
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Because of such an active engagement it has been possible to describe the continuous 
process of the alliance, supported by data collected and analysed on an on going basis, 
using the same methods as in the first study. 
It was essential to capture as much as possible about what was happening during this time 
and detailed field notes were very important (refer to chapter 3.9, page 102). A standard 
form based on Miles and Huberman's work (1994: 73) helped to systematise reporting and 
allowed basic analysis to begin. The form was divided into the following five sections (see 
appendix I): - 
1) main themes and impressions to capture an impression of events 
explanation 
3) conflicting reports or disagreements 
4) next steps in data collection 
revisions, updating, coding 
Using the above form for field notes forced standardisation of field note writing and made 
the researcher more disciplined in terms of interpretation of events. In effect, the notes 
were written up twice, once in the research diary and then into the computer file. There 
were a number of advantages to using this method, firstly, it helped the researcher 
interrogate the data more thoroughly by encouraging the writer to think more about the 
implications of the data, rather than simply reporting it superficially. It also assisted in 
future data gathering as well as providing an audit trail to track where ideas came from and 
the reasons why particular actions were taken. Data gathering included one-to-one 
interviews, reports of meetings and discussions, as well as details of ongoing events. 
Case Studies 
The case studies are in-depth descriptions of each business alliance (refer to chapter 3.8, 
page 102). They are an integral part of this inductive study and one of the main research 
products. The cases tell of the subject's experiences and paint a chronological picture of 
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events and how it altered with the passage of time. The cases are intended to provide a 
complete and detailed story in an organised manner. Each case can be compared and 
contrasted to highlight patterns and relationships, as well as similarities and differences. 
The cases are based on findings drawn from data, with the intention of forming a 
meaningful, credible piece of work. 
3.16 DATA COLLECTION AND METHODS OF ANALYSIS 
PHASE I Literature Observation 
CONCEPTUAL 
Deductive and Review 
Inductive 





PHASE HI Re-define Re-define 
Progressive conceptual conceptual 
Theoretical fi-amework framework 
Development 




Presentation of F-Relationship 
Development Mode 
PHASE V Conclusions 
Concluding Limitations of study 
I 
Future research 
Figure 3.1: Phases of Data Collection and Analysis 
Figure 3.1 illustrate the research design of this study. The study was divided into five 
phases. In the first instance literature review and observation were combined and an early 
conceptual framework outlined (refer to chapter 4.0, page 121). The second phase was 
exploratory in nature and findings from the first research site served to inform and re- 
develop the earlier framework (see chapter 4.5, page 169). Phase three, progressive 
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theoretical development, took place using data from a second research site and the 
conceptual framework continued to develop in light of this data (see chapter 5.6, page 222). 
The fourth, testing phase, was possible using secondary data from a third alliance. This 
phase served not only to test the existing work but also new information was garnered to 
further inform and re-define the framework (see chapter 6.6, page 268). Phase five, 
presented the conclusions of the study. 
Questionnaire Design 
Developing themes and designing the questionnaire involved the following activities: - 
" Identifying, documenting and listing associated themes using a "key theme tracking 
form " (see appendix 11 and IIA) 
" designing questions and tabling data source 
e preparing questionnaires 
In the first instance, the same basic information was asked of all participants in order to 
ensure systematic and comprehensive interviewing. However, the interview was 
intentionally semi-structured to flag up new topics and provide freedom to probe and 
explore. The structure and content was found to capture the main themes (appendix III). 
Observation of team meetings and field notes were added to the data. 
A second alliance questionnaire was developed from the research data, to enable 
respondents to retrospectively review events over the time span of the alliance. This was 
completed by parties in all three alliances. The questionnaire did not claim to be exhaustive 
and new themes were able to be added if contextual factors affected one alliance differently 
from another (appendix M. 
In total, over sixty interviews were conducted and 100 hundred hours of dialogue 
transcribed and analysed (see appendix V). Interviewing stopped when themes were 
becoming recurrent and no new ideas were being drawn from the information received. An 
interesting aspect of the interviews was the amount of disclosure after the tape recorder had 
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been turned off It was essential to be very alert at this time and continue to take notes, 
because invariably the additional off-the-record information proved to be of great interest. 
The Constant Comparative Method was employed to analyse the interviews. 
3.17 CONSTANT COMPARATIVE METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS 
Mles and Hubennan 1994 
Figure 3.2 The Constant Comparative Method: Source Miles and Huberman 1994 
This study has used the comparative method of analysis, whereby the theory is "grounded" 
in data (refer to chapter 3.7, page 98). Data was gathered from a wide variety of sources 
that included interviews, observation, field notes, case studies, personal experience, history, 
as well as academic papers on related subjects (refer to chapter 3.9, page 102). The 
Constant Comparative Method was used in the analysis of the interviews, and was used to 
identify themes from the raw-data. Similar characteristics were grouped into clusters. 
Clustering involved comparing and contrasting themes to bring together those which were 
similar and to separate ideas of different significance. The same compare and contrast 
procedure was used to group the characteristics into new, higher order categories. 
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Analytical procedure 
As theoretical concepts emerged from data analysis, findings gave rise to new data 
collection, although modifications occurred less often as characteristics began to fall into 
place. Analysis was complete when the critical characteristics were defined, and 
relationships between them established and no new themes were emerging from the data. 
Each phase entailed data reduction into manageable chunks and interpretation involved the 
following stages: - 
* All field notes were typed, interviews transcribed and photocopied. (The completed 
questionnaire was duplicated. One copy for filing and the other for cutting into units of 
meaning. ) 
4, Every interview was numbered, with the date, interview duration, the interviewee's 
name and position recorded. 
Information in the margin of each paragraph included the respondent's name, date, page 
and paragraph number. In this way, all quotations can be traced back to the original data 
source. These were coded in the text as follows: - Commercial Manager, Mleen, 1998, 
page 2, paragraph 2; CMK, 98,2,2 
In the first instance, many characteristics were identified and this meant there needed to 
be as many categories for analysis as possible. 
Unitising the data involved carefully reading the copy. Every piece of transcription was 
treated in the following way. When a unit of meaning was identified a line was drawn 
across the page. The left-hand margin contained the information stated in the previous 
paragraph. Each unit of meaning was described by a word or phrase in the right hand 
margin. 
" Each unit of meaning was cut from this page and stuck on 5" x 8" index cards. As text 
fitted the categories, it was placed under the broad headings guided by descriptions in 
the margins. 
" If a card seemed to fit another category it was copied and also placed in that category. 
" Although very time consuming, this procedure continued until all data cards had been 
categorised. 
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9 Cards were grouped together, using the lookfleel alike criteria. 
* The next task was to distill the categories in order to reduce the number of 
characteristics, and to create an economical framework. This was done using a matrix 
divided into the conceptual framework stages, categories and segments. As a result of 
the data analysis, the framework was continually being redefined (see table 6.9, page 
265). In this way the basis was formalised for the propositions and characteristics within 
each stage of the conceptual framework. 
Comparative analysis meant the researcher was able to systematically check data obtained 
during the course of a study. It may be viewed as an ever changing process with theoretical 
implications that fit, and are easily understood, in the study context. 
3.18 LIMITATIONS OF THE METHODOLOGY 
Data collection stopped after the 68P interview (total number of interviews from the three 
cases) because managerial responses increasingly reinforced themes and patterns identified, 
without adding significantly to the breadth of findings. That is, signs of data saturation 
were clearly evident. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, this study may have been affected by several factors that 
held the potential for bias. Firstly, the small sample of cases made it unfeasible to draw 
general conclusions (refer to 3.5 which illustrates a number of studies that have generated 
theory using two or fewer cases). With regard to internal validity, the intention was to 
understand the realities influencing the participants and to record a true reflection of their 
activity in each alliance. However, although the data drawn from the three alliances in this 
study, indicated a pattern in alliance development it is insufficient evidence to claim 
absolute external validity. Only future empirical validation of the propositions and 
framework in a larger sample of firms can attest the external validity of the thesis. 
However, the study provides an excellent starting point for further investigation to evaluate 
whether a broad pattern exists across alliance types and industries. 
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Few views were from persons not directly participating in the process. Seeking opinions 
from those outwith the alliance area may have provided a fuller understanding of the 
cultural and institutional barriers, as well as the political dynamics and how the latter may 
have influenced the alliance. Related to this is reliance on managerial descriptions and 
recollections. This was counterbalanced by triangulation using a variety of data collection 
methods (refer to chapter 3.9, page 102). 
The greatest shortcoming, was that data analysis was the work of a single researcher. In 
defense, all research has its limitations, whether in terms of the bias the researcher brings to 
the study, the analysis and interpretation of the results, or the quality of the data gathered in 
the first place. It has to be acknowledged that there are always better and different ways to 
do things. 
3.19 INTERPRETATION, PRESENTATION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Empirical findings are in three parts; (1) exploratory, (2) progressive theoretical 
development, and (3) testing. The first described the exploratory phase and development of 
the early conceptual framework and the second part developed and refined the framework 
based on the evidence presented in each research site (see chapters 4.0, page 121; 5.0.1, 
pages 172; 5.6, page 222). The third phase, using secondary data allowed the framework to 
be tested. (see chapter 6.6 -6.8, pages 268-277) 
The discussion chapter seven, compares and contrasts the three cases, drawing out the main 
themes from the research to present a structure of alliance development. Chapter eight 
continues the discussion with particular relevance to the literature described in chapters one 
and two. Finally, conclusions are presented as a contribution to knowledge in terms of 
management theory, practice and policy implications. With respect to experiential 
limitations, these issues have been addressed in an agenda for future research, in the final 
chapter. 
Chapter four explains in detail the development of the preliminary conceptual framework 
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Chapter Four 
Findings - Part I 
4.0 FINDINGS - PART 1 
4.0.1 DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter will endeavour to explain the early phase of conceptual development. Also, 
the research objective of the thesis will be examined i. e. the notion of phased evolutionary 
change in alliances. 
The intention is to: - 
9 clarify how the initial conceptual framework was derived 
9 define the developmental stages 
give an account of the development of the IDW Killeen alliance 
reassess the conceptual framework in the light of these findings 
As described in chapter three, work for this dissertation began in August 1996 during 
involvement in an EPSRC project, Grant Number GRK 21252, titled "Implementing 
Partnering in the Supply Chain". The duration of the project was the three years from 1994 
to 1997. The project had been running for fifteen months prior to the author's engagement 
and secondary data had already been compiled by a previous researcher. 
Literature review, concerning supply chain cooperation and the study of a recent alliance in 
Ireland, between International Distillers and Vintners (IDV), producers of Baileys Irish 
Cream and its packaging company named Killeen Corrugated, identified the importance of 
inter-organisational teams when embarking on a partnering route. Starting with the basic 
assumption that teamwork was a key element in business alliances, an early aim of the 
research was to try and understand how team dynamics, in an inter-organisational context, 
affected project outcomes in cooperative coalitions. 
Secondary data appeared to indicate a pattern to the IDV/Killeen alliance development. 
The research attention then shifted away from team efficiency to considering the notion of 
evolving stages in alliances. 
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To reiterate the methodological approach was exploratory and initial data collection in 
Ireland was analysed in a variety of ways throughout the duration of the study, Interviews 
were reviewed using the constant comparative method, (using the look feel/alike criteria 
described in chapter 3.17, page 117), in this way it was possible to capture new and 
emerging themes and to cluster similar themes and indicators together. Also, interrogating 
the data in this fashion ensured that all material was considered and placed in appropriate 
categories. Field notes were written after each visit and a research diary was kept up to date 
and analysed in a same manner as the interviews. This in turn influenced subsequent data 
collection, as themes emerged and some characteristics became more important than others. 
Methodology: Exploratory Literature 
Interviews and research phase review 
Emerging themes 
Understanding principles -Intense inter- -Slowing down 
Commitment organisational activity and stagnation 
Figure 4: 1. Early Conceptual Model 
Figure 4.1 Illustrates how the early exploratory phase of this research created a rudimentary 
framework which was initially informed by the IDV/Killeen alliance. 
Reflection on the IDV/ Killeen alliance and the events as they unfolded, suggested 
incremental steps or stages. In the first instance the author termed these, Stages I, II and III. 
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Stage I, was generally concerned with understanding basic principles and raising awareness 
of the level of commitment that would be required. Stage II, was noteworthy for the 
intensity of inter-organisational activity. Achievement of team objectives followed by a 
degree of stagnation, slowed the process down and demonstrated a plateau period or Stage 
III. 
Examination of secondary data gathered from the start of this alliance, suggested that IDV 
and Killeen had already passed the first of the two stages outlined above. By the time the 
writer became involved in 1996, IDV and Killeen seemed to be in, what has been termed, 
Stage III. 
Discussions with key participants within IDV indicated that they had also noted a sequence 
of similar stages, not only in the IDV/ Killeen relationship but also in two separate alliances 
with glass and label suppliers. In summary, the IDV and Killeen alliance project provided 
manifestations of a definite pattern of development in the alliance relationship. The 
foregoing encapsulated history includes the first rudimentary conceptualisation of a 
framework and offers a field of research to be further investigated. 
Table 4.1 below, illustrates characteristics attributed to each stage, garnered from literature 
(see appendix IIA showing each characteristic and associated literature) and resulting from 
analysis of fDV / Killeen data. Characteristics have been grouped in the stage where they 
appeared most frequently. 
Alliance agreement 
Contract refined 




0 Reduced uncertainty 
" Compelling purpose 




Understanding of process 
" Reflection and soul searching 
" Adapting cultures 
" Training needs assessment 
" Performance sustainable 
" Cost drivers difficult to 
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" Expectations Participative decision quantify 
" Ground rules making 0 Customer focused 
" Developing skills in teamwork Conflict management 0 Increased technical and 
" Identify strategic direction 0 Project management commercial know-how 
" Investment in relationship 0 Feedback mechanisms 0 Learning from each other 
" Leadership 0 Benefits clearer and from experience 
" Learning 0 Growth of commitment 0 Potential rewards better 
Mechanisms for coordination 0 Increase social relations understood 
and control 0 Individual responsibility 0 Operations routine 
" Rules and procedures increases 0 Strategic integration 
" Feedback mechanisms 0 Openness contemplated 
" Regular team meetings 0 Environmental analysis 0 Individuals become more 
" Negotiation Reduced misinterpretations flexible 
" Objective setting 0 Longer-term planning 0 Dense communication 
" Explicit mutual goals 0 Team and communication network 
" Performance metrics skills developing 0 Shared norms and values 
" Resource allocation and 0 Internal and external among relationship 
planning networks forniing participants 
" Assign task responsibilities 0 Transfer of knowledge 0 Teamwork, promoting 
" Social interaction between participants philosophy of cooperation 
" Transfer of ideas 0 Joint value better 
" Technological contribution understood 
" Trust building 0 Discussion promotes 
" Anticipation of reciprocity corrective action 
Table 4.1: Characteristics Identified in Each Stage 
The foregoing paints a picture of the exploratory phases of this research and explains how 
the conceptual framework was founded. The following case study, describes the nature of 
alliance process in detail while attempting to evolve and build the framework. 
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4.1 STAGE 1: Duration August - December 1994 
The following describes the chronological development of the IDV / Killeen alliance 
broken down into interactions and processes. Table 4.2 below indicates characteristics, 
drawn from literature and the secondary data shown in table 4.1. Dominant characteristics, 
(main themes emerging from data analysis using the looklfeel alike criteria described in 
chapter 3.17, page 117), provide a structure to illustrate in detail how the IDV/ Killeen 
association initially developed (see appendix VI for the background to the organisations). 
STAGE I 
Characteristics from table 4.1 Dominant characteristic 
" Team working 0 Building Trust 
" Closer working relations 
" Anticipation of reciprocity 
" Participation on Steering group 0 Commitment and Leadership 
" Team members 
" Ready allocation of time and resources 
" Regular team reviews- feedback 
" Investment in relationship - time and resources 
" Regular information sharing Communication 
Cross-functional activities break down barriers 
" Communicate vision 
" Social interaction 
" Explicit mutual goals 
" Regular team meetings 0 Coordination and Control Mechanisms 
" Feedback and evaluation of projects 
" Joint planning and control 
" Problem definition 0 Learning 
" Understand alliance concept 
" Transfer of ideas 
" Tracking quality standard, late deliveries, sub 0 Performance Metrics 
standard performance 
0 Metrics identified 
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Team composition Resource Planning 
Assign task responsibilities 
" Mutual goals Setting Objectives 
" Steering group formed 
" Identifying strategic direction 
Table 4.2: Distilled Characteristics in IDV/ Killeen Stage I 
4.1.1 Building Trust 
It had taken some time to build trust. "In the early days, we didn't know each other well 
enough to speakftankly, but all that disappeared after the second or third meeting, when 
no one stood on ceremony. " (B, IDV, 97,3: 2) 
Developing an understanding of a partner's business and why things happen in particular 
ways, was the start of the long road to building trust between the two organisations. The 
mandated teams encouraged this by building closer working relations. 
"A degree of trust has been built up although possibility there's still a slight fteling of 
reserve. " (OPM, K, 97,1: 1) 
'7 think what helped was the good working relationship that Tom and I had, We had a 
generous respectfor each other which grew during the course of the process. Clearly this 
cascaded down to the teams. They saw that we were prepared to talk about confidential 
and other matters that we wouldn't have mentioned before. The teams took this to heart 
and realised they should be equally open. " (PD, IDV, 97,12: 3) 
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4.1.2 Commitment and Leadership 
" "en someone like Esmond devotes so much of his time to the alliance, obviously that 
shows genuine commitment at the highest leveL " (KD, K, 97,8: 2) 
"People in Killeen are very positive about IDV It seems to be the one company that 
people turn cartwheelsfor. " (CKY.., 96,3: 1) 
As with any major strategy, the most important factor for success was continuous 
commitment on the part of senior management. These were the people able to make or 
break the relationship. They were the process champions and could authorise the time and 
resources required to make it work. Their support was crucial at all times. 
It was recognised early on, that a joint strategy was needed to make sure changes happened. 
"Although numerous operational activities were going on at the same time, there still 
seemed to be a loss offocus and we needed a long-term strategic plan to draw together the 
activities of the three teams.. It was suggested that our monthly review meeting should 
discuss developing this kind ofstrategy. " (CKK, 96,5: 4) 
IDV's Procurement Director and the Managing Director of Killeen, together chaired a 
Steering Committee specifically set up for the purpose. The Committee was to regularly 
review progress and provide direction to the teams. Also it was there to allocate resources, 
encourage involvement, motivate team members, stretch their capabilities and to innovate. 
"Tom and Es7nond embody commitment and consistently motivated and stimulated the 
teams. " (QKIDV, 97,9: 2) 
Top management commitment to the partnering was always evident, not only by the 
Steering Committee, but also due to committee member's participation as members in some 
of the teams. Resources from the two companies were adequate and available in plenty of 
time, giving the teams freedom to function. 
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"There are a lot of people in the organisation who want to make things hetter and are 
heing constrained. The challenge is to hreak down harriers and we need to engage the 
attention of the people on the factoryfloor ". .... " this negativity in the plant, no matter 
what we do, puts a hrake onfurther improvement and we recognise that. " (PD, IDV, 98,3: 4) 
In Killeen, participation was mainly by management, however, all staff attended a regular 
monthly meeting chaired by the Killeen MD. While 1DV had always been an 
acknowledged and important customer, the meeting helped to raise awareness of what was 
going on. 
Increased communication between personnel in both organisations, together with managers 
taking the role of ambassadors, helped to foster a common vision in both companies. 
4.1.3 Communication 
"IDVhas become approachable. Now it's a customer with aface that stands outftom the 
crowd of faceless customers. " (CM, &97,3: 2) 
Cross-organisational activity slowly began to break down barriers that had divided the 
companies in the past. 
"It took some time, hefore people got to know each other properly. " (cKY, 97,3: 1) 
On the most part, individuals were beginning to communicate freely and regularly share 
information. This was not so in everyone's case and a positive note was sometimes absent. 
"Yhere seems to he a lot of one way information with littlefeedback " (CKK, 96,3: 1) 
Improved communications flow and access by the supplier to detailed market forecasting, 
stimulated joint planning and generated more accurate production schedules. A daily 
forecasting meeting was started and this went a long way to ensuring accuracy of Killeen's 
planning. 
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4.1.4 Coordination and Control Mechanisms 
The steering committee was the ground for reporting and monitoring team progress. It was 
also the forum for discussion and provided an opportunity to analyse team activities and 
identify areas of duplication. During the initial stage teams met regularly every month, with 
the venue alternating between the organisations. However little, if any, documentation was 
shared and few minutes taken. 
" We tried to introduce a standard project form and to get the others to buy into this as 
well, but they didn't. At the time, the idea was that the various project groups should come 
together and update each other with information. It wasn't very planned and Ifelt there 
should have been a central point of reference for the sixteen projects that were going on, 
the people involved, the timescales and so on. We never got that going. 
WIDV, 97,6: 6) 
The Steering Committee was the forum where the teams reported to IDV and Killeen senior 
management, although it has to be said that some team members felt quite anxious about 
making a presentation. 
"It was difficult going into a meeting of about twenty people around the table, and to be 
asked to explain how your team was performing. " (FD, Y, 97,6: 2) 
Control of team activities and project management was left entirely to the individuals 
concemed. 
"Yhere was a lack of proper disciplined record keeping and note taking. It's difficult to 
have clarity ofpurpose when you'refeelingyour wayfor thefirst time. " (PCIDV, 97,4: 4) 
There was an immediate change affecting planning after the project launch in April 1994. 
Goods had to be dispatched by 1800 hours at the latest the night before the required day 
and Killeen began to log their late deliveries. 
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"Targets weren't always met and if we were going to be late I would immediately inform 
Sydney who would in turn tell IDV and ask which of the box codes could be delayed 
Before, if we were going to be late, we would keep our heads down and hope for the best. 
(CNLK, 96,4: 2) 
"Co-ordination between planning in IDV and Killeen's production seems to he running 
smoothly, due to better planning at IDVs end as well as greater access to the IDV 
production schedule and call off times. " (CKY,, 95,1: 2) 
At this juncture stock inventory reduction was being carried out and the procedure for 
managing material levels had become more transparent. Inventory reduced, obsolete stock 
was dealt with and minimum stock levels agreed. Money was no longer tied up in costly 
materials. 
"We've actually managed to get a complete picture of the stock, references and purchase 
orders, so that now the whole thing has hecome much more comprehensive, which is indeed 
progress. " WIDV, 95,6: 2) 
4.1.5 Learning 
This was the beginning of an increase in quality and service, as scheduling became less 
chaotic, and Killeen found itself able to concentrate on neglected areas of customer service. 
The pay off was improved efficiency and increased capacity. 
"I don't believe the majority of people who talk about working in an alliance fully 
understand what it's about. I didn't fully understand the mechanics, the pitfalls, the 
opportunities and the whole dynamis7n of what can happen when two companies get 
together. " (B, IDV, 97,1: 6) 
The mandated teams encouraged learning through closer working. In most cases team 
activities during this building stage had not yet affected daily operations and there was 
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considerable pressure to reduce the man-hours dedicated to the alliance. The teams were 
trying to get to grips with the bigger alliance picture and IDV needed to understand the 
Killeen costs and why paper was such a volatile market. At the same time Killeen did not 
appreciate the role that the box played in IDV/ Baileys marketing and its significance in 
terms of brand image. 
Ae background was that no one knew the details of Killeen's costs and how costs in the 
paper industry in general were justyled We were suspicious because they had been 
benchmarked as 20% uncompetitive, and this had a bearing on the IDV team input 
Killeen's input to the team was blurred because they did not really know what we wanted, 
as they were understandably ignorant of in-store merchandising. " (B, IDV, 97,1: 2) 
4.1.6 Performance Metrics 
In the first instance it was necessary to establish exactly where the problems lay, what 
contributed to Killeen being uncompetitive and the reasons behind IDVs frequent call off 
changes. 
An alliance service agreement listed all the expectations such as detailed stock availability, 
delivery interruptions, expected quality and so on. A supplier log was used to track quality 
standards, for example, incorrect specifications and performance shortfalls. Meanwhile 
Killeen was beginning to record the number and details of changes and the impact these 
had on production. 
4.1.7 Resource Planning 
Three joint working groups were established to look at logistics, print quality and cost 
reduction. The Logistic team was tasked with promoting the understanding of the joint 
process, stabilising planning cycles, creating and sharing forecasts and long-term plans, and 
improving communication. 
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The Quality team was there to analyse quality failures, introduce corrective measures, set 
up a quality regime, promote best practice and set up tests and R&D facilities. The Cost 
team set about benchmarking the competition, reviewing industry standards and identifying 
areas of bad practice. It recommended corrective action and developed a plan to ensure 
continuous improvement. 
It quickly became apparent that team projects could take up too much of people's time. 
Fitting these activities in with day to day work had to be managed skillfully. To some 
extent, in the early days, high levels of energy and motivation helped overcome this 
challenge. 
Keeping in sight strategic objectives set out in the partnering agreement, teams needed to 
develop their own tactical plan, milestones, group performance measures and monitoring 
and evaluating procedures. 4 
The Logistics team produced results within three weeks of its being established. 11 
"At the time we thought it surprising that Logistics achieved so much so quickly, We 
expected the Cost team to make quicker progress, however they did not and were actually 
very sluggish. So was the Quality Improvement team. " (PD, IDV, 97,4: 1) 
The reasons for this seemed to be that the joint IDV/ Killeen Logistics group started simply 
to communicate and began to share IDVIs scheduling information. This meant that for the 
first time, Killeen was able to have a long term planning horizon. 
Other teams took longer to produce results and did not seem to grasp the problem at first. 
The Cost and Quality teams notably became involved in a lot of testing and evaluating 
work. It was at this time that the importance of communicating with people outside the 
teams became evident, as well as the benefit of using experience of suppliers further up the 
supply chain. 
132 
"After about three or four months into the process, the other teams started to catch up. " 
(PD, IDV, 97,4: 4) 
However, all was not plain sailing and Killeen was dismayed that IDV continued to 
demand changes to call-off schedules. Despite such early problems, logistical planning 
between the companies showed a substantial improvement. 
"Doubts were expressed as to whether IDV would stick to the call-off deal because it 
wasn't meeting ourjoint obligation. Although we get a two-week call-off in advance, we're 
not always getting the jobs dispatched by 6.06pm or earlier as agreed At the same time 
IDV`s changes are within the limits of the period that it's committed to. So all in all, the 
situation has substantially improved " (QKK, 95,2: 2) 
Success depended in large measure on how well an IDV/Killeen team understood its own 
objectives and also on management's commitment to allocate resources to enable the team 
to operate. At strategic and operational levels teams were empowered with the authority 
relevant to the task in hand and the Steering Committee made the final business decisions. 
"We didn't impose too much discipline on the teams because they consisted of relatively 
senior people, able to make decisions. " (P, IDV, 97,3: 4) 
"I would say though, in nine out of ten instances the teams were fully autonomous and that 
Tom and Es7nond only rubber stamped their decisions. Ae exception would be something 
major, like pricing. " (B, IDV, 97,1 1: 1) 
4.1.8 Setting Objectives 
Apart from cost reduction, the ally companies raised a number of subordinate objectives to 
be achieved by the implementation of the alliance. These included greater flexibility in 
response to customer requirements, and long-term security of supply. These objectives 
were to be realised by influencing the supplier to develop in ways that aligned with the 
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customer's strategic direction. Crucial to this fundamental change was the supplier fully 
understanding the customer's business needs. 
" Fundamentally the partnering process is not about relations, its about business issues. 
We need to clearly understand the business, what our relationship is, what the margins 
should be and what the cost drivers are. " (PD, IDV, 98,1: 6) 
In 1994 joint targets were identified as follows: - 
" Cost To reduce cost of the corrugated box 
" Board To reduce field failures 
" Print To improve graphic impact 
" Logistics To generally promote order and reduce end of year chaos 
(Source IDV/Killeen partnering agreement document) 
Teams, composed of people from B)V as well as Killeen, were set up to tackle these topics. 
The Steering Committee addressed the broad concerns and only laid out in general terms 
what the teams were supposed to do. In the beginning it took time for the teams to figure 
out exactly what they were going to do. 
The teams were asked to meet again in a month, by which time they were expected to have 
set their own agendas and to have identified the way they were going to progress. Although 
most of the teams experienced some initial confusion, the roadblock was usually negotiated 
and in the final analysis eventually accomplished their objectives. 
"At the very beginning of the project we gave each team a written document spelling out 
what we wanted and identifying the specific objective, which was the 20% cost reduction. 
We then gave out a page each, not only detailing their and the steering committee's 
responsibility, but also asking them to come back in a month to explain specific stepsfor 
achieving the objectives and the resources needed " (PD, IDV, 97,2: 3) 
134 
At the start, time was spent simply trying to establish what they should have been doing. 
Confusion evaporated once the teams had a plan. However, minimal cross-team interaction 
meant that there were "islands" of activity and most teams did not know if their particular 
project had any implications as regards the work of others. 
Regardless of such problems, and although it took longer than expected for benefits to be 
realised, there were a few notable exceptions. As relations evolved, key participants soon 
began to appreciate what was required. 
4.1.9 Summary: Transition to Stage H 
This alliance became characterised by its informality and apart from the alliance agreement 
itself, flexible structures set the tone of the entire relationship. 
In Stage I, fundamentals set out at the beginning had to be reviewed frequently, to check 
that the alliance was on track and where adjustments had to be made. This stage laid the 
basic foundations, although the building blocks had to be continuously re-evaluated to align 
the direction to meet external and internal contingencies. 
Early pay backs held the promise of even greater prizes. Because milestones were 
unambiguous, the inter-organisational teams could regularly assess progress against these 
targets. This stimulated new ideas and constant adaptation as the process developed. 
Performance was directly measured against the impact on the box cost. 
Teamwork provided the structure for the members to work in a mutually supportive 
manner, and to develop effective problem solving skills. Nevertheless, at times the teams 
had difficulty prioritising activity and this was restrictive. However, people learned how to 
delegate tasks to those with the most appropriate skill or experience. Transition from Stage 
I to Stage II was characterised by the project teams working to full capacity. There was an 
openness as regards personal relations and everyone was spurred on by the Logistics team's 
success. 
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Table 4.3 surnmarises behaviours which signalled the transition to Stage 11. (refer to chapter 
7.7) 
Stage I Transition Stimulus Stage 11, Transition Indicators 
" Building trust Teanis working well 
" Commitment and Openness 
leadership Inspired by early success 
" Communication 
Managerial Action Enthusiasm from senior 




" Performance metncs 
" Resource planning 
" Setting Objectives 
Table 4.3: Transition from Stage I to Stage 11 
4.2 STAGE 11: Duration January 1995 - March 1996 
This stage was mainly concerned with the team processes and benefits resulting from freer 
communication and interaction between the organisations. This improved the information 
flow and led to a better appreciation by both companies of each other's business. 
Generally the teams comprised between four and six senior managers some of whom were 
involved in more than one team. 
Table 4.4 below, shows, how characteristics drawn from literature and secondary data as 
indicated in table 4.1 have been distilled, providing the structure to describe the events in 
Stage 11. 
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Charactedstics from table 4.1 
" Motivation high, but sometimes fluctuates 
" High energy 
" Common mission 
" Growth of commitment 
Historical interdependence 
" Joint problem solving 
" Sharing market information 
" information exchange 
" Joint planning 
Team skills 
Understanding joint processes 
Understanding partner business 
Transfer of knowledge 




" Team achievements 
" Improved communication behaviour 
" Individual's responsibility increasing 
Dominant 
0 Compelling purpose 
0 Interdependence 
0 Learning and alliance skills 
0 Joint decision making 
0 Personal satisfaction and motivation 
Table 4.4: Dominant Characteristic in Stage H 
4.2.1 Compelling Purpose 
Both companies were motivated to achieve the alliance objectives. IDV wanted to drive 
the cost of the box down and improve performance by scheduling and planning. Killeen 
saw an opportunity to improve quality of service to a very important customer by working 
in concert with IDV. The inter-organisational teams stimulated innovative changes which 
went a long way towards attaining these objectives. 
Early suspicion by IDV that the alliance was simply a public relations exercise on the part 
of Killeen was gradually dispelled because of the latter's commitment to the project in 
terms of time and resources. 
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"Every supplier will always tell you what you want to hear. If Mr. Buyer says to Mr. 
Supplier partnering is a great idea, Mr. Supplier will reply that he wasjust about to say the 
same thing. So in the beginning Killeen might well have considered the 'Whole thing a PR 
exercise. " (B, IDV, 97,6: 2) 
4.2.2 Interdependence 
The historical interdependence between the companies was such that it would have taken 
IDV some time to get an equivalent service from another box supplier and up until this time 
IDV had not really considered that route. IDV was a very substantial segment of the 
Killeen business and Killeen has made a number of investments specifically for IDV's 
business, such as the print machine for the Baileys box that printed seven colours in two 
runs. 
The first alliance agreement guaranteed that IDV would continue to use Killeen for a 
further three years, that is from 1994 to 1997. In return, Killeen promised a series of cost 
cuts within that time frame. In the first instance, therefore, these two factors removed the 
uncertainty in respect of supply on the one hand and market value on the other. 
Communication between organisations helped to create order as a result of forward 
planning information; work was now shared with Killeen. Also, Killeen would give 
advance notice to IDV when they would be unable to meet the order schedule and together 
they would reassess and prioritise which deliveries were most important. This was directly 
due to the cross-organisation team projects and communication improved hugely in the 
course of the alliance. 
"We Pre working better together and are much more open. There's no fear about speaking 
to one another about problems and all of us are trying to look globally, rather than 
specifically. Yhere are more people involved and there's been a big tratisfer of knowledge 
in both directions. " (MC, ID, 97,1: 2) 
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"Me single biggest achievement is communication. " (MM, IDV, 97,6: 3) 
Before the alliance, dialogue between the companies had been minimal and it was as a 
result of the alliance that realisation grew that the old style behaviour was by comparison 
disadvantageous. By bringing Killeen into the planning process to challenge IDV's 
assumptions, issues of mutual concern often were easily resolved. 
"We no longer had to ask Killeen to do things at the drop of a hat. By making suggestions 
and identifying requirements we were able to plan better. We actually took a chunk of 
overtime out of the Killeen process and as a consequence costs disappeared " (B, IDV, 97,4: 2) 
Near the end of 1995 and in early 1996 paper prices were on the increase. This was just at 
the time when IDV was developing its cost model in anticipation of raw material cost 
reductions. A sense of unease was generated within Killeen and this grew in view of 
reduced communication and feedback from IDV. 
"I think that Killeen has been more open than ever before, by providing normally 
confidential information and both Liam and mysey'put in a lot of important work prior to 
coming to meetings. However, at the end of the day we haven't really got anyfeedback or 
creditfor this. " (CKK, 96,5: 4) 
4.2.3 Learning and alliance skills 
By early 1996, there was a far greater comprehension by the allies of each other's 
processes. Over the nineteen months of the alliance, IDV learned more about box 
production than had been garnered in two decades of working with Killeen. 
"We now know how a carton is made. In terms of management skills, we've learnt how to 
get round problems. Willing collaboration is much more powerful that the adversarial 
way. " (PD, IIDV, 97,6: 9) 
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While everyone was ploughing new ground, a helpful hand was always readily available. 
"Both companies were sailing in uncharted waters, although we did not realise it at the 
time. Ifwe needed more information, we got it and then moved on. " (B, IDV, 97,5: 3) 
Three or four years ago (1992/1993) Killeen had two main customers. Killeen 
subsequently obtained sole supplier status from Proctor and Gamble, which was followed 
by a third customer. By 1996, Killeen was serving three large customers and more business 
was coming in, whereas in the summer of 1995, Killeen had spare capacity. By the end of 
1996, Killeen's production was significantly more efficient. 
The alliance cost team was given the difficult task of tracking the costs of the box and it 
was at this point that Killeen gradually began opening its books to IDV. 
"We would never have done it on our own, but certainly the push ftom IDV gave us 
confidence to improve our cost management. " (CMK, 97,7: 2) 
Nevertheless Killeen found it difficult to break down the cost of the IDV box and identify 
the cost drivers. Cutting overheads and the labour cost involved in converting the paper into 
the finished cardboard case proved to be a struggle. 
"The cost model is broken down into raw material, distribution, overheads and conversion. 
We agree and accept that the overheads to sales ratio is out of line and we are trying to 
drive this down within an agreedperiod " (FKY.., 97,1: 2) 
As the integration stage developed the teams became more cohesive almost to the extent of 
exclusion, in the sense that, although secondary information sources were available, they 
were only just beginning to be explored. Boundary spanning was progressive and expertise 
from outside sources began to be used routinely. This reduced risk and eased the pressure 
on the team when reporting back to the steering committee. Associated technical 
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companies, such as the Smurfit R&D facility in France, were referred to for advice in 
support of team decisions and also Killeen's ink suppliers helped develop new colours. 
"Direct involvement with Smurfit in France, as well as with ink andpaper suppliers, began 
in the lifetime of the partnership and is still happening to this day. From the packaging 
development point of view and in terms of professionalis7n and reliability we've certainly 
moved up afew notches. " (QKIDV, 97,6: 1) 
The cost team used outside information extensively for market research and benchmarking. 
Significantly, however, they did not avail themselves of local expertise even when they 
needed it. 
"Yhe benchmarking criteria was external, and with hindsight, we would probably have 
benefitedftom more in depth involvementftomfinance. " (B, IDV, 97,2: 6) 
Clearly, the teams understood the benefit of external sources in their research, but lack of 
information sharing between teams meant, on occasions, duplication of effort. 
"We'd areas of work which overlapped Aere was no appreciation by the teams of what 
each was working on and the weren't really looking at the task in the round " Ae y 
presentation every month could have been the opportunity to identify common interests. 
(MAIDV, 97,6: 3) 
Usually teams decisions were the result of consensus and the steering committee would 
resolve disputes after everyone had aired his view. Major disagreements were rare and 
mostly occurred during price negotiation. 
The diverse composition of the teams helped to make decisions balanced and this was a 
positive factor in the leadership selection. The leader was generally the individual with the 
greatest technical expertise for the particular project in hand, with others taking on the 
leadership role as circumstances demanded. 
141 
"Yhe team leader wasn't someone standing head and shoulders above everyone else. It was 
a subtle elevation within the team and it was quite sufficientfor that person to have been so 
identified " (QKIDV, 97,7: 1) 
Problem solving took a similar course, namely through discussion and a consensual , 
decision followed regarding action. Above all, there was continuous interest on the part of 
the steering committee with the latter offering strong leadership and a point of focus. 
The teams were expected to identify market trends and monitor their own progress. 
Overall, performance was judged on its impact on the unit cost of the box. Plenty of work 
needed to be done to achieve targets and the meetings and reporting mechanisms provided 
teams with a structure to work within. Some fared better than others. 
Project management proved to be the least of the teams skills, with the exception of the 
Logistics team who made good use of project management techniques. The leader of this 
team was particularly well organised and expected team members to perform similarly. 
The activities of most teams were not sufficiently sophisticated to add value to day-to-day 
activities apart from Logistics, whose daily operations were positively affected by the 
alliance. Time management was important and a degree of control built into the procedure 
was needed to do this efficiently. 
The Logistics team had this down to such a fine art and when the team met, each member 
reported his recent activities and the outcomes. Further actions with deadlines were then 
recorded. By comparison, other teams operated in far more of an ad hoc way and although 
meetings should have been documented, mostly this was not the case. Consequently, much 
of the knowledge gained was team specific and was generally not disseminated. 
Above all, we learned that you need toformalise and use standardformats, particularly if 
the team is going to be involved in three orfour projects. Activities had to be numbered, 
prioritised and afterwards analysed and evaluated " (MCIDV, 97,4: 4) 
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4.2.4 Joint Decision-Making 
As the alliance progressed and production was audited, it became clear to IDV that quality 
problems were now a rarity. Isolated incidents over the years created a negative perception 
of suppliers in the mind of I1DV staff and this permeated from unit manager level down to 
the production floor. In fact, IDV had exactly the same unflattering opinion of their glass 
supplier who they said was providing a below standard service. In actuality, the root cause 
was II)V's own poor control, for example, inaccurate specifications were causing supply 
problems. The matter happened to be brought to light at one of the daily IDV production 
and planning meetings at which Killeen were now in attendance. This misconception by 
IDV was straightened out and reinforced the necessity of both parties understanding the 
implications of their own actions on the ally's business. 
"In general terms we're fairly happy and certainly the documentary evidence shows that 
the packaging quality is good But I am not sure if that matches up with the perception on 
the shopj7oor. 7hat is the men working with the outer cases, or the managers in production. 
It's also galling tofindproblems that are the result of IDVs own making. So I think it is 
important that we actually have these people (Killeen), at review meetings so as to ensure a 
common level of understanding. " (WIDV, 97,4: 3) 
The Marketing manager from IDV, International Brand Company (MC), was more 
receptive. He had joined the brand development team a little later in the process and 
provided the team with market information. The team looked to the IBC for direction in 
terms of where market opportunities lay and how the industry was developing. It relied on 
the IDBC to give assistance in technical design and to advise how this might impact on the 
brand itself. Ultimately, Killeen and the design company, Tutsells, were in direct contact, 
with the supplier becoming involved in discussions concerning design at the very early 
stages. 
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4.2.5 Personal Satisfaction and Motivation 
Tcam mcmbcrs likcd working togctlicr and wcrc obviously stimulatcd by achimnictits. 
"I've certainly eiVoyed the whole process because it's taken its out of the office atulptit its 
lit the front fine. It's beets very challenging. and made its look at new ways of doing 
things. " (FNLK. 97,2: 4) 
The alliance project was driven ahead at full steam by teams aligncd 'in a common mission. 
However, it quickly became apparcnt if anyone was not on board and this applied 'in 
particular to IDV unit managcrs who supcrviscd and managcd the bottling hall and wcrc 
directly in charge of manufactuning. 
Although their remit was to keep production up and to maintain cfTicicncy. Unit Managers 
paid little attention to schedules or agreed production plans. They gave the impression or 
being oblivious to the knock on cffect or their actions and seemed reluctant to discuss and 
resolve issues with suppliers or to attend logistics or indeed any other meetings. 
@d7here is an attitudinal problem. Unit managers focus oil is-lwt they are doing to the 
exclusion of everything else and view the swppl), of materials as wry elastic. 
(MM, IDV, 95,4: 2) 
There was notable improvement in communication links, especially, between IDV store 
men, forklift drivers and Killeen's delivery drivers. The store men were prominently 
involved in the planning process and although not assigned to a team, their importance at 
the interface of materials coming into IDV was recogniscd. 
4.2.6 Summary: Transition to Stage III 
It was at this point in the relations that energy on both sides bcgan to diminish and thcsc 
signals marked the transition to another next stage. Mid way through 1995, the tcams 
began to lose focus and to rcctify this the team structure and projccts wcrc reviewed and 
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adjusted to reflect changing circumstances. Members were specifically directed to examine 
particular aspects such as logistic operations, brand development, benchmarking and 
innovation. At the same time a joint strategic plan was discussed again but still was not 
formally adopted. 
The foregoing is the backdrop to the transition to the Stage III. The effect of the review 
and team reshuffle did not achieve the aim of re-energising the teams and after a brief 
period of apparent revitalization, they began to lose concentration once again. Table 4.5 
summarise the indicators during this transition (refer chapter 7.7). 
" Compelling purpose 
" Interdependence 
" Learning and alliance skills 
Joint decision making 
Personal satisfaction and 
motivation 
Crisis followed by 
Managerial Action 
Loss of focus 
Many projects completed 
No formal strategic plan 
Meetings cancelled 
IDV benchmarking for 
packaging suppliers without 
consultation with Killeen 
Table 4.5: Transition to Stage M 
4.3 STAGE 1111: Duration March 1996- March 1997 
Late in 1995, IDV sought tenders from other companies for its packaging business without 
notifying Killeen. Despite all the good work of the past year, IDV remained unconvinced 
that the packaging cost was actually being reduced. Killeen struggled from the outset to 
break down the cost structure of the box, but was constrained because of overhead 
allocations as well as corporately driven pressure to maintain margins. Table 4.6 below, 
shows the dominant characteristics in the third stage. 
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Characteristics from table 4.1 Dominant characteiistics 
" Growing trust and commitment Adapting cultures 
" Teamwork promoting cooperative philosophy 
" Shared norms at relationship interface 
" 14R practices not influenced by the alliance 0 HR assessment 
" Companies maintain own policies and 
procedures 
Communication becomes increasingly routine 0 Performance plateau 
Teams lose interest 
Routine operations 
" Partners knowledgeable about each other's Process understanding 
business. 
" Scheduling and planning information available 
" Operational performance sustainable 
" Customer focused 0 Reflection and learning 
" Increased technical and commercial know-how 
" Learning from each other and experience 
Table 4.6: Distilled Characteristics in Stage III 
Factors that contributed to the slow down in activity were as follows. - 
20% cost reduction accomplished 
continuing pressure exerted on IDV to source packaging at the most competitive price 
and 
* increasing paper price plays havoc with Killeen's cost plan. 
However, there were still many positive factors evidence as the alliance continued to 
mature which have been described below. 
146 
4.3.1 Adapting Cultures 
In the early stages, the teams seemed to be "shadow boxing" and social interaction 
improved as individuals got to know each other. Trust and commitment grew as a result of 
continuous management support and this was greatly reinforced by team success. 
By this time the relationship had matured to the extent that a new philosophy and culture 
permeated Killeen. This was not universal in H)V and affected only persons directly 
involved in the alliance, whereas in Killeen there seemed to be a more general shift in 
attitude. Nevertheless, teamwork was seen as the way to do business and a change of 
behaviour was evident in many people. 
4.3.2 HR Assessment 
There was never any expectation of personal or group rewards. Motivation was purely to 
improve competitiveness. Employees worked to an agenda involving major organisational 
changes and those taking part gained considerable satisfaction from working in the team 
and from its achievements. Some of the projects were valued highly and successes were 
recognised and celebrated. 
IDV had always been an organisation with positive HRM policies. Training in team 
building skills was promoted, both in house and by means of external seminars and 
workshops. Career development and rewards were based on annual performance appraisals 
that include team working. 
4.3.3 Performance Plateau 
Most of the projects were running and some teams had initiated sub projects, however, 
despite this team effort began to slow down. "I think the teams worked well till at one stage 
they hit a wall. It was a very definite problemfor them. " M, &97,2: 5) 
147 
Duplication of effort was due to the fact that no one had a complete overview of team 
activities. A major demotivating factor was the amount of time spent on certain projects 
that were destined to be shelved. In most instances this was inevitable and was justifiable 
after evaluation. 
"Mere were projects with no definite output. No one knew until they got to the end 
whether they would be successful or not. They were long-term, pie in the sky t)pe of 
things. " (ONtK, 97,1: 2) 
Mostly, it was too uncomfortable for B)V to change. For example, the case standardisation 
project aimed to reduce the eighty or ninety case variables, down to about fifteen. The 
savings identified were considerable but the project was scrapped because H)V decided it 
was too difficult to make the change. 
Similarly, Killeen and its ink supplier, together with an IBC representative, created a new 
gold colour for the Baileys box to enhance the marketing and brand image. Trials were 
completed but the project was scrapped because the design company had something else in 
mind for the new container. 
Clearly, such projects involved political decisions and stakeholders in the wider 
corporations had not been consulted at the appropriate stage. The effect of these reversals 
on the Operations and Quality team was demoralising. 
"Nobody had approached the market place andftom Killeen's point of view there was a 
huge potential in the new design. Ifwe were set aproject by IDV and costs turned out to be 
the issue, IDV wouldn't accept that we couldn't do it. On the other hand, if it benefited us 
and it was turned down because ID V did not want to do it, then Ifound that exasperating. 
That is the negative side to the partnership. " (PKK, 97,14: 5) 
A few of the original members of the Logistics team, now termed Operations, formed a 
sub-committee, because day to day business seemed to be falling behind. The sub- 
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committee saw the need to continue looking at areas where money could really be saved 
such as logistics planning, run lengths and the like. 
"We actually broke away ftom the Operations team, off our own bat, to keep track of 
logistics, order and planning accuracy, quality, delivery schedules, servicing and things 
like that. " (ONtK, 97,1: 2) 
On the most part although the projects were experimental by nature, the teams were 
attempting to produce innovative breakthroughs. Issues for these projects included: - 
" trim reduction to improve stacking 
" outer case standardisation 
" board grade reduction 
" EDI implementation 
" crease re-design 
" clay coat reduction 
" new gold trials 
9 cost models 
Savings were realised through: - 
" reduced origination charges for complete case changes 
" reduced set-up times and 
" longer print runs 
The biggest blow to the Killeen team morale came about as a result of rumours that IIDV 
had put the whole of their packaging business out to tender. 
"At various stages in the partnership we were under threat and we will never know how 
close ID V was to giving the business to someone else. It would have been too easyfor us to 
say OK we accept the whole thing and as a gesture of goodfaith, our price reduced by 
10916. But that would have decimated us. " (FKY,, 97,8: 9) 
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4.3.4 Process Understanding 
As well as suffering logistical problems originating in IDV, such as inconsistency of 
output, planning's disregard of production guidelines and various interdepartmental issues, 
Killeen experienced frequent changes of instructions that resulted in disrupted production 
schedules. The picture was transformed, due to the alliance, so that scheduling and 
forecasting information were available and daily operations in both organisations were 
merged. 
". .. production information is more structured and controlled and Sidney (Killeen) relays 
infonnationftomIDV We've now have abetter handle on the way IDV operates, and this 
means we know the little things that we can do to help and the little things they can do to 
help us. On the whole, I think it's working very well. " (OMY,, 97,1: 1) 
"I'm meeting with their production people and know how the company operates. That they 
are looking at my areasftom every angle, certainly helps. " (SPMX, 97,4: 4) 
However, change had taken place at different rates in different areas. 
". ... ftom our 
department's point of view change is not happening fast enough 
although I'm the first to acknowledge that some problem areas have been taken on board 
andploughed on. " (hDAIDV, 97,5: 2) 
This lack of progress reflected how difficult it was to alter an entire community's work 
patterns and attitudes. 
the bottling could be slower to change. .. they gofor producing volume regardless of 
whether you ordered it or not.. and the bottling department is a large department ... 
Yhere are eight to ten unit managers and counting the people on thefloor themselves, in all 
there are about ninety people. For change to really happen, and to take it forward 
everyone has tofirst buy into it. " (NQvLMV, 97,5: 1) 
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"Aere was some difficulty regarding Planning sticking to agreed ground rules because 
customers exerted pressure to deliver with less than the agreed lead times, and the 
planning department would run with the request and alter the plan " (Ml4jDV, 97,5: 3) 
"There was also a personal or even interdepartmental dimension to the problem of abiding 
by these ground rules. Sometimes materials, planning and production approached 
problems with attitudes that are blinkered to issues of real interest to others. " 
(MMJI)V, 97,5: 3) 
4.3.5 Reflection and Learning 
IDV achieved its reduction in box cost and by this time Killeen was operating with greater 
efficiency, having learnt so much about its own company's practices. 
" From a learning point of view, one of the main benefits to us has been putting our people 
in theftont line to deal with customers. It's made them much more customerfocused and 
aware. " (MLK, 97,5: 4) 
Peaks and troughs in the process mirrored team motivation'that fluctuated in accordance 
with the level of progress and feedback. 
"7here were a lot of times when we were desperate and didn't know where we were. Aere 
was only a certain amount we could do and we would then move on to another problem. 
(CM, &97,6: 10) 
A two day workshop was proposed to revitalise the teams and establish new strategic 
objectives for the alliance. This generated a new momentum for about three or four 
months. Then people began to get frustrated again, "they seemed to be getting nowhere, 
asking exactly what it was they were trying to do. Me confused state we have been in for 
the pastfew months is quiteftustrating, " (B, IDV, 97,7: 6) 
During the Plateau stage, many new ideas and projects were mooted and an Innovation 
team was established to capture these ideas. Unfortunately, after only a few meetings, like 
the other teams,, it got stuck. 
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"Mis Plateau is an evolutionary stage, it has been very valuablefor us to reflect on and 
learn ftom the past few months. We realised a cost benefit along with a deeper 
understanding of our supply base. Now that we know what we want and understand our 
interdependence with Killeen, we aim to develop the relationshipfurther. " (PD, IDV, 98,1: 5) 
4.3.6 Summary: Transition to Stage IV 
As the alliance agreement, which was signed in 1994 defined the duration as 1994 -1997 
the relationship was still active and maturing. Given that initial operational objectives had 
already been achieved, it seemed justifiable to introduce a further relationship stage into the 
conceptual framework. It was therefore postulated that, Stage IV was characterised by a 
significant change in depth of involvement and structure of the relationship. 
Poor feedback from the monthly review meetings contributed to de-motivation. Work was 
undermined because projects were not taken to a final conclusion. What had to be done 
was seen in terms of politics or requiring structural change and beyond the scope of the 
temns to realise. 
People almost welcomed the loss of momentum. There were so many other areas of 
business to concentrate on that the alliance was pushed to one side. Everyone involved 
sensed what was happening but did not know how to deal with it. Guidance was sought 
from the Steering Committee and a review meeting was dedicated to categorise and 
prioritise all current projects. This was the first time that such an evaluation had taken 
place. Had they been conducted more regularly the duration of the plateau period may have 
reduced. 
The Steering Committee recognised the need to review past achievements and consolidate 
existing projects. It also instituted a review to clarify what was understood by the term 
innovation and how to manage the process of capturing new ideas. This required a more 
structured approach to project evaluation and it also became evident that much learning 
from the Alliance had been lost because of inadequate recording and, when it did happen, 
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poor dissemination. Reporting at the Steering Committee had become mechanical and 
reports were cobbled together at the last minute. The structure of these review meetings 
changed, so that the teams were limited in time thereby inhibiting communication and 
learning. 
Despite the foregoing background, a philosophy of cooperation filtered some way into the 
ally companies. Teamwork, as a method of working, had been established. There were 
pockets of support towards the alliance in IDV and in Killeen, knowledge was now spread 
far wider. Cross-fertilisation of tacit expertise enhanced the teams technical, operational 
and commercial know-how. Many of the lessons learnt have been passed on to other 
customers and suppliers and innovation has also taken place at the interfaces of these 
organisations. 
New strategic objectives were as yet unclear and teams needed direction to meet new and 
changing internal and external environmental challenges. The transition to Stage IV was 
characterised by a structured review of current projects and the planning of a process 





0 Reflection and learning 
Managerial Action 
Structured review of current 
projects 
Identified need to manage 
innovation better 
Next steps considered 
Table 4.7: Transition from Stage III to Stage IV 
4.4 STAGE IV March 1997 to November 1999 
Table 4.8, illustrates dominant characteristics, inductively derived from data gathered 
during participant observation in the fourth stage of the IDV/ Killeen alliance. 
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STAGE IV 
Characteristics drawn from data Dominant characteristics 
Changing attitudes towards the alliance in both Cooperating cultures 
companies 
Alliance mind set amongst participants 
Collective identity 
Teamwork ethos 
Problem solving and analysis skills Developing alliance skills 
Understand operations in each company 
Incremental problem solving Joint innovation and continuous improvement 
Joint projects produce innovative solutions 
Networks foster innovation 
Transfer of knowledge and capabilities Joint learning, tacit and explicit 
Teams have considerable knowledge of alliance 
partners and processes 
New capabilities developing 
Improvements routine in day-to-day business 0 Process alignment at interface 
Operational objectives achieved 0 Step change 
Joint strategic plan for next alliance period 
Re-define goals and objectives 0 Strategic Review 
Opportunity for the alliance to become truly 
strategic 
Adapt to external and internal dynamics 
Table 4.8: Dominant Characteristics in Stage IV of the IDV/Kflleen Alliance 
4.4.1 Cooperating Cultures 
Killeen's management always treated IDV as its principal customer, but now support 
throughout the company was generally so widespread that "even the people on the floor 
(are) speaking of quality and service. " (CM, K, 97,4: 6) 
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It is evident that the culture has changed within both organisations ".. attitudes have 
become more open andftiendly. I can remember about two or three years ago IDV was 
preceded by a profanity, now it's IDV and there are no adjectives in front of it. 
(ONM97,5: 6) 
What gave the alliance impetus was the effort by the two companies to dismantle 
communication barriers and motivate staff. Throughout the duration of the alliance project 
managers had been prepared to go the extra mile and this contributed significantly to the 
cultural change in the organisations. 
"Esmond and Tom, are fully committed and I think this has been passed on to the rest of 
the people. " (ONM97,5: 6) 
One thing unanimously acknowledged ýy everyone actively involved was that top 
management commitment to the project was continually in evidence. 
The culture within Killeen changed. "Killeen had a reputation for laying off people and 
there's been quite a difference since 1990 when Smurfit took the plant over. For the first 
time in twenty-five years issues such as working conditions and social clubs have been 
discussed 7he men have had an attitudinal change reflecting the scope for personal 
development. We're bringing in a training programme to increase the flexibility of the 
employees. " (CKY%, 97,5: 1) 
IIEW's view was that Killeen still was not "challenging" assumptions enough although it 
has become much better at forewarning of impending problems that might impact on 
supply. IDV needed to respond positively to this and freely admitted that it had not always 
done so in the past. 
"Sometimes our reaction to bad news verged on the hysterical and that didn't encourage 
Killeen to share problems with us again. - MIDV, 97,2: 2) 
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Opinions differed regarding how well IDV managed change, for example. . "By and large 
I would say yes, people are open to change and willing to try new things. "(w, mV, 97,5: 2) 
Whereas another point of view may be summarised as "reactive as opposed to 
proactive, risk averse. " (BIDV, 97,9: 2) 
The mood in the business had changed and the signs were positive. Killeen bought new 
machinery; the biggest investment being a six colour printing machine. The new machine 
was installed on the production floor that had been replanned for more efficient use of 
space. 
4.4.2 Developing Alliancing Skills 
Major changes have taken place inside Killeen over the past few years. .. "the majority of 
the people here are in theirfifties. 7he workforce was largely unionised, thefactory itself 
used to be quite dirty and old, and the machinery needed maintenance. In the last three 
years there has been a big investment in plant. All the machinery is now in good running 
oýder and there is a maintenance programme. Planning is controlled through our central 
office and we have the commitment of the men on the floor who work all the hours god 
sends, to make sure we achieve what we've promised. I would definitely say we accept 
change nowadays much more easily than we did three years ago. " (CKK, 97,4: 3) 
People skills are clearly very important in alliance management. Members of the joint 
teams developed team spirit, problem analysis and solving skills. They identified each 
others needs, developed more collaborative attitudes to the other's staff and they defended 
one another against outside criticism. 
Yve never seen so muchjoint team work that has gone on in this (partnering). I used 
to be quite cynical hearing about partnering but now I'm very impressed by the degree of 
openness afterjust six months. " (OKY,, 96,6: 3) 
Although some people were in more than one team, there has been little cross team 
fertilisation of ideas, or discussion where projects obviously overlapped. Nevertheless, 
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some teams did boundary span to obtain external advice and assistance. Killeen sought 
IDV supplier's expertise to assist with the new box design. Representatives from Killeen 
were able to contact the design company at any time to discuss ideas. 
"Eighteen months ago thatjust would not have happened " (OMY, 97,11: 2) 
It has to be said however that, on the whole, boundary-spanning activities were not 
managed efficiently. For example, a team member delegated to carry out research found 
difficulty in making initial contact with an outsider who already had had dealings with 
others in Killeen or IDV. In retrospect, it would have been quicker if the person, who 
already knew the relevant individual, had made a point of formally introducing his 
colleague. 
"People are now generally more focused because there's now more contact and quicker 
communication with the customer. " (ChM97,7: 2) 
Newly acquired knowledge of the modus operandi of the ally organisations helped in 
aligning team and company goals. Multi-disciplinary teams brought a diversity of 
technological expertise and the open atmosphere at meetings was conducive to airing all 
points of view, controversial or otherwise. 
All in all, a robust set of alliance management skills and competencies has been developed 
in both companies. 
"Undoubtedly, we're far more knowledgeable about how to manage an alliance, and I 
would suggest that we know more about real partnering than any other company I'm aware 
of. " (B, IDV, 97,4: 1) 
4.4.3 Joint Innovation and Continuous Improvement 
Innovation needed the active support and encouragement of management. It took some 
time for the teams to grasp the mechanics of innovation generation in a team environment, 
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although a retrospective examination of what had been achieved so far suggested that 
innovation had indeed been ongoing and incremental. 
Baileys new box design, intended to create a dynamic new image in seventeen markets, was 
approved. Early involvement by Killeen in the design project enabled issues, such as the 
time required for trials and implementation, to be factored into the plan. 
A particularly difficult problem was reduction of colours from seven to a six, to allow 
printing to be done in one pass. Collaboration between Killeen and its ink suppliers also 
succeeded in improving the case image by development of a new bright metallic gold 
background. 
Killeen frequently used the R&D facilities of its sister company in France. As the board 
grade reduction project proved to be difficult, it was proposed that the current Swedish 
paper suppliers should be asked to help find a method of strengthening the paper. 
Furthermore IDV suggested that supplier involvement generally should be rolled out 
further and that Killeen should invite its own suppliers to the alliance meetings. 
In reaction to the market demand for innovative packaging, a five year plan was 
formulated, with regular reviews of package design development. The planned start of 
implementation of the new primary and secondary packaging was October 1997, with 
tertiary packaging following in June 1998. 
Latterly, it had not been clear if the alliance was destined to continue into the future. This 
previously unspoken concern was eventually raised at a steering committee. The 
suggestion that the alliance was in question provoked surprise on the part of the directors 
who, in their own separate discussions, had agreed that the relationship would continue. 
Discontent had been stirred up mainly one person in the guise of "devil's advocate7. This 
led to Killeen picking up rumours from IDV personnel that the alliance was unlikely to last. 
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Even although IDV procurement director continually reassured Killeen that the situation 
was under control, nevertheless, Killeen staff remained unconvinced. 
The problem was finally resolved at an internal IDV meeting, when each individual in 
attendance was asked to state whether he was in favour of the alliance. Everyone at that 
meeting replied positively and agreed that he was on board. 
This particular incident highlighted the importance of personal relationships in the change 
process and how easily trust could be eroded. Accordingly, it was vital for all concerned to 
be fully committed, because one dissenter could exercise a disproportionate negative 
influence. 
Lack of information was the root of uncertainty which demotivated team members tasked 
with joint evaluation of problems and solutions. There was a commonly held feeling that it 
was not worth wasting time and energy on projects that might come to nothing. This was 
dispelled when a further three-year agreement was formally negotiated starting lst May 
1997 through to 31 st March 2000. 
An exercise by the benchmarking team flagged up that Killeen was still pricing to high in 
comparison to the UK market. From tender returns the cost model revealed that one 
specific supplier was consistently more competitive than Killeen and was able to produce 
equivalent print quality. 
The accounting in the model was straightforward in itself However, it was still difficult to 
justify in financial terms Killeen's advantage to IDV, despite its better understanding of 
IDV's requirements and business processes, quicker speed of response, greater flexibility 
and geographical proximity. 
"... Killeen .. look as if they are paying above the market price for corrugated and we 
suspect it's about 10% more. But infact they're giving us the service and the XT to keep 
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our linesfec4 and we've no stock - Yhaf must be worthfar more than the additional 10% we 
are payingfor the box. " (BIDV. 97,2-4) 
The outcome was a twelve months cost sharing commitment during which time a value 
assessment model was to be developed. The agreement said that Killeen had to become the 
lowest cost supplier and provide IDV with the most competitive price by the end of a year. 
Progress was to be monitored every six months by the steering group. 
4.4.4 Joint Learning, Tacit and Explicit 
"We've been talking to Killeen's suppliers and learning about paper making. We'realso 
examining the supply chain to pin down how to improve the end product. " (PD, rDV, 97,7: 2) 
Learning about each other's organisations and respective industries has created relationship 
specific knowledge. 
" We've learnt about Killeen's organisation and the corrugated industry, startingfrom the 
mechanics of buying the paper, corrugating, andfinally conversion. You learn about the 
physical operation, what is involved, the Problems encountered and how they originate. Of 
(BD, IDV, 97,3: 6) 
4.4.5 Process Alignment at the Interface 
Daily operations were affected by the alliance so that more information was now available 
to both organisations, in particular regarding scheduling and forecasts. What is very 
interesting is understanding the reasons behind the changes and how they impacted on each 
partner. 
The focus of attention was on each company's core operations and how they could be 
realigned or adjusted to meet the requirements of both. The basic essential was that each 
organisation understood the other's process and how the two fitted together into an 
integrated system. 
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"We know we want to look at how the processes merge between the two organisations and 
what can he done to improve it. We want change to be continuous and integrated We want 
to involve as many people as possible. nen there are issues to be dealt with we'll build a 
team to deal with that particular issue and then disband it. " (PD, IDV, 97,9: 7) 
For Killeen, paper sourcing was a very significant subject given that material represented 
48% of the total cost. Clay coated and white top paper came mostly from Sweden, some 
from Smurfit in the UK and the remainder from Ireland. 
Manufacturing required twenty-four hour drying times between corrugating and conversion 
before it was finally ready for print. Set-ups still involved person-specific skills and 
extended lead times. Rolls of paper were large and heavy and despite the recent parts 
renewal the corrugator machine was old and sensitive to settings and running conditions. 
Print was of a reasonably high quality given the available technology, but as previously 
mentioned the number of colours had to be reduced to allow a single pass through the 
printing machine. 
Materials for use the next day had to be at IDV at 6pm the day before. Much double 
handling could have been avoided if a direct physical link could have been established 
between the two plants, but this was not possible because negotiations with the current 
owner of the intervening land had stalled. 
Packaging design had significantly improved due to advances in print technique and 
collaboration between Smurfit, Killeen and Killeen's ink supplier to develop the new gold 
colour. Communication about packaging changes was becoming quicker, but not yet as 
good as Killeen would have liked. Information about paper pulp price fluctuations was now 
shared with IDV and material cost agreements meant that IDV was getting significantly 
better terms than other Killeen customers. 
Detailed cost information, linked to actual manufacturing and distribution was either not 
available to Killeen or was not actively used. The scheduling system (PCTops) provided 
information on an average basis but it was unclear if the production run size and variety 
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could be compared to best effect. Nor was it clear if there was any mapping of the 
manufacturing process, of the anticipated cost of set-up changes, or if information on 
quality standards was being adequately recorded. 
4.4.6 Step Change 
Both organisations were aware of their strengths and weaknesses. The further three-year 
agreement between IDV and Killeen was in place and this provided the opportunity to 
refine practices during that period. The intention was to have another strategic review to 
move the whole process forward. However, the general opinion, was that this particular 
alliance had reached its peak and a step change would be required in the future. 
"I think that in the not too distant future, it's not going to be a Killeen issue at all. It's 
going to be a Smurfit issue. " (PD, IDV, 98,1: 9) 
4.4.7 Strategic Review 
By October 1996, objectives and targets set out in 1994 had been achieved in large 
measure. Costs had been cut and stock reduced by elimination of over ordering or re- work. 
Deliveries were to plan and performance compared with the ideal was very good. 
"We've a 100%fix on two weeks, 95% on week three and weekfour is a "best guess" - 
whatever we think is going to happen is open to change. Basically, we look at afour week 
horizon and run through the programme, bottling line by bottling line, examining what we 
are trying to do for the next four weeks and we discuss any issues which arise. I' (UM, IDV, 97,4: 1) 
While IDV had realised more reliable deliveries and improved quality, for its part Killeen is 
operating machinery more efficiently and had increased production. 
"We've certainly been able to put a lot more through our plant. When Icame herein 1993, 
if we got out 300,000 square metres per week, it was a great week. Now over 450,000 is 
thought to be a good week and last week we did 451,000 square metres. We've achieved 
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this volume with pretty much the same number ofpeople and due to our investment in plant 
we rarely have down time due to breakdowns. " (FDK, 97,6: 2) 
Planning had improved and because of this new business had been acquired. Business has 
also been attracted as a result of improved print quality. Innovation in inks had made 
possible achievement of the lithographic quality target within the next five years, using 
flexographic print medium. 
In the meantime, the "optimum" target appeared to be shifting and there were still concerns, 
highlighted by the benchmarking exercise, as to the best way of measuring IDV's 
improvement due to the better service contributed by Killeen. The issue was less about 
comfort in the knowledge of a job well done and more on generation of evidence to satisfy 
each parent organisation. 
"Although we've taken signYlIcant costs out, we're still uncompetitive with other market 
players. We stillface the task of demonstrating to interested parties in both organisations 
that the alliance has been successful. The way to do that is to establish very clear 
benchmarks and this is what we are ttying to do. Although scepticism has disappeared 
we're conscious that there still are doubts and we have to demonstrate the results. 
(PD, IDV, 97,6: 6) 
4.4.8 Summary 1994 - 1999 
Transition between the stages was characterised by changing behaviour and attitude by the 
allies and it is also evident from reduced communication and enthusiasm. To date the IIDV / 
Killeen alliance has been through three periods of what might be termed crisis, although the 
first two were never considered truly critical. Transitions in the alliance seemed to follow a 
period of uncertainty and the resulting change was the catalyst for upsets of differing 
degrees of severity. 
The purpose of this alliance as the means of reducing IDV costs has been emphasised 
consistently in the study. Between 1994 and 1997, both companies acted with little 
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interference from parent organisations provided that managers proved to the corporate 
boards that savings were being achieved. 
Although not proven it was always suspected that Killeen spread its overheads across its 
customer base. What is clear is that price reductions won by IDV were at the expense of 
Killeen and were achieved by eroding the latter's margins. In the long-term this was not 
sustainable and contrary to commercial sense. However, the positive side was that it 
forced Killeen to try to better understand its system for allocating overheads. Eventually in 
1995, Killeen was deemed to be still pricing too high and as a consequence a joint team 
project was created to investigate Killeen's costs. 
Some improvements were being made, especially in the logistics process and IDV 
continued to benchmark the corrugating packaging industry. Armed with increasing 
knowledge of Killeen's cost and overhead structure, as well as a better understanding of the 
corrugating industry, IDV appeared to be able to analyse the market in Ireland and the UK 
with greater accuracy. 
" Mey know the price of the paper, they know the price of our manufacturing process, they 
know everything about our printing process and they know labour costs and still they are 
turning the SCrew. "( SPKK, 99,4: 3) 
In 1997, IDV sent its packaging business out to competitive tender and what shook the 
alliance to its foundations was IDV's statement that it had sourced an alternative supplier in 
the UK who could service its requirements in Ireland. Not surprisingly Killeen countered 
by saying that like was not being compared with like, neither was 11DV taking into 
consideration added value in terms of Killeen's speed of response. 
The situation became untenable and this was a time of serious reflection and soul searching. 
The consequences of the crisis were postponed by a nine month moratorium between 1997 
and 1998 due to the Diageo merger and change of senior management in Killeen. In May 
1998 the boards of Guinness and Grand Metropolitan announced that they had agreed the 
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terms of a proposed merger of the two companies. It was intended that the new group 
should be called Diageo Plc., IDV then became UDV. 
The effect of these incidents on the alliance was profound. The second alliance agreement 
aimed to give between 1998 and the year 2000 a series of cost reductions of 6%, 6% and 
5%. These were to be achieved by joint effort within the spirit of the alliance. 
Diageo then announced its "pay to play" policy whereby suppliers were to help cover the 
costs of the recent merger by paying an agreed sum to Diageo and in return they would be 
allowed to continue to serve the much larger group. Killeen paid UDV a further 5% 
"Diageo put a stake in the ground very soon after the merger was announced, stating that 
it intended to double shareholder value within five years. As a result of that it had to be 
seen to increase profits. Yhere is a different outlook on our brand and a significantfocus 
on cost reduction. " (BUDV, 99,6: 1) 
From a procurement perspective, Diageo appointed category managers for each of the raw 
materials that the business required. The category manager headed a global team of 
procurement personnel from each UDV centre with a remit to source the most competitive 
price worldwide. 
The MD in Killeen left the company almost simultaneously with the announcement of the 
merger and many other key people followed shortly after. This change came at such a 
critical time and the exodus meant that only one person remained in Killeen from all the 
original teams. Although the new teams heard how the alliance had worked in the past, 
they were on unfamiliar ground. Also Killeen was faced with UDV looking for more 
money, over and above what had been agreed. 
From UDV's point of view, Killeen had gained significant value through the alliance as 
additional work had increased Killeen's capacity and this was bound to have had a positive 
impact on its other business. 
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"Frank inherited a difficult situation coming in on the back of an intimate working 
situation, as there's no doubt that Tom and Esmond were the driving forces behind the 
partnership. 7hat, plus the business changes didn't provide fertile ground and it's been a 
bit like that ever since. " (QKUDV, 99,1: 4) 
From Killeen's standpoint, the alliance was in the balance. 
"Killeen ftels threatened now and the people on the shop floor don't have the same 
motivation, although they don't produce any less quality. Yhe progress and economic 
viability of the company ispublicised every month in the canteen. So the men know how the 
company is doing and all of this doesn't have a positive effect on the workforce. 
(SPKK, 99,2: 10) 
The Killeen plant had laboured under physical constraints that contributed to its lack of 
competitiveness, namely, the age of the corrugator machine, small size of the plant itself 
and each piece of equipment does a single operation, i. e. printing, die-cutting etc. Modem 
plants have machinery that do all of these things in a single operation. 
The UDW Killeen alliance stands at a crossroads. Killeen sees itself continuing to supply 
UDV in the short to medium term that is in eighteen months to two years. There is still a 
lot of good work that can be done and the challenge for Killeen is to overcome recent 
damaging events and plan its tactics as constructively as it did in the past. 
"7he whole alliance is full of contradictions but whatever happens between UD V and 
Killeen, it's the relations between the Jefferson Smurfit group and Diageo, they are 
crucial. " (MDjr, 99,6: 8) 
At the end of the day, UDV and Killeen have a strong bond and Killeen meets the client's 
current requirements. There needs to be a clear strategic direction in the future for both 
organisations with objectives identified to suit changing circumstances. In terms of the life 
cycle this means revisiting Stage I and progressing from there. 
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Although developed by UDV and Killeen in the first place, UDV Ireland use the alliance 
model with others, namely local glass and label suppliers. It has changed the way many 
people work in UDV and aligns with the corporate strategy to reduce costs. 
The future can never be certain and the importance of the UDV/Killeen alliance has moved 
up a notch to now involve both companies at corporate level. UDV is reviewing its 
packaging strategy and this involves negotiations not only with Smurfit, but also with other 
global players in the packaging industry. 
Even if the structure of the relationship changes, the main players are LJDV and Jefferson 
Smurfit (Killeen"s parent company). It has been this alliance that has paved the way, 
although it is cold comfort to Killeen if it loses the UDV business. 
Neither company wishes to withdraw from the alliance and indeed this was not feasible in 
the short term. A number of options were open at this time in both the short and medium 
term. However, the most important task was to improve the current situation by beginning 
to re-build personal relations and trust between the companies. A review of joint strategy 
provided the impetus for renewal, rather than considering the possibility of exiting the 
alliance. 
Regarding the corporate agenda, the notion of partnering was initially regarded with some 
cynicism as the Smurfit group had had a track record of unsuccessful attempts at 
partnering. Managers in IDV were less pessimistic because of the level of encouragement 
from their directors in the early stages. However, the success of IDV/Killeen's alliance has 
surprised many and has quite converted the cynics. Killeen has gained a company award 
and as a result managers from both businesses have made a joint presentation to UDVs 
senior management team. 
Since the Diageo merger, it has become very difficult for UDV to justify the alliance route, 
as driving down costs is the only way to remain competitive in a savage global market. 
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Although Killeen operates a shift structure in a three union environment that produces non- 
competitive pressures, nevertheless the company had become significantly more efficient 
and provided a more reliable service to UDV. Overtime and overheads were issues now 
being addressed as the alliance moved into a new stage. In the meantime Killeen managed 
to increase the proportion of its business with other customers. 
The alliance had resulted in a greater awareness of the importance of customer service, by 
raising expectations and continuously examining possibilities for quality improvement. 
Increased information transfer between UDV and Killeen and accurate joint forecasting 
appears to have balanced out the effect of short notice changes. Reducing set-up times and 
rescheduling of Killeen production runs with the minimum of disruption are seen as key 
elements. Improving machine efficiencies has increased productive capacity and reduced 
quality complaints and late deliveries. 
UDV had become a customer with a face. More inter-personal communication reinforced 
the feeling of interdependence and above all it induced greater trust, so essential in the long 
term. Both organisations recognised that implementing an alliance could be slow and even 
painful and demanded a critical analysis of internal systems and procedures, as well as 
identification of cost drivers. Nevertheless, benefits of long-term competitiveness arising 
from improved efficiency far outweighed short term opportunism between the 
organisations. However, from a corporate point of view, the alliance could have been 
perceived as unsuccessful if costs were not reduced on a year on year basis. 
In summary, significant investment in time and resources over the past five years, 
stimulated by the alliance process, resulted in outcomes that have been innovative. UDV 
now has a better understanding of the processes and complex technologies involved in 
making and printing the box. Although Killeen was at the top of the print quality table of 
companies in this field and had won print awards, nevertheless partnering forced Killeen, in 
collaboration with ink suppliers, to augment its flexographic printing capability. 
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It is important to emphasise the foregoing, even although the alliance had gone through 
difficult times. Performance was sustainable between UDV and Killeen and no longer took 
up any additional major resources. There was a reluctance to completely embrace the 
alliance because UDV/Diageo were still developing a broad strategy and this would affect 
Killeen's future. The latter is not prepared to invest until it is clear where it stands in the 
scheme of things. Circumstances may dictate a fundamental change in relations, but what 
was certain was that UDV and Killeen's alliance strategy had built the foundations for 
collaboration by Diageo and the Jefferson Smurfit group. 
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Figure 4.2: Conceptual Development 
Firstly, using data from observation of the IDV/ Killeen alliance, in conjunction with an on 
going literature review, the conceptual framework has been expanded by drawing on the 
author's observations as well as participants experience. A subsequent Stage IV, was 
added because of indications that the 1DV/ Killeen alliance had progressed to a new stage 
after Stage III. As described in section 4.4.8 (page 163), the destiny of this alliance was 
unclear at the end of the author's involvement. However, both companies were continuing 
to work closely together and to make improvements. 
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Despite the uncertainty created by the Diageo merger, both UDV and Killeen recogmsed 
that they could still improve performance and it is proposed that this alliance was not yet at 
an end, new joint objectives were likely to be realised and that the cycle would be repeated. 
That is, the companies would loop back to the Stage 1. However, whether the alliance 
would complete the cycle again is entirely another question. Table 4.9 illustrates the 
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Table 4.9: Dominant Characteristics in IDV/ Killeen Alliance 
In order to address the emerging picture an inductive approach was used in the second field 
site. Such methodology became possible due to access in January 1998, to a newly started 
tripartite alliance, in Aberdeen, between Shell Expro UK (UESL), Seaforth Maritime 
Limited (SML) and ARR-Craib (ARRC) referred to as the Supply Chain Alliance (SCA). 
Records were made by the author ftom the very outset of the alliance and this, and the early 
conceptual framework, provided focus and orientation for data gathering. 
UESL provides a full logistical service to its internal customers, the combined Brent and 
Northern business unit, as well as Central and partial support to the Southern business 
units. 
Seaforth Maritime (SML) is part of Halliburton and Brown and Root, USA, one of the 
world's leading offshore energy support companies. The company's logistics division 
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provides a comprehensive range of onshore services and facilities for offshore operations. 
These include a "one stop shop" marine support base, pipe storage and handling, short and 
long distance trucking, warehousing, distribution and office accommodation. 
Two local, independent Scottish companies, Aberdeen Road Runners (ARR) and Craib 
Transport, merged in January 1983 to form ARR Craib Transport Limited (ARRC). 
Aberdeen Road Runners was an oil related specialist that had developed a strong customer 
base of major UK and European players in the oil industry. Craib was a traditional long 
distance haulier serving the paper, food and steel businesses. 
These proceedings are the subject of Chapter five. 
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Chapter Five 
Findings - Part 11 
5.0 FINDINGS - PART II 
5.0.1 DEVELOPING CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
One of the findings to come out of this work was that, although the Supply Chain Alliance 
(SCA) agreement was formalised in January 1998, considerable time and effort had been 
expended by the respective parties in setting up the collaborative effort, during the nine 
months prior to signature of the compact itself (see appendix VII for background 
information about the organisations). As a consequence, a further stage had to be 
considered in the conceptual framework in order to capture this preliminary work and 
relevant information was available, both in terms of documentation and also first hand from 
key participants. The stage, which has been termed Stage 0, is characterised by the laying 
down of organisational preconditions, and analysis of motivations and market conditions 
prior to the alliance commencement, see table 5.1 
This initial stage describes the activities undertaken by Shell Expro Service Logistics 
(UESL) [U= UK, E= Exploration and Production = Expro, S= Services and L 
Logistics], Seaforth Maritime Limited (SML) and ARR Craib (ARRC), prior to the 1998 
alliance agreement. 
Table 5.1 below, shows, how characteristics drawn from the data have been distilled. It 
should be noted that although characteristics may not have been identical to those in the 
IDW Killeen case, using the constant comparative look/feel criteria, they could be clustered 
under dominant themes set out in table 4.9 (see page 170) and this procedure applied to 
each stage of this alliance. These dominant characteristics provide the structure to the 
detailed description of the SCA's early development stage. 
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STAGEO 
Characteristics from SCA data Dominant characteristics 
" Alliance Contract 0 Alliance agreement 
" Competitor analysis 0 Environmental analysis 
" Long-term contractual arrangements 0 History of working together 
Formal process of selection 0 Partner selection 
Strategic decision by customer 
" Cost / benefit analysis 
" Influenced by individual experiences in parent 0 Previous alliance experience 
companies 
" Vehicle to improve utilisation of resources and 0 Strategic intent 
improve scope of business 
Table 5.1: Distilled Characteristics in SCA, Stage 0 
This study concerned a leading multinational corporation with a market perception of being 
too big and too structured to be able to change. However, the company knew it could not 
continue as it had always done and that it was time to do things differently. Each 
department had the remit to develop its own strategy and there had to be a consensus of 
approach to managing the challenge. 
Against a backdrop of erratic contractor /client relations the following describes the 
situation where a cooperative strategy was implemented instead of the client determining 
his preferences as a result of competitive tendering. The Supply Chain Alliance (SCA) 
was officially launched in January 1998 although nine months of negotiation preceded 
authorisation of the start. 
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5.1 STAGE 0 
5.1.1 Alliance Agreement 
The alliance was seen as an enabling contract with specific targets and milestones laid out 
and geared towards handing over to contractors operating and management responsibilities, 
in a controlled and staged manner. At the outset SNIL would continue to supply labour, as 
it had done in the past. Once milestones were successfully reached, the company would be 
able to take on even more responsibility. 
"Yhe contract is written so that it can be changed annually, but variations can be made as 
and when required It is a live document. " (SLMUESL, 99,1: 4) 
No guidelines or directives were in place in the beginning. 
"That's another lesson we've learned We should have said, here are our ground rules. 
What are yours and which ones are we going to use? We didn't do that and we could have 
captured everything in one document. 7his should have been part of the tender exercise. 
(AKAB, UESL, 99,4: 11) 
5.1.2 Environmental Analysis 
ASCO, SUL's main rival in the North Sea, had been the largest logistics operator in 
Aberdeen for a number of years and amalgamation with the Woodgroup made it even more 
formidable. Competition was fierce in the oil and gas support services sector and SMIL's 
ambition was to be as big and powerful as ASCO. 
One of ARRC's greatest skill was market surveillance. ARRC was aware of ASCO's 
internal problems, and its ineffective use of resources through over capacity, down time and 
injudicious subcontracting. This provided a perfect opportunity for the SCA to flourish. 
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Although the main competitors were obvious and well known, other competitive dangers 
threatened. Integrated service contractors (ISC), tied in with Shell, operated in the Brent 
locations administered by the Woodgroup. The Northern field was managed by ANIEC and 
the Central field by AOC. Any of these companies could have set up a warehouse facility, 
taken on supply vessels and offered a less expensive service to the Shell business units. 
"Aere's apolitical game going on. Don'tforget that Woodgroup has a 4% stake in ASCO 
and that AAýEC and Northern have a strategic alliance with ASCo. We've been battling 
this outfor ayear. " (CKSML, 99,11: 7) 
The same applied to drilling contractors and others with specialised skills. All companies 
were now respon ing to the fiercely competitive environment by developing new 
competencies. 
UESL was benchmarked against other oil companies in the North Sea. How much per 
passenger mile and how much per tonne mile, were two criteria. If these considerations 
were not at the top of the Logistics cost targets, then it meant that UESL would be unlikely 
to continue to win and maintain its internal clients. 
5.1.3 Organisations and their History of Working Together 
Both SML and ARRC had been long-term contractors to UESL. 
5.1.4 Partner Selection - 
An internal Supply Logistics report set out the justification and strategy for taking the 
alliance route, rather than a traditional contract and this was submitted internally, to the 
Shell Tender Board. The board requested further explanations and, after some adjustments, 
the alliance was approved in principle at a second hearing. 
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In January 1997, six potential partners were identified and asked if they were interested in 
participating in a supply chain alliance. The companies were then asked to submit tenders 
and were subsequently invited to individual meetings to discuss their bids. The tenders 
were then evaluated by UESL against criteria that included commercial and technical 
factors, risk and added value. Risk meant not only risk on the part of UESL but also the 
risk that the contractor had to be prepared to take. 
" 7he risk is that if it does not work, you probably won't go back to square one and choose 
another partner, and you have to stick with the same contractor. Yhere would also be a 
big question asked about partnering. Even when you have a relationship that is open with 
a good commercial deal, there's always the temptation to say, well we know that, but let's 
just go to tender and check! " (SSIIvLUESL, 99,12: 1) 
"Yhe riskfor Seaforth was that when the contract wasfinished, we could kick them out of 
their office in Altens base. " (SSLKUESL, 99,12: 3) 
The preferred partner was to be provided with a separate lease agreement as a safeguard. 
That would allow them to continue to operate from Altens base and if the alliance broke 
down, they kept their independence (see appendix IX). 
Evaluation of the tender documents was finally concluded in April 1997 and SNIL emerged 
as the preferred bidder. At the initiative of UESL, SML and ARRC prepared a preliminary 
joint business case for presentation to UESL. This proved complicated as both companies 
ran transport fleets in competition with one another and had been old rivals for Shell 
business. Nevertheless, at the alliance inception both recognised the synergy of working 
together and negotiations began in July 1997. Numerous meetings took place to discuss 
terms and conditions, how the alliance would work, the allies roles and responsibilities and 
sharing of rewards. 
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5.1.5 Previous Alliance Experience 
The alliance was not a new concept for ARRC as the latter had been collaborating 
informally for many years, particularly with food companies. The notion of pooling 
resources made commercial sense to ARRC. The company acknowledged that by being an 
integral part of an enterprise, value was created for the benefit of customer, while at the 
same time it was in their own best interests. 
Neither was alliancing new to Shell. In an initiative called Win Nineties, Well Engineering, 
which is another part of Royal Dutch Shell, partnered with drilling companies. On the 
production side, Brent, Northern and Shell Central business units had cooperative 
agreements with Integrated Service Contractors (ISC) companies to provide engineering 
support to the platforms. The Cost Reduction Initiative for the New Era (CRINE) ran 
seminars in conjunction with these contractors. CRINE had an up-to-date Internet web site 
for discussion and reference regarding supply chain issues (CRINE had subsequently been 
superseded by LOGIC, Leading Oil and Gas Industry Competitiveness). 
Although the alliance was a corporately driven, pragmatic solution to changing market 
circumstances, within UESL the alliance project was influenced to a large extent by one 
particular logistics manager. In the past this man had managed an offshore alliance, which 
meant that he now brought to the project first hand expertise of alliance management. 
"I camefirom platform operations and had seen alliances working well. "en I took the 
job over I had the strategy in my head I was going to introduce what I had learnt on the 
platfonn operations into Logistics. " (SSLKUESL, 98,7: 2) 
Halliburton and Brown and Root, SML's Parent organisations, were both involved with an 
Integrated Well Alliance, in addition to being part of a seven year association worldng on 
the Brent platform with AOC, an offshoot company of the Brown and Root group. For its 
part however, SML had no alliance experience. 
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"It's the closest alliance type arrangement we've ever had We don't have any other 
alliance although we do have close relations with clients. Ais one is unique, a real 
alliance. It's more thanjust a contract, it is all about running Shell's own business really. 
(CKSUL, 99,4: 1) 
5.1.6 Strategic Intent 
In December 1996, Shell Expro Supply Logistics (UESL) reviewed strategic options for 
Altens warehouse facility and the Torry dock, so as to optimise use of these bases and at the 
same time reduce the cost of storage and transport to internal off-shore customers. 
In the past, Altens was important to Shell for the Long Term Development Project (LTD) in 
the Brent field. This had come to an end and the base was only utilised to about 50% of its 
full potential. 
A second factor that UESL had to take into account, was that in January 1999, internal 
customers in the Brent, Northern and Central fields, became able to put their logistics 
business out to tender, if a more competitive service was available. This meant UESL had 
to meet the competition in terms of cost and value, by optimising use of its operating bases 
and by reducing warehousing tariffs. 
Supply Logistics understood its internal customers very well and UESL's considerable 
efforts meant that customer service had been of a very high standard. Logistics was not 
Shell's core business and there was a drive towards out-sourcing to private contractors. 
UESL's objective was to educate contractors (SML and ARRC) in operations to meet 
demanding service level agreements, which would give UESL personnel the freedom to 
concentrate on strategic planning and forecasting. 
From its contractor perspective, SML recognised that the creation of the Supply Chain 
Alliance (SCA) was the ideal vehicle for securing business with greater scope, as opposed 
to simply providing manpower to UESL. 
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Another factor motivating SMIL, was the reduction of its cost base by greater exploitation 
of the UESL infrastructure. In theory, this should have increased its responsiveness and 
ability to offer a better service to new customers in the northern sector. SML operated on 
high turnover and low margins and the potential for increasing turnover was considerable. 
Since 1996, ARRC enjoyed a preferred contractor status vis-i-vis Shell Expro and prior to 
the alliance, ARRC personnel were located in Shell offices at Torry dock. For ARRC's 
directors and managerial staff, the alliance made perfect business sense and indeed it was 
seen as the important next stage in closer working relations with UESL. 
"We knew years ago that everyone was working his own patch and we had to get together. 
Ae SCA was the logical next stage. "' (IKARRC, 98,7: 4) 
During the oil industry's halcyon days in the 1970's, "operators in Aberdeen used to be 
paid by the tonne. " 7his created a generation of contemptuous, lazy and uninterested 
workers, quite happy to go to Portlethen, fetch a loadfrom a vendor, disconnect the trailer 
at the quayside andput theirfeet up with a newspaper. " (MD, ARRC, 98,6: 2) 
These days were long gone and due to the vagaries of the market at the time the conditions 
were such that it was imperative to address productivity and efficiency issues. 
5.1.7 Summary 
In the beginning, the bases at Altens and Torry, were managed by UESL. Once the 
contractors demonstrated that they were able to manage the job, Shell Expro asset managers 
backed out and UESL released control. The idea was that the base managers should have an 
overseeing duty for only as long as the new SML and ARRC managers were learning the 
job. If there was a serious problem, the Shell managers would revert back to their old roles. 
In practice, this was seen as undermining the SML people and caused conflict. 
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The objective of the SCA, as laid out in the alliance agreement, was to provide logistical 
services "of the best quality at the lowest cost". As such the SCA was not a legal entity, 
but a way of working together to achieve that objective. 
The initial intention was a customer-supplier relationship and although the contract was 
clearly defined, the reality was different and there were problems from the early days of the 
alliance. Unfamiliarity with the contract details caused misunderstandings. SML wanted to 
change everything straight away although it lacked the expertise to do so. SML failed to 
fulfill early promises, which generated distrust between the parties and exacerbated the 
situation. 
Contractual milestones and targets had not been articulated to the SMIL base managers, and 
there was confusion about the roles of SML and Shell staff. Key personnel in SML who 
had been responsible for the initial contract, left the company and a completely new set of 
people became part of the alliance team. As a consequence, much of the valuable pre- 
alliance experience was diluted. 
In contrast to SML, ARRC operated with state of the art trucks, whereas SML's transport 
fleet was a written-off asset. Shell wanted ARRC in the alliance because of the high quality 
of service provided between 1995 and 1998 and it was ARRC's involvement that swayed 
the balance in favour of UESL accepting the joint tender from SMIL and ARRC. 
Both ARRC and SML were old rivals in the road haulage business and the antagonism that 
was to ensue was essentially due to this habitual competition. A proposition had been made 
for ARRC to purchase SML's vehicle fleet, however time had rendered the SML trucks 
unroadworthy so much so that the issue was quickly dropped 
Additional confusion was generated because originally most of the workforce had been 
employed by UESL specifically to satisfy Shell customers. SNIL now employed the same 
men who this time served a variety of different customers demanding diverse standards 
and requirements. 
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Table 5.2 summarises behaviour which signalled the transition to Stage I. 
Alliance agreement 0 Signing alliance contract 
Environmental analvsis agreement 
History of working . together Managerial Action 0 Formal project start 
Partne'r selection 
Previous alliance experience 
9 Strategic intent 
Table 5.2: Transition from Stage 0 
5.2 STAGE I: Duration January - July 1998 
The alliance quickly gained momentum as the companies began to better understand 
collaborative practices. Individuals developed closer business relations with others in the 
ally companies. Much time and energy was expended in the course of preparation for, and 
attendance at, meetings. 
In May 1998, the first rumblings of discontent were heard and the focus on SCA's work 
became less sharp. 
One of SML's most frequent criticisms of UESL was the latter's insistence on controlling 
everything. UESL had been operating the bases for thirty years and was now supposed to 
hand this responsibility over to an outside contractor. This meant breaking habits of a 
lifetime and UESL managers found it doubly difficult because the contractor's managers 
from the bases at Altens and Torry were continually absent. As a consequence UESL asset 
managers had to continue to direct operations at both bases, as the alternative was simply to 
sit back and watch everything that they had built up fall apart. 
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"There's a whole history of Shell activity, building up assets, systems and it! frasiructure 
and they've now said, "Here, these are for you to manage. " But they had a problem 
pulling back, because they owned all of that development. " (OM, SML, 99,4: 1) 
"UESL went through the pain developing a super system down at lorry. We were then 
pulled awayftom it to let the others come in. They were given a real baby. An absolutely 
brilliant, properly mapped system with KPIs everybody had bought into and that was what 
drove the business. " (SLM, UESI, 99,4: 2) 
Having been contractors to Shell in the past, the alliance appealed to both companies as an 
excellent commercial opportunity to secure continued business, quite apart from the 
prestige of working with such a high profile a multi-national. Two main teams were set up. 
The first was the SCA board, made up of senior managers from each company and the 
second was the operations team. 
Table 5.3 below, shows, the essential characteristics drawn ftom first hand observation of 
the SCA alliance. These characteristics are not absolutely the same as those from the 
IDV/Killeen case, but do fall into the same clusters of meaning. The characteristics in the 
left hand column have been distilled into one unit of meaning in the right hand column. 
The dominant characteristics provide the structure to describe in detail how the SCA 
relationship developed in its early stage. 
Charactetistics from SCA data 
Committing resources 
Closer working relations 
Dominant charactedstics 
0 Building Trust 
Participation in Steering Group Commitment and Leadership 
Team members 
Regular team reviews- feedback 
Investment in relationship - time and resources 
0 Regular information 0 Communication 
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0 Cross-ftinctional activities break down barrier 
Inforniation technology aids Coordination and Coordination and Control Mechanisms 
control 
Joint vlanning and control 
Problem definition 
Understand alliance concept 
Understand logistics process 
Transfer of ideas 
Understand roles and responsibilities 
Understand need for clear goals 
* Leaming 
Metrics identified I: 
Explicit in contract 
Poor understanding of alliance concept and 
expectations might inhibit planning 
Team composition 
Assign task responsibilities 
Identifying strategic direction 
Mutual goals 
Five year plan 
Steering group formed 
9 Performance Metrics 
0 Resource planning 
9 Setting objectives 
Table 5.3: Dominant Characteristic in Stage I 
5.2.1 Building Trust 
Good personal relations took a long time to develop and were inclined to fluctuate as a 
result of the partners' ambivalent attitude towards one another. 
"Trust has disappeared at this moment in time, we don't seem to be pulling in the same 
direction. " (EA, ARRC, 98,4: 2) 
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"I would say trustfluctuates. It was there originally; everything was unrestricted to start 
with and everyone was involved in planning. I don't think there was a problem until the 
Nord Centre was pulledftom Seaforth [Seaforth had to leave the Nord Base]. 7henitwas 
madpanic. " (IWLARRC, 98,3: 7) 
"Trust will increase once they start to deliver. Ae whole thing is about lack of confidence. 
It's got to be backed by action. " (CS, UESL, 98,5: 9) 
Matters improved when SML assigned someone to deal exclusively with the alliance 
business. Fortunately this person also had had experience of working as part of a long-term 
alliance in the Brent field. He recognised that his own company's infrequent contact with 
the allies had been interpreted as a lack of interest. Thanks to him, the information log jam 
was cleared, personal relations and trust improved and insecurity decreased. 
"Scepticism is at a high level. Trust issues bedevil the SCA board team and the operations 
team. Maybe about twenty people need to get these issues on the table. Yhe most crucial 
part of the whole relationship is that these people begin to have confidence in each other 
early on. It comes down to 4ndividuals and there is a perception in Shell that we are not 
committed to the alliance. I expect that comes ftom personality problems. " 
(CKSUL, 99,17: 6) 
5.2.2 Commitment and Leadership 
A number of factors affected the participants' commitment to the alliance at this time. One 
was the historical background of the alliance tender. It was many months before the reasons 
for SML's apprehension were fully understood. 
"There's definite commilmentftom ARRC and UESL, but I don't see much reciprocity on 
the part of M. Yhey're simply utilising assets, notfor the benefit of the alliance, butfor 
their own good and they want to keep their own identity. " (rKARRc, 98,5: 1) 
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"Mere's a perception that we've not lived up to expectations. Perhaps not in a 
communication sense, hut we've brought in new business and we've relocated We're 
working to clear all the problem issues, maybe not as effectively as we should, but our 
whole future is tied in with Shell. If they think that Seaforth is uncommitted then Ifind that 
really extraordinary. We've sold the alliance so much that now there's tremendous 
pressurefirom above to make it work. " (CKSUL, 98,1: 3) 
In the early days, there was only one senior UESL representative at the SCA board 
meetings. This was not due to lack of involvement, because the UESL team had been 
empowered to take decisions, and it had been felt that a greater presence might have been 
inhibiting In SMIL's eyes this was 'Unacceptable and it complained that LTESL was not 
giving the alliance due importance. ARRC never had problems of this kind. Its directors 
simply discussed the pros and cons and made a decision right away. 
5.2.3 Communication 
There was a gap between senior managers' understanding and the work force's perception 
of what the supply chain alliance was for. In the past, Shell controlled the entire logistical 
operation although SML managed the workforce. Now, the bases were managed by SML 
and individual roles and responsibilities in SMIL had increased in importance. It has taken 
some time for base managers to grasp the implications of the changes and to ease 
themselves into the job. 
Discontent seemed to be rife, particularly as SML was concentrating on relocating its entire 
business onto the Altens base. The move itself had been daunting and a drain on already 
limited resources. Because much of the time SMIL managers were 'not at the base, the 
workforce continued to look to the Shell managers for direction. It was no surprise that the 
workforce did not know whether it was coming or going. At the time, some of the changes 
happening within the SML organisation included: - 
9 the physical removal 
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corporate pressure to reverse a negative cash flow 
changes in job scope and roles 
limitation of management resources 
senior staff leaving due to mismanaged vessel leasing 
loss of decision making autonomy 
the supply chain alliance 
conflict between SML and ARRC. 
All in all, SMIL found the changes difficult to manage and consequently, the SCA was 
given low priority. 
Some of the problems may have been due to SML's straitened circumstances, exacerbated 
by its failure to secure a major contract that it had high hopes of winning. Also rushed 
negotiations during the move to Altens (the purpose and strategic intent of the SCA from 
UESUs point of view was to optimise utilisation on both bases). In this way, the tariffs 
would reduce for UESL's off shore customer. Communicating, planning and structuring 
the alliance tended to be treated as an afterthought. 
"I'm not making excusesfor them, but it might have been the madpanic to sort things out. 
Ae last thing they would have been worrying about is cas6ading information down. Still, 
that's not how it should work and communication has to be the number one priority. 
(TKARRC, 98,3: 2) 
Despite the difficulties, people were beginning to understand the logistics processes. For 
example, the transport manager understood why cargo had to be loaded in a particular 
order, that sailings had to be on time and off loaded goods needed to go onto the right rig in 
a planned sequence. Delays due to late delivery by third parties were investigated and 
reported at weekly operations meeting attended by the base managers. 
Transmission of information is a critical factor in any business and it affects all people and 
all activities. It was dismaying therefore, when it came to light that communication within 
186 
the SML organisation was poor and even its own employees often found it hard to get 
information. SML's closed culture was quite contrary to that in both UESL and ARRC 
where views were continually exchanged, problems shared and joint solutions thrashed out. 
" We love working with Shell, we dofantastic things with them, they make changes happen. 
They are proactive to change and are always willing to listen. They want us to make 
money. So much so that I wish everyone could be like Shell. " (MD, ARRC, 98,3: 4) 
5.2.4 Coordination and Control Mechanisms 
UESL introduced the SAP information management system at much the same time that the 
supply chain alliance was being rolled out. There was little appreciation of the impact that 
SAP was likely to have or that the learning curve would be so gradual. Many customer 
complaints arose as a result of the SAP programme's implementation. 
Information technology issues had to be resolved before SML moved into Altens., This 
needed integration, not only of the Shell IT system, but also SML's and, to make matters 
worse, the latter had just been converted to a new operational system imposed by 
Halliburton. In all, there were seven different operating environments. It was therefore of 
paramount importance that common IT links were in place before moving. This was one of 
the reasons for SML's delay in relocating from the Nord base to Altens. Fortunately, these 
issues were resolved at the end of the day and company communications were made 
effective. 
Safety indemnity procedures were very important in a high-risk environment and Shell's 
high profile worldwide meant that it had a reputation to protect. An accident on the bases or 
at sea put Shells' reputation at risk, not the contractors. The important safety indemnity 
was the Mutual Hold Harmless indemnity insurance. MMH protected every party so that 
they could not sue each another. The MMH was the legal mechanism which enabled the 
operators and contractors to share equipment. Each company, including sub contractors, 
was responsible for carrying its own insurance. 
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"I don't think our quality is gold plated, hut we have a standard to live hy and won't drop 
below that standard " We live in an environment where we can't allow accidents to 
happen. " (SMUESL, 98,3: 1) 
SML was part of the Aberdeen Marine Logistics Association (AIVIIA) which was a boat 
sharing consortium. SML was credited with having formed AMLA to promote vessel 
deck-space utilisation and sharing amongst operators. This had worked very well during 
1997 and 1998, but the flat spot market in 1999 had reduced its effectiveness. With regards 
to the SCA, the more often SML shared vessels with other operators meant that the 
utilisation of the boats would be more efficient and less costly, generating direct savings in 
the logistics process. 
The Tender Board was the organisational structure within Shell that challenged the 
standards and evaluated new contracts presented to Shell. This added discipline to the 
process and ensured that all contractors were aware of standards as well as particular 
conditions of tender. The SCA strategy had to have direct approval from the tender board. 
In the early days, SML felt frustrated and constrained because it was not given the same 
scope by UESL that it had been by other clients. For its part, UESL wanted to make 
absolutely certain that SMIL knew what it was doing and it was some time before UESL felt 
able to relinquish its control and allowed SMIL to manage the operations. 
"We've a number of clientsfor whom we do everything, we are able to design, control and 
deliver the best service. Still we don It manage the entire businessfor Shell, who is a major 
customer and also an alliance partner. " (AB, SIVOL, 98,4: 3) 
5.2.5 Learning 
Despite the fact that a great deal of thought had been put into establishing objectives set out 
in the alliance agreement, it was only when work began that real doubts and 
misconceptions surfaced regarding the methodology for accomplishing these goals. 
188 
It was fairly certain that even at the outset, the respective roles and responsibilities were not 
fully understood by all the players. This deficiency led to misunderstanding and friction 
between company representatives who suspected the other allies of inadequate personal and 
corporate commitment. 
The entire alliance process had to be carefully thought through afresh and this was while 
because the allies were concentrating on dealing with the poor relationship between 
themselves. It was not until later that the full architecture of the supply chain was 
visualised and understood. Although critical, personnel responsible for procurement at one 
end of the chain and the Shell internal customer at the other, were not involved in this 
alliance. The importance of stakeholder analysis should not have been under-estimated at 
this stage. As the workforce and significant others were not informed before things 
happened, it was little wonder that as a consequence people were de-motivated and their 
performance affected negatively. 
Learning by experience proved to be enervatingly sloW and it tended to highlight negative 
incidents that had to be reassessed and rectified. However, -despite the early upheavals, 
positive signs were also evident at an operational level. For example, assigning employees 
to other work locations facilitated the transfer of tacit and explicit knowledge. Planning and 
scheduling became more accurate. Collaboration in such an environment was encouraged 
by open communication and informal business networks 
Co-location and interfaced technologies accelerated speed of response. All three companies 
invested in up to date technology and a joint training programme was set up for the SAP 
system. 
5.2.6 Performance Metrics 
Performance measures had been set out in the agreement document and SCA business was 
to be combined in a "value pot, " with 65% going to UESL, and the balance divided 
between SMIL and ARRC according to their own internal agreement. 
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"At the end of the day, the lessons learned were that the contract was not right. It was not 
aligned with where we wanted to go in the beginning and some of the KPIs, were 
MeaningleSS. " (SLKUESL, 98,2: 5) 
Despite the turbulence in relations, performance had improved and UESL, SML and 
ARRC appeared convinced of the benefits to be gained from the alliance and became more 
committed to it, despite the problems, past, present and ftiture. 
5.2.7 Resource Planning 
SML had been notified by a client that a major contract would not be renewed and the 
implications of this had since proved to be considerable. Failure to secure the contract had 
made SMEL homeless as it rented the Nord Operating Base from that customer. The failure 
to secure the contract was because the client felt that SML lacked the infrastructure to 
support exploration activities in that particular sector of the North Sea. 
The alliance also suffered greatly from replacement of key personnel by people who did not 
really understand the alliance concept and who were brought into the process when it was 
already active. This caused a loss of personal incentive and commitment. 
"Seaforth was more than a hit ambitious. ney made promises that in the end they couldn't 
keep. " (CS, UESL, 98,2: 7) 
"Seaforth's proposal was very well sold and we had no reason to doubt it... But hindsight 
is a great thing. " (CSUESL, 98,2: 7) 
5.2.8 Setting objectives 
In January 1998 when the Alliance officially began, the intention was that it should last for 
a minimum of five years. Shell Expro's objective was to optimise use of its operating bases 
and reduce warehousing tariffs charged to Brent, Northern and Central offshore customers. 
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" The SCA is about sharing and reducing costs to our internal customers ... Filling the 
bases will allow tariffs to fall, which just now are going through the roof. " 
(SLKUESL, 98,3: 4) 
This motivation had been consistently maintained since the outset, although it might have 
appeared at times that everyone was not marching in step. In addition, the SCA had to 
reflect strength and unity to the market, as well as internally within the company. 
"Me thing that annoys me most is that the essential part of the agreement has never been 
adopted Unless the basic formula is agreed and promoted by core people, it can't filter 
down to the working environment and will simply dissolve. " (MD, ARRC, 98,8: 5) 
"At the end of the day we're all in this to make money. " (BKSUL, 98,5: 6) 
Inexperienced individuals in the Supply Chain Alliance not only found themselves breaking 
new ground, but were also having to make decisions with only limited information. 
Although a statement of intent had been drawn uP with the objective of identifying 
commercial aims and setting out contractual arrangements, in retrospect, targets and 
milestones were unclear. It became obvious early on that people were either overwhelmed, 
or confused and that objectives had to be re-addressed. 
"It'sfairly new stuff. No one had done this before and when I asked the contract specialist 
about profit models, they did not come up with anything. I eventually gave up on them and 
moved on to work it out ourselves. " (SLKUESL, 99,1: 5) 
Tension arose because people did not know what information could be divulged and what 
was confidential. This understandably put them on the defensive. Furthermore, as the 
parties became immersed in operations, the momentum and problems which surfaced made 
it difficult to keep the original performance milestones in sight. 
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"It was hard at the beginning. The alliance started o very easy but one month into it, there ? ff 
were hurdles. SML wanted to do what they did before and throw off the last ten years. 
Some ofit is good, so let Is build on that andget rid of the rubbish. " (SLKUESL, 99,6: 1) 
" Either I'm beginning to lose sight of the objectives, or my perception is changing of what 
I thought the alliance wasfor. " UKARRC, 98,1: 5) 
"The alliance is a great opportunity to open doors and to get new business. Weadmitthat, 
but still have to get thefundamentals right. " (MD, ARRC, 98,1: 4) 
One of the alliance's main aims was to reduce Shell's budget. This focused the contractor's 
attention on manpower reduction and, despite an increase in customers, there was no 
intention to increase manning. Altens had been over manned for some time, but had a 
flexible and well motivated crew. Nevertheless erosion of the workforce, encouraged by a 
"beat-the-budgef' incentive in the alliance contract, compromised this versatility and those 
left were very discou raged. 
5.2.9 Summary and Transition to Stage R 
There was a notable, almost palpable, difference in atmosphere after SUL moved to the 
Altens base. The transition from Stage I to Stage II was marked by a change in attitude. 
Communication was unrestricted, outlook and behaviour had become more positive. Key 
people were now taking part in regular dialogue. Discussions were future orientated, not 
pessimistic, or fixed in the past. It was also evident operating costs were being reduced. 
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" change of attitude 
" communication and open 
dialogue 
" friendly behaviour 
" better understanding of 
logistics process. 
" building trust 
Table 5.4: Transition from Stage I to Stage 11. 
5.3 STAGE 11: Duration July to December 1998 
The oil crisis imposed even greater internal pressure on UESL to provide the most cost- 
effective service to its internal customers. In the past, Shell had done very little marketing 
to promote awareness of the breadth and quality of its service. In order to change this, a 
number of internal cro ss- functional teams were set-up. These included a customer group to 
identify exactly what the customer required now and in the future, a contract group to 
support service contracts, a business improvement team and a planning team. 
1998 was a time of market uncertainty when, by and large, contractors had to reduce 
prices. Shell, leaner and more efficient, was undergoing internal re-organisation and the 
SCA was seen as the vehicle to meet corporate efficiency targets with projected savings for 
1999 of f7m. Attitudes needed to change, especially in the Business Units, which 
represented the internal customer. This was an ideal opportunity for the Shell Business 
Units to work with the alliance. 
The alliance seemed to be racing ahead and people were becoming anxious mainly because 
milestones in the alliance agreement were being ignored. Before long, UESL reviewed the 
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agreement and took immediate action to regain control. This was called the "Pause Plan" 
and was met with relief by all concerned. The main points addressed were contract details, 
methods of payment, apportionment of profit and health and safety issues. 
Table 5.5 below, shows how characteristics describe the events in Stage H. 
STAGE 11 
Characteristics from SCA data Dominant characteristics 
Motivation high, but sometimes fluctuates Compelling Purpose 
High energy 
Common nussion 
GroNvlh of commitment 
Inter-orgamsation teanis identified 
Steering committee and Core team Conflict Management 
Dialogue to resolve issues 
Joint problem solving Interdependence 
Sharing market information 
Information exchange 
Joint planning 
" Established joint performance measures 
" Team skills Learning and Alliance Skills 
" Understanding joint processes 
" Understanding partner business 
" Problem solving Joint decision making 
" Joint communication plan and revised budget 
" Social interaction Personal Satisfaction and Motivation 
" Team achievements 
Improved communication behaviour 
Individual's responsibility increasing 
Table 5.5: Dominant Characteristic in Stage 11 
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5.3.1 Compelling Purpose 
SML increased its management team by two and people in the organisation were beginning 
to realise the potential of the alliance. 
Inter-organisational improvement teams had to identify the resources and time needed to 
achieve the tight schedules imposed by the SCA core team. Each team determined success 
according to anticipated savings and now the core team authorised people to be assigned to 
do so. For example, boat related projects came top of the list because a lot of money was 
likely to be saved in this area; possibly as much as Dm. Shell was to be the custodian of 
the project, and of its plan and schedule. The SCA was widening the projects by bringing 
in these additional people. Instructions to the teams were roughly along the following 
lines: - 
1. Identify the project, tasks, champions and team members. 
Plan target dates in outline and propose realistic time frames. 
3. Identify how the tasks can be completed. Avoid over commitment or under 
estimation. 
4. Assign responsibilities. 
Hold two weekly review meetings attended by champions and SCA board 
representatives. 
The slump in oil price reinforced the importance of the SCA in terms of helping UESL 
reduce its 1999 budget. At the same time, the SCA was equally important to the 
participating contractors who required to secure business in difficult economic times. The 
first objective was therefore to identify where potential cost savings could be generated, 
bearing in mind maintaining a balance between a reasonable service and price. . 
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Cost savings were seen as coming from the following broad areas: - 
Optimisation of assets by retaining Altens and Torry bases and increased tonnage 
throughput. Maximum utilisation of the yard for warehousing, plant, equipment and 
boats. 
9 increased market share by offering "best" value. Areas of potential reductions included 
- fleet, containers, security, cleaning, catering, building maintenance, harbour board and 
tank cleaning. Pooling Halliburton resources was also suggested, for example Seabase 
Quay and the pipe yards. Such a move would have directly affected rates and yard 
usage. 
9 Business Improvement Projects and new business (income) 
5.3.2 Conflict Management 
This alliance suffered from conflict which was manifested by angry discussions at 
meetings, exposing lack of unity between supposedly collaborating allies. This was 
probably due to a misfit between goals and tactics, as well as a basic lack of understanding 
and direction. There had been an overwhelming dearth of trust throughout the course of the 
alliance and continual friction between SML and ARRC, nevertheless, relations were 
improving in certain areas, in particular at the Tony Dock, where all parties were co- 
located. Although conflict was often evident in this alliance, intense dialogue and 
individual commitment was the response for resolving conflict. 
One small but unhelpful point, was that SNIL bypassed personnel in UESL and tried to play 
individuals in other companies against each other, which caused annoyance and mistrust. 
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5.3.3 Interdependence 
By its very nature, managing an alliance is hard to do well and in this case, three 
independent companies were learning how to foster co-dependency. The core team set a 
rigorous schedule during October and November 1998 and tasked itself with establishing a 
set of common objectives for 1999. Once the objectives were confirmed the next milestone 
was a three way contract that stressed the importance of mutual reliance and which should 
have, but did not, clearly lay out the allies respective roles and responsibilities. 
The agreement was built around a sound commercial model that made sense and was 
accepted by the companies. The intention was that the agreement should be flexible enough 
to allow people the freedom to innovate and be creative. This was easier said than done 
and the original contract proved difficult to understand, principally because targets and 
performance criteria had not been adequately quantified and were liable to mis- 
interpretation. One of the criticisms of the first set of performance measures was that it was 
open to selective interpretation. 
Supervisors were tasked to jointly develop a scorecard, in order that each person would be 
aware of the performance specification and measurement. Key Performance Indicators and 
Performance Indicators were finally fixed and became, the target for a monthly management 
report. The resulting scorecard was a difficult challenge for the SCA, as performance 
criteria were set when the price of oil was $14 per barrel. Notwithstanding the extra- 
ordinary increase in the oil price since 1999, at the time, turbulence in the oil industry 
demanded continuous discipline to mitigate the impact of the slump. 
"Yhere were too many versions of what the agreement was all about ... you could not 
understand how the original contract worked "' (CKSUL, 99,3: 7) 
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5.3.4 Learning and Alliance Skills 
"Shell showed the contractor the importance of being able to measure and document. Mey 
(the contractors) taught us that there are certain things you can't do when you are dealing 
with a number of different operators. We've learned to look at the way other people do 
things. If it's reasonably acceptable, we go with it, rather than putting ourfoot down and 
saying this has to be done to the Shell standard " (SSLKUESL, 99,4-. 8) 
Lessons had been learned and there was a strategic document and review procedure in 
place. Team implementation was well defined and the alliance companies were actively 
involved. All parties openly discussed current and future objectives and recognised the 
importance of teamwork in an unstable environment. 
The allies began to formalise procedures specifically covered the following: - 
* Communication, including performance reports, updated monthly and presented at board 
meetings. 
9 Procedures to report on income, contributions and sharing. 
* Operational meetings regularly held and minutes circulated. There was an emphasis on 
teams knowing exactly what it was they had to achieve. 
5.3.5 Joint Decision-Making 
A core team of six senior managers, with two from UESL, three from SML and one from 
ARRC, was established and a strategic plan developed to monitor SCA project performance 
on a monthly basis. 
Main objectives for the year 1999 were: - 
" save Orn to meet Shell Expro, reduced budget target of DI. 8m 
" ensure KPI performance 
" deliver a minimum of 90% performance on the Service Level agreements 
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The principal strategy to achieve these objectives included the following: - 
flexible use of marine assets by pooling fleets 
exploiting spot markets 
joint boat sharing 
ensuring "fit for purpose7' service to customers 
developing and maintaining client base 
optimising use of assets and developing service contracts to support Altens, containers, 
fleets, cranes etc. 
promoting teamwork, common work practices and goals 
delivering Business Improvements Proposals (BIP's) 
monitoring and controlling programme of KPI deliveries 
market surveillance and exploitation 
clear cost reporting and forecasts 
All parties contributed to drafting the revised budget and reward model. A communication 
plan, defining the SCA reporting structure, was incorporated in the strategy. Team 
members and leaders were chosen and fifteen business improvement projects' were 
launched. 
UESL arranged a meeting with SML and ARRC as well as other main contractors to 
discuss how to reduce costs by taking concerted action. 
In late October 1998, the first SCA joint workshop took place and it went a long way in 
aligning the goals of the three organisations. A SWOT analysis was conducted followed by 
the formulation of a statement of common purpose. A joint strategy outline included the 
framework for an HR and finance plan and core team members were nominated to 
implement the strategy. 
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From an operational perspective, the SCA was running quite smoothly. One UESL 
specialist was transferred to SML with the intention of gathering data and reporting on 
performance and base utilisation. Although the information was supposed to be in the 
system, it seemed to be quite difficult to track. Nevertheless, the core team was now in a 
better position to more accurately calculate the SCA "value pot", contribution and reward 
share than any time in the past. 
Recognising the importance of controlling the process, a communication strategy and 
reporting structure was established. Schedules of meetings were drawn up as fora for 
discussion, reporting and reviewing. Business improvement teams prepared project plans 
for each subject under review and UESL personnel became custodians of the procedures. 
Each team prepared a plan to evaluate the project and defined milestones. Every month 
project team leaders reported the current status to the core team. Actions and comments 
were recorded and circulated. Team development was documented by a single business 
improvement coordinator. 
5.3.6 Personal Satisfaction and Motivation 
More open communication and frequent dialogue signalled improving relations. There was 
a friendlier atmosphere at meetings and everyone contributed to discussions. Meetings 
became more positively structured with minutes recorded, distributed and follow up action 
reviewed 
'. 
Inter-firm wrangles were fewer and the new member of SML's management 
team was deemed to be trustworthy and accepted the SCA. 
Notwithstanding this positive atmosphere, there remained an undercurrent of fiustration 
with the Supply Chain Alliance. Some people thought the alliance was taking up too much 
time and had little or no impact on market share. Although this was perhaps a premature 
judgement, certainly SUL did not expect a payoff until 1999. SML experienced major 
disruptions in 1998 including the move frorp Nord, manpower problems, a new 
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management team, new people at the head office and at the same time the company was 
expected to maintain margins and make money. 
In general, people expected to see results immediately and de-motivation was the outcome 
because of apparently slow results. 
5.3.7 Summary and Transition to Stage M 
Alignment of objectives only happens when the plan has been collaboratively designed. 
Although everyone understood the goal, nevertheless, perceptions of lack of commitment 
created distrust and, as a consequence, raising of defensive barriers. Nevertheless, allowing 
for such peaks and troughs, the results of the first fourteen months of the SCA had been 
impressive. 
The alliance had reduced operating costs. Savings were commonly pooled and as stated in 
item 5.2.6, this was split with 65% going to UESL and 35% divided between SML and 
ARRC. This was deemed equitable because UESL provided the entire infrastructure, i. e. is 
Altens and Torry bases, for the logistics operation. 
Large labour cost reductions occurred as a result of the alliance. The labour budget in 1998 
was E3.5m and by cutting the workforce the alliance estimated the number employed was 
now 18% below this figure. 
The alliance was operating in a mature industrial sector and UESL's objective was to 
provide the best service to the North Sea platforms at the lowest cost. Inherent waste in the 
supply chain required to be addressed. In the fiercely competitive environment, there had 
to be a compromise between UESL's 
' 
demand for high quality of service and SML's policy 
of maintaining expenditure at the lowest level. 
Although the Altens warehouse utilisation had increased since SML moved to the base, 
what bedeviled the alliance was poor communication and a lack of cost openness. 
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Innovation was an important product of the alliance and currently there were fifteen 
business improvement teams in existence, although with overlapping membership. Some 
had already resulted in savings, but many had foundered due to lack of commitment, 
changed prioritisation, or poor leadership. 
The alliance got off to a smooth start and then hit a brick wall by attempting too much too 
soon. Everyone thought the alliance would only take about eighteen months to set up, after 
which it would be plain sailing. In reality, mere enthusiasm had not been enough and the 
emphasis should have been first on agreeing ground rules instead of trying to make 
progress prematurely. What actually happened, was that team players' motivation was 
difficult to sustain because initial objectives had not been explained well enough. 
"Although we're sofar ahead, we leftfundamental things undone. We raced ahead with all 
the visionary concepts, and didn't have thefoundation blocks in place. " (MD, ARRC, 98,9: 4) 
The opinion shared by both UESL and ARRC was that SML was uncommitted to the 
alliance. From the outset ARRC and SML distrusted each another and this lack of 
openness reinforced defensive attitudes. It had to be borne in mind that, on the most part, 
people involved had not been exposed to anything like this before and learning was 
gradual. Also, we are talking about different kinds of trust, namely, organisational as- 
opposed to individual trust. In this Particular context there was no trust between the 
organisations, although, in some instances there was a high level of individual trust. 
"Yhere are pockets offtiendship but on the whole there is little sign of trust in either 
COMPany. " (BMM, SML, 98,5: 4) 
All the problems of confidence affected higher echelons in the organisations and did not 
feature at operational level, that is in the warehouse in Altens or on the Torry dock side. 
The problem at the lower levels was that the workforce failed to understand what the SCA 
was all about. Perhaps if people had been better informed, commitment to the SCA would 
have happened quicker. Even although events of the past year (1998) had been turbulent, 
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the SCA made a significant impact. Quick successes early in the relationship, provided 
encouragement during difficult times. 
From the outset this alliance had been tempestuous, yet managers had worked hard and 
there had been significant successes. The conflict that undermined relations was mainly 
due to one partner's lack of commitment to the alliance and also negative messages 
emanating from that company. Problems and concerns evident at the early stage were 
never fully addressed or resolved and consequently, people eventually lost motivation and 
momentum. The following descriptions in table 5.6 applied in varying degrees to people 
and events, as the SCA shifted into Stage III: - 
" Compelling purpose 
" Conflict management 
" Interdependence 
" Learning and alliance skills 
" Joint decision making 
" Personal satisfaction and 
motivation 
No formal strategic plan 
Poor communication 
Low trust 
Crisis Divergent values 
Fluctuating commitment and 
confidence 
Christmas holidays - 
momentum lost 
Legal issues took a long tinic 
to be finalised 
Alliance resources re- 
allocated to other projects 
Table 5.6: Transition from Stage 11 to Stage III 
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5.4. STAGE IH : Duration January to May 1999 
A typical feature of the Stage III was loss of zeal by team members and some teams failing 
to reach their targets. Table 5.7 illustrates characteristics in Stage III. 
Characteristics from SCA data 
Organisations very different 
Divergent values cause stress in afliance 
HR practices not influenced by the alliance 




0 HR Assessment 
" Communication becomes increasingly routine Performance plateau 
" Teams lose interest 
" Resources stretched 
" internal organisational pressures shift focus 
from alliance - 
" Partners knowledgeable about each other's Process understanding 
business. 
" Scheduling and planning inforination available 
" In-depth process analysis identifies hidden 
costs 
" Customer focused 0 Reflection and learning 
" increased technical and commercial know-how 
" Learning from each other and experience 
" Understand need for structure and groundrules 
Table 5.7: Distilled Characteristics in Stage III 
5.4.1 Adapting Cultures 
Although the alliance partners belonged to three very different business organisations, in 
the first instance little thought went into their cultural fit. In essence, UESL identified the 
need for radical change and, although it saw the alliance as the vehicle to achieve this, it 
paid scant attention to the actors themselves. 
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"Culture mattered in the early stages, but we've been through the pain of trying to fit 
together and now it doesn't matter so much any more. Other things have happened that 
supersede organisational values. Personal relations have developed and now individual 
values are the drivingforce. " (ONtSML, 99,12: 5) 
The greatest source of friction in this alliance was the clash of organisational cultures. A 
service company's approach was not the same as that of an oil company. The former was 
concerned with competitive price and the latter was primarily interested in quality and 
safety. On the other hand, ARRC and LTESL had always been culturally aligned and this 
was also partly why there was such animosity between the two rivals (ARRC and SML). 
"Craib recognised the importance of the customer and that is where we fell down. We 
missed the point as a company. " (CKSML, 99,7: 3) 
"We're able to make decisions. We don't have to sendfortyfive memos or go to a meeting 
about it. " (EAARRC, 98,9: 2) 
"We were miles apart at the start, but over the last eighteen months we have certainly got 
closer. We're trying to move from being reactive to proactive and to be more strategic. " 
(ABKSML, 99,5: 3) 
5.4.2 HR Assessment 
At the very beginning, SN1L's new Operations Manager was neither selected as a core team 
member nor was he party to discussions relating to the new strategic plan. This lack of 
inclusion held up the launch of the HR plan to communication the importance of the 
alliance internally within the organisations. Interpersonal clashes, exclusion of key 
personnel from strategic discussions and lack of interest further strained the alliance. The 
culmination was the second major crisis which happened at the end of January 1999. 
Workforce morale was getting progressively worse at Torry dock. Men were waiting for 
conditions of employment to be altered, and this was taking longer than anticipated due to a 
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hold up in the legal department. Overtime had been stopped and there was also an issue 
concerning several employee troublemakers who had been bullying people on the dockside. 
All the foregoing problems were dealt with and draft conditions of employment agreed and 
finally issued. Communication between the workforce and management was immeasurably 
better. 
"We're a service company and the needs of our business are different to that of an oil 
company. Manning levels are always going to be less than we actually need, because it is 
not just dawn to resourcing, but what is deemed affordable by our parent, Halliburton. 
(OKSNIL, 99,9: 5) 
"To befair, we gave M the incentive to dive costs down and it has done so; probably 
too far. It has reduced manning to such an extent that it can't provide a proper service. 
Quality was never the issue, only how to reduce costs. " (ABKUESL, 99,2: 6) 
Despite the disturbance, there was never any doubt in the minds of management that the 
alliance would eventually be a success. In fact, benefits had already been demonstrated and 
the monthly management report provided a record of ongoing performance improvement. 
5.4.3 Performance Plateau 
A number of factors contributed to lack of enthusiasm, slower pace, and over stretched 
resources. In addition, Halliburton's legal department held up the lease and this affected 
transfer of contracts from UESL to SML to manage. It was eighteen months into the 
alliance before the foregoing agreement was eventually signed. 
Combining UESL and SML marine fleets, an area where pooling of resources was to 
produce anticipated and immediate cost savings, seemed pointless when it emerged that 
different chartering agreements were likely to increase UESL's costs. SML was very keen 
to use the UESL boats, which would have provided huge economies of scale, while at the 
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same time hedging its own risk. At the end of the day, due to reduced activity in the North 
Sea, the spot market proved to be a more economical way of chartering boats. 
Resumption of work after the Christmas 1998 holiday, found SMIL fully committed to 
tendering and this further delayed the strategic document. UESL's contract specialist 
moved to SML offices to boost its management team. Core team members took on extra 
work to help SNIL complete the strategic plan and the 1999 cost model. Merging the 
marine fleet and the boat sharing were to be addressed as separate issues. 
Things were coming to a standstill. Contracts could not be novated (handed over from 
UESL to SML) until the contract lease had been signed and until UESL had secured a 
guarantee. This was to come from Halliburton, the parent company, which would 
underwrite boats and would eventually help to resolve the impasse concerning the different 
cost structures. Things slowed down even further before they got better and the Halliburton 
legal department lived up to its reputation for procrastination. 
The SCA board meeting in February 1999 was uneventful possibly because, as was the case 
with most business improvement meetings, it was poorly attended. Many projects were on 
hold and only a few were moving, even if slowly. Key personnel failed to attend core team 
meetings and replacement members were often poorly briefed. UESL personnel, involved 
in internal departmental restructuring, had lost enthusiasm for the alliance. 
Alliance members became frustrated and, to make matters worse, ARRC saw itself being 
marginalised by SML. SML was using its usual "back door" approach to bypass the UESL 
manager responsible for the alliance. 
Eventually the situation exploded. A core team meeting was cut short and senior 
management had to patch up differences. As a result, a key person in SML was brought in, 
concentrating entirely on the SCA. Things began to normalise as far as was possible, until 
the legalities managed to be formalised. 
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"We took a little time to drew breath andgather our thoughts. We're up and running again 
and even may have gained a bit ofmomentum. " (ABKSUL, 99,5: 5) 
5.4.4 Understanding Process and Cost 
Although SML completed an in-depth analysis of its own internal processes as part of a 
People Performance and Results (PPR) initiative, there was no attempt to map joint 
activities where the alliance interfaced. In fact, it was only recently that there had been any 
recognition of the need to do so. This happened when SN11L changed the shift structure of 
its workforce, without ARRC or UESL's knowledge. The effect was that, although SML 
were seeing savings, ARRC costs were increasing due to overtime work. Communication 
had broken down because of changes in ARRC personnel at the Torry offices and 
scheduling and planning information was no longer shared. 
As understanding of the supply chain improved, it became clear to SML that it was remote A 1.0 
from, and not dealing directly with, the end user/customer. At the outset, UESL was seen as 
the customer and it acted as intermediary to the internal customers who were serviced by 
SMIL and ARRC. UESL considered that it was its job to promote the SCA to the internal 
customer and that it had to be seen as the point of contact for the alliance, addressing 
service quality problems. The offshore customer believed that standards of service had 
fallen since the start of the SCA, despite the fact that monitoring the alliance's performance 
did not appear to corroborate this. 
"Customers think that the Shell service at Aliens has deteriorated with a corresponding 
benefit to a thirdpartyprovider (M) who is in here. " (ABKUESL, 991: 1) 
"Yhere are stillfundamentalflaws regarding expectations of SCA performance, not least 
ofwhich is the relationship with the end user, customer and service provider. I suggest that 
there needs to he greater clarity within Shell. Shell Logistics has been seen as SML's 
customer and increasingly there's a sense that the individual business units have their own 
logistical requirements. " (OKSUL, 99,2: 1) 
208 
SML felt that UESL was acting unilaterally, by deciding what to do and what not to do. 
This confiised SML, the service provider and SNIEL wanted to know where its loyalty lay. 
The process needed to be streamlined in the interests of the end customer. 
"Ihe Brent business units have reduced the number of sailing's without reference to us. 
77zey did not bother to identify the impact on our service. 7hey made the savings and expect 
the service to remain the same without having consulted us. " (OKSML, 99,3: 2) 
The importance of these stakeholders was becoming increasingly evident. UESL was the 
interface between the end customer, the oil rigs and drilling platforms and all 
communication from SMIL went through UESL. SML was fiustrated because it felt that it 
needed to take ownership of the logistics process to benefit the SCA and optimise the 
supply chain. 
For some time Shell Expro Procurement department and UESL had gone their separate 
ways and interfacing had almost entirely ceased. This was not in SMIL's control, but in 
terms of waste reduction, too much stock held in the warehouse had been needlessly tying 
up capital and valuable shelf space for years. 
"A huge amount of company stock is being maintained UESP (Shell Procurement) say 
they don't own it and UESL say they don't either. 77fis has to he thrashed out and 
someone needs to resolve it. " (ABKUESL, 99,4: 1) 
A new bar code information system appeared to be the missing critical link between 
procurement, logistics, and the SAP management. The situation was far from perfect as the 
stock analysts (from Procurement) independently took decisions processing goods into the 
Altens warehouse inventory. Because this took so long and information was out of date, 
the analysts got it wrong with the inevitable consequence on stockholding. 
Despite this, understanding in other areas had improved. It had been generally recognised 
that the initial 1999 KPI's did not accurately reflect performance and needed to be more 
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specific. The new series was jointly discussed to ensure that subjectivity had been 
removed. Operating managers and supervisors had to agree performance milestones, 
quality assessment, productivity, safety and environment issues. These results were to be 
reported monthly and posted on notice boards in the two bases. 
Preliminary information concerning 1998 cost savings shared by the three companies was 
announced. According to SNIL, parts of the jigsaw were missing with particular reference 
to UESL's vessel costs and the final charges levied on the Business Units. UESL could 
never disclose these costs, to do so would have infringed anti-trust legislation 
"We don't understand the whole picture, particularly in terms of overheads against the 
assets. There has to be a charge for all the Shell people in Logistics and if you add all that 
on top of the costs then it is going to look pretty expensive to the business units. " 
(CKSNIL, 99,5: 4) 
5.4.5 Reflecti(in and Learning 
The alliance motivation was to make best use of assets and reduce operating costs so as to 
cut charges to the Business Units. This was a pragmatic move UESL to outsource non-core 
business while maintaining a degree of control. UESL personnel were slow to pull back 
completely, because of their historic role building up systems and infrastructure, although 
by this time management of these assets they had officially been handed over to SML. 
UESL was continuing to withdraw both physically and intellectually. Attitudes had to 
change and the UESL organisational structure was adjusting as well. The SCA structure 
was reforming to reflect the increased scope of SML's work. 
One of the important things learnt was that early problems which remained unresolved, 
were likely to continue to arise from an absence of specific objectives. The parties also 
needed to agree the formalities as to how the alliance would operate. A clearly articulated 
and structured plan was essential, to draw on the talents of the stakeholder community. In 
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addition, monitoring and coordinating mechanisms were needed, to provide basic ground 
rules and performance expectations and to audit progress. 
Alliancing was a rapidly changing scenario. As relations evolved flexibility was required 
to deal with unforeseen events. Common understanding and flexibility at the alliance 
interface helped to bridge the gap between practice and execution of the service. 
5.4.6 Summary and Transition to Stage IV 
Throughout the duration of the alliance, ARRC has provided a first class service to its 
UESL customers. Unfortunately, conflict between SML and ARRC, which had always 
been simmering, erupted from time to time. For its part, ARRC's managing director spent 
nearly all of his time worldng on SCA issues and, as the latter only amounted to about 20% 
of his overall business, he was beginning to question the alliance concept as a whole. Lack 
of trust remained the major issue between SN11L and ARRC. 
Objectives for 1999, prepared jointly by the core team in late 1998 and set out in the 
alliance strategic plan, aligned each organisation's vision of the future. 
By the latter part of 1998, energy, the notable feature of the SCA, had largely dissipated. 
This may be have been due in part to the Christmas holidays but more significantly, SMEL's 
efforts had to return to tendering for work essential to its business. 
Over-commitment by SML on boats had undermined its authority to make independent 
decisions within the Halliburton group. Other uncertainties resulted in a loss of morale on 
the part of SCA members. UESL was concerned about SML's financial position due to 
over commitment on vessels, so much so that it requested a guarantee from the parent 
company to mitigate the risk. 
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SAP continued to cause problems. The warehouse SAP module required dedicated 
personnel and well designed methodology to work to its full potential. Lack of initial 
training of ISC contractors had not helped the situation. 
The structure of the SCA was changing, in as much as the bulk of the business revolved 
around boats, leaving little in it for ARRC. It had been suggested that there were not 
enough clear signals to the market endorsing UESL support for pooling of the fleets. SML 
requested that this should change. 
EU anti-trust legislation mitigated against vessel commingling (pooling) in the sense that 
UESL was not permitted to divulge cost information to SN1L and could only talk in terms 
of averages rather than disclosing actual figures (see 5.4.4, page 204#2). This meant that 
SNIL decisions were based on limited knowledge. 
Despite the foregoing and looldng at the overall picture, the conclusion seemed to be that 
on the whole the SCA had been operationally successful. There was a much clearer 
division of work now that the conflict concerning the role of asset and base managers had 
been resolved. 
internal restructuring in UESL had had a major impact on the SCA. The customer focus 
had changed requiring that UESL loosened its previously hands-on, operational role in the 
alliance. This did not diminish the importance of the alliance, although it could affect the 
SCA structurally in the sense that as UESL became less involved, allowing SML and 
ARRC to manage the logistical operations, which is effectively outsourcing. 
From the outset UESL had been fully involved, both operationally and strategically. For 
the most part, the contractor had depended on UESL personnel for guidance, financial 
support and provision of infrastructure. Interpersonal relationships had reflected 
fluctuating confidence in accordance with the degree of information exchange, perception 
of partner's integrity and general communication, at any one time. The champion's role as 
change agent had been of paramount importance at this time. 
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A standardised performance report was in place, which was intended to enable ARRC and 
SN1L to get on with running the alliance and to minimise waste of time in troubleshooting. 
Consequently, transaction costs in terms of control was expected to reduce. 
In an attempt to move away from the current method of encouragement based on budget 
reduction, an alternative cost model was being considered which meant a more equitable, 
performance related, gainshare approach. 
Improved cost understanding reinforced personal relations. The glue holding the alliance 
together was the expectation of trust and openness. Ideally these should have allowed the 
client to monitor and evaluate, leaving SML and ARRC to operate and promote the 
alliance. 
There was still a great deal of mistrust within the alliance and accusations of absence of 
commitment. People were being pulled out of meetings at the last minute and there was 
continual pressure on SML from Halliburton to divert the emphasis onto tendering for other 
new work. This stretched the resources of the small existing management team. 
Nevertheless, the structure of the alliance was still evolving and undoubtedly would look 
quite different in the future. It had to be remembered how important the impact of the 
external environment was on the SCA and that this would continue to be so in the future. 
The transition to Stage IV was characterised by a drive to formalise rules and procedures 
concerning collaboration, see table 5.8. Confirmation of last year's figures (1999) was 
currently being sought from SNIL. ARRC had already complied and had submitted like 
information. 
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Table 5.8: Transition from Stage III to Stage IV 
5.5 STAGE IV: Duration June 1999 to January 2000 
Table 5.9, illustrates dominant charactenstics, inductively derived from data gathered 
during participant observation in the fifth stage of the SCA alliance. 
STAGE IV 
Characteristics drawn from SCA data 
Changing attitudes towards the alliance in both Cooperating cultures 
companies 
Some shared values 
Problem solving and analysis skills 
Understand operations in each com 
0 Developing alliance skills 
incremental problem solving 
Joint projects produce innovative solutions 
Nc%% car)abilities develWinp- 
0 Transfer of knowledge and 
Improvements routine in day-to-day business 
Wnrkfnrre invnlvement ininmveq nneratimr. 
Joint innovation and continuous improvement 
0 Joint learning, tacit and 
0 Process alignment at interface 
0 Re-define goals and objectives Strategic review 
0 Opportunity for the alliance to become truly Step change 
strategic 
0 Adapt to external and internal dynamics 
0 Operational objectwes achieved' 
9 Joint strategic plan fo next alliance period 
Table 5.9: Dominant Characteristics in Stage IV 
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5.5.1 Cooperating Cultures 
Evidence was growing that norms within the alliance companies were converging to align 
cultures and change values. This was quite a cultural shift, as initially UESL had been 
principally concerned with savings. Now the focus shifted towards understanding business 
drivers as a means of reducing cost. UESL was actually interested in the contractors' well 
being, how SML and ARRC were doing things and where they were going. Alliancing was 
now a part of the UESL culture although a few years ago no one would ever have thought it 
possible. 
Mff, is growing intellectually, as we both are. At one time, although we were urging SML 
to lookfor new business, it soon becmne apparent that itsfirst priority was to retain the 
business it already had It was veryfrustratingfrom ourpoint of view until we realised that 
if SML hadn't kept that core business, costs would have gone upfor us. Now that they've 
re-bidfor existing contracts, they're again starting to searchfor new business 
(SSLKUESI,, 99,17: 4) 
5.5.2 Development of Alliance Skills 
"Alliances are interesting, if only that lots of people learn many things. Yhey stretch 
people's imaginations and the way they think about things. 7hat's what adds 
value. "(SSLKUESL, 99,18: 5) 
As a result of the alliance, UESL personnel who possessed excellent technical skills, 
learned a new sets of skills, including innovative thinking and teamwork. For its part, SML 
grew in confidence and developed its management capability. Competencies were 
continuously improving. Not only was SML improving performance in terms of 
management skills and professionalism but it was also honing its ability to measure 
performance. SML had learned from UESL how to become more competitive and had 
taken on board some of UESL's management techniques for safety on the bases. For its 
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part, UESL developed business improvement sIdlls by learning to analyse and evaluate new 
ideas and convincingly sell business cases. 
It took SML a long time to understand what the big gain would be. Initially, the prize was 
sharing cost savings between the partners. The real value for SMEL was that it had 
developed skills to be used to manage not only UESL's, but other multi-nationals logistics 
business as well. 
Shell personnel learned to understand how alliances evolved and how to manage them. 
"At the beginning, we helped the contractor to change ftom being just a body shop to 
become a management contractor. 7hen we moved to the first set of incentives. We went 
ftom crisis to a period of relative stability and to the next stage of growth and 
development. " (SSLKUESL, 99,14: 7) 
in general termi, the development could be simply summed up by saying that UESL's 
approach had been transýferred to the partners. The alliance introduced its own culture and 
helped transform customer/supplier relations for the better. UESL learned that there had to 
be hands on involvement by the Business Units and that it needed to re-align the entire 
logistics department to customer requirements. The alliance had demonstrated that, in the 
absence of alignment of goals, there was no real alliance. This was the common thread that 
ran through all activities involving the parties in the alliance. 
5.5.3 Joint Innovation and Continuous Improvement 
Innovation was a function of maturity and the business improvement teams were the 
vehicles to drive innovation. 
While all three parties, UESL, SML, and ARRC had a long standing reputation and 
experience of this industry, all were keenly interested in improving initiatives within their 
particular organisations. 
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During the early stages of the alliance, the main effort was to reduce costs. By cutting 
labour and imposing strict controls, savings had been realised. All three parties were 
continually monitoring processes to ensure that they continued to improve and add value. 
These principles had to be transferred to alliance activities. Opportunities had been seized 
by pooling resources, and harnessing and unifying the separate strengths of the allies. 
Many UESL people (2000) were now working on aspects of logistics that added value, 
rather than on day to day logistical operations; one of the reasons for embarking on the 
alliance. Things had changed dramatically within the alliance. Initially the objective was 
to get SMI. to move onto the base, so as to reduce costs and manage Torry and Altens. 
Now relations had improved to such a degree that UESL was suggesting that SML worked 
in direct contact with the Business Units. UESL would have been just be another client 
rather than an active SCA member and discussions had taken place regarding transfer of 
Shell staff to SML. The idea was that these UESL employees would assist SMI, in 
developing expertise, while at the same time UESL's skills would, if anything, have been 
sharpened. 
In general terms, the alliance had promoted improvement and challenged people's thinking 
It had made them look closely at other contracts and instigated new ways of working, as 
well as providing a stimulus to other aspects of current activities. 
5.5.4 Joint Tacit and Explicit Learning 
So far, much of the knowledge gained in the alliance had been tacit. This included, but was 
not only limited to, details of the alliance partners business, communication, joint 
objectives and tactically how to achieve them. Of crucial importance were accessible 
comprehensive accounts and performance indicators. 
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5.5.5 Process Alignment at Interface 
SML and ARRC realised they needed to work more closely together. A monthly informal 
forum was in place where the workforce could air its views. Attended by SML's operations 
manager and the IMD of ARRC, it was aimed at smoothing the change process. It also 
allowed a two way dialogue between the workers and management, to explain to the 
workforce the purpose of the SCA and how important its contribution was. So far, the 
meetings had worked well and as long as management attended and took action to resolve 
real issues, it would continue to be an eZective medium for exchange. 
Communication was much better and the operations team met weekly to discuss key issues 
from the past and for the future, listing actions and assigning personal responsibilities for 
resolving problems. 
UESL and SML had proved that they were able to work together. The time had come to 
concentrate on the stability of the alliance by broadening SUL's scope and by 
concentrating on management of supply vessels. 
5.5.6 Strategic Review 
SN1L was now well established in Altens Base. ARRC had made significant investments in 
transport and improvements were expected in the near future. 
Logistics required to have a longer term planning horizon and it proposed to achieve 
financial targets by more closely aligning services with the Business Units needs. In the 
past the Business Units had had a bad reputation for not planning and for criticising 
Logistics. As part of radical internal changes, the Business Units had resolved to be more 
coordinated and were now looking at service requirements for the coming years. This 
experience would enable UESL to design incentives to reward alliance contractors fulfilling 
the Business Unit requirements. 
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For the first time, UESL internal customers were determining what they wanted from the 
logistics service. Operators on the two types of platforms, drilling and non-drilling, had 
different priorities. In the case of the former (drilling), on time and sometimes immediate 
delivery was demanded because 24 hour well operation was necessary due to the high level 
of investment. 
"Rewards will depend on howfast theY can get to Plalforms and satisfy our requirements. 
For excunple thejob may only be one visit afortnight; even so we make sure all the right 
stuff is on board Another may be saying, "although I need equipment on Mondays and 
zhursdays, if something goes wrong on Ffiday you need to get a boat to us on Saturday. " 
7he cost of that boat is miles less than the loss of oil revenue if drilling stops. - 
(SSMUESL, 99,5: 2) 
The general consensus was that the management report should have been made known to a 
wider audience as well as. to all stakeholders to raise awareness of the alliance 
achievements. 
"Ae weakness in the whole set tip is that we don't make the end user aware of our success 
in reducing costs by making savings. " (ABKSM1,99,6: 3) 
"We haven't adequately explained either the philosophy or strategy of what it is we're 
trying to do with the business units. We've not explained as well as we might have what 
the alliance is and where it is going. " (SSLKUESL, 99,14: 6) 
The message within SML was that the SCA was important to the company's survival. 
"The incentive that people have for increasing job security is to make the SCA work. 
Unless there's a high level ofterformance thenjobs will bejeopardised " (OKSNIL, 99,11: 3) 
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5.5.7 Summary 1997-2000 
The alliance environment had changed since the outset, due to the dramatic fall in the price 
of oil and the need to become leaner and more competitive. UESL was forced to re-define 
its entire strategy. The management structure of UESL had changed from being a series of 
functional departments, to becoming more horizontally and process oriented. 
Cross-functional improvement teams were the principal tools for bringing this about. The 
teams were made up of people from both client and contractor companies and the emphasis 
was less on individual effort and more on team activity. This cooperative culture relied on 
positively motivating people and encouraging the teamwork ethos. The inter-organisational 
teams were constituted so that people from separate organisations could develop new 
strategically significant capabilities. Aligning these skills with strategic objectives, meant 
that supply issues and business decision-making processes were integrated to maximum 
effect. In one year, the business improvement teams saved 115m. across the logistics 
function. 
Challenges facing UESL stemmed principally from continued turbulence in the industry, 
from the complexities of managing such a tenuous network and from an increasing sense of 
insecurity on the part of the workforce. Attempts to put collaborative philosophies into 
practice proved problematic, principally because staff within UESL and the wider Shell 
organisation had to deal with multiple changes occurring simultaneously. 
The essential ingredients of the UESL network were only partially acknowledged or 
understood i. e. what it was, what it was intended to do, what the costs, benefits and 
limitations were. Even though Logistics tried to improve supply chain relations, the 
adversarial attitude and behaviour on the part of UESL internal customers seemed to be 
aimed at exploitation of both UESL as well as contractors of long standing. That is, as long 
as the customer continued in the "old" way then everything was all right, but "don It ask us 
to change our attitude or behaWour. " In consequence the natural reaction of UESL was 
defensive and this was also passed on through to the network as a whole. 
220 
The alliance had helped SML grow significantly. Whereas at the outset of the alliance the 
company struggled to survive, now it had every opportunity to be a leader in its field. 
Confidence in SML and UESL had been boosted especially as savings had become 
apparent. Time and visible results made a big difference. Although turf protection took 
place, generally speaking, the relationship was good and much improved from the early 
days. 
Despite the history of conflict between SUL and ARRC, there seemed to be greater 
interdependence between the companies as they recognised that each had an important part 
to play in the alliance. Interpersonal trust had grown mainly due to the influence of one 
particularly charismatic person in the SML management team. Communication had 
improved in both formal and informal channels. 
Looking to the future, anticipated changes in the external oil and gas industrial environment 
did not appear so radical as to upset the alliance. 
SML still found itself pulled in a number of directions, in terms of the SCA requirements, 
service to other oil companies and loyalty to Halliburton, the parent company. It was not 
surprising that UESL thought that SML had not focused enough on SCA business and, 
because SML was clearly under resourced, this probably would not change in the near 
future. 
Nevertheless, UESL and SML were becoming more interdependent. UESL had pulled back 
from the day to day operations and relied on SML and ARRC to demonstrate savings, in 
terms of performance. 
Alliance roles were changing. It has been put to SML that it had to manage everything, 
while UESL paid for the materials and labour it used. This was a move to eliminate 
UESL's fixed costs and tramfer the risk from UESL to SML. 
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Anyway one looked at it, the scenario was a complete turnaround for UESL and it was 
driven by the corporate cost cutting agenda. In order to become leaner, in reality UESL 
was taking the outsourcing route, using the alliance to ensure that at least some of UESL's 
values were transposed to the contractor organisations. In the volatile market environment, 
where the pace of change had to be quick, the alliance had proved in some instances, to be 
too slow moving and decision making, too cumbersome. 
The alliance contract had two years to run and, in terms of its development, the SCA was 
poised to return to the Stage L Indicators were: - 
* SML presented Project 2000 to increase scope of work in alignment with UESL s 
strategy. 
e SWs internal re-organisation explicitly recognised the importance of supply chain co- 
ordination. 
e SML Business Improvement Projects (BIPs) were in place to co-ordinate with UESL 
BIPS. 
* SCA potential was better understood. 
5.6 DEVELOPING CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK BASED ON SCA CASE 
On the basis of the evidence presented, the original conceptual framework had been 
enhanced in the following way. A fifth stage was added using the data from the alliance in 
Aberdeen, when a great deal of pre-alliance investigation took place over a period of nine 
months. I 
This stage has been termed Stage 0. The alliance contract was signed up for a five year 
period and still had two more years to run. As already mentioned in the previous 
paragraph, project 2000 was intended to increase the scope of this alliance, consequently, 
new objectives would be necessary to manage this change. Using the learning gained from 
the first cycle, the SCA alliance process was ready to return to Stage L 
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Both IDV/ Killeen and SCA case studies have shown the alliance cycle to be iterative and 
the feedback loop. in the conceptual framework, illustrates this point, see figure 5.1, 
Exploratorý. 
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Figure SA: [)e%-eloping Conceptual Framework 
Data gathering from both sites continued to inform the study and a third research location 
was subsequently pursued. 
The companies active in the third location were Sun Microsystems and Birkby's Plastics. 
Sun Microsystems' core products based on the UNIX operating system, are workstations, 
file servers, central processing units and related machines all of which are aimed at the high 
volume, data transaction market Birkbys Plastics makes mouldings at its Liversedge 
headquarters near Leeds, and, since 1996 in Glenrothes, Scotland. 
Analysis of primary data was illustrating stages in alliance development with particular 
characteristics within each stage. Using this as a guide, analysis of the secondary data 
began The alliance process between Sun Nficrosylems and Birkby's plastic has been used 
to test and inform the conceptual framework and this is the Subject of chapter six, 
c 
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